Below you will find an article from co-designers D. B. Dockter and Mark Herman on the design of their upcoming game titled Defiance: 2nd Russo-Ukrainian War 2022-?, which is available for P500 preorder from GMT as of this December. This article was originally published on Conflicts of Interest Online in April 2023, and you can find the link to their version of the article here. Onward! -Rachel
Background
Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, attempting to conquer a near abroad European republic in an effort to recreate a Russian empire. This was the same European republic, Ukraine, that had successfully freed itself yet again by overthrowing a Russia-backed leader during the 2014 Maidan Revolution. For many of us children of the 20th century, it appeared like some fascist fever dream attempt to “Make the USSR Great Again”: a cold war finally going hot. A big European War in 2022? Seriously? Would Putin actually invade Ukraine again and attempt to erase a nation state of 41 million Europeans?
Many of us have followed (or participated in) the story arc since the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine’s evolution into a Western republic, and the rise of Putin (see Putin’s Way: Frontline: PBS). And some of us followed the 2021 Russian build-up of 100+ BTGs (Battalion Tactical Groups) and other formations on the Ukrainian border. And, a few of us read Putin’s infamous July 2021 7,000 word essay “On the Historical Unity Between Russians and Ukrainians.” So, we had eyes on it.
The war has its roots in Russian Eurasianism, described by Marlene Laruelle, with one of its philosophical architects being Aleksandr Dugin. Russian Eurasianism is a call for an illiberal totalitarian Russian Empire to control the Eurasian continent—from Dublin to Vladivostok—to challenge America and Atlanticism. Russia’s war of “ethnic and cultural cleansing” of Ukraine represents just one continuing step in implementing that vision. More to follow in the Russian near abroad (see Baltic republics) if successful. Stay tuned.
Opposing that? An independent European republic, Ukraine, that precedes the founding of Russia by a few hundred years; a country that desires to become a part of Europe and not a satellite in some resurrected USSR led by a dictator. That’s the ideological context: a totalitarian expanding empire (think “House Harkonnen” for us Dune fans) vs. an independent European republic. It gets better.
So, the totalitarian regime tries to bum’s rush the republic, believing their own propaganda that the invader will be “Greeted as Liberators.” They pack a marching band for the scheduled glorious victory parade. The plan was to seize the republic’s capital, Kyiv, in 3 days, by utilizing a tried and true Red Army playbook (Prague 1968/Kabul 1979). Then, eliminate Ukraine’s leadership, suppress (“cleanse”) the resistance, topple the republic, and conduct a triumph worthy of Caesar to celebrate Russia’s great, new tsar. But the republic not only thwarts the plan, but, within six weeks, routs a vastly superior army (arguably top three in the world prior to war) out of the theater. How did this “Miracle on the Dnipro” occur?
A compelling story of resistance. And, as with any compelling story, fertile material to tell a tale. A book? A movie? An HBO series?
How about a military simulation (“wargame”) of the heroic struggle of Ukraine? The last one (designing a wargame of an ongoing conflict) is the fool’s errand the two of us embarked on in the summer of 2022: a first draft of history while the bombs were falling…a view of the military conflict unfolding as it was.
We began designing a wargame on the conflict within the first 100 days of Russia’s invasion. So, there was plenty of fog of war surrounding what actually occurred, plenty of ground to produce a simulation that events would subsequently and possibly make irrelevant, and plenty of fertile material for the sound and fury of social media to rage against. Wiser men and women would avoid. But not us fools.
A Fool’s Errand?
Historical military simulations (“wargames”) seek to provide students of them with a sandbox to better understand what happened and why. Or “What could have happened if different choices had been made?”: you be the judge. Designers of such simulations benefit from perspective (distance from the conflict) and being able to understand what actually happened using data/facts/stories, assuming that conflict is firmly buried in the past. Additionally, some of the immediate rawness of the conflict has passed/healed with time, so dispassionate perspective can be gained.
Modeling a hypothetical simulation gets a free emotional pass: the designer invents a story and the audience has little emotional attachment to the conflict. Modeling a conflict currently underway—headlines screaming with a daily litany of war crimes (such as Bucha)—blood on the streets…well, a designer tackling that subject gets no free pass. Tread carefully.
In 2010, GMT and designer Volko Ruhnke published Labyrinth: The War on Terror while the conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan were still occurring. Predictably, sound and fury ensued prior to publication, during publication, and post-publication. Many of the usual hobby horses were trotted out: “How can you do a game on a current war?”, “It’s not an accurate depiction of the nature of the conflict!”, “The game has a political viewpoint!” Yada, yada, yada.
Labyrinth won the Charles S. Roberts Best Post-WW2 Era Board Wargame in 2010. The game is the 53rd top ranked wargame ever published [per BoardGameGeek] and just produced a recent expansion. So, Mr. Ruhnke proved, along with other designers, that one could cover an ongoing conflict well.
Challenges? Yeah…a few…
Some challenges with modeling an ongoing major European war in the first part of the 21st century:
- PREMATURE LESSONS: Lessons drawn reflect what has been learned up to that point, which may prove to be actually the wrong inferences drawn from the conflict six months/six years/six decades from now.
- FOG: Data/facts are incomplete; that fog of war thing thickens as proximity to conflict increases.
- CHANGE: War has apparently changed, again!…Now, conflict is characterized by enhanced and expanded multi-domain war. For example, images/pictures/field intelligence is uploaded to social media (Twitter, Telegram, etc), crowdsourcing geeks pour over it/analyze it/amplify it, and it in turn impacts the actual operational campaign and related information war – which in turn impacts the strategic will of the competing sides (for example, see #OSINTGuild224 on Twitter)…There’s a 24-7 integrated NATO/Ukraine intel net…And, the age of drones has arrived. Plus, war economics are radically changed. For example, consider one $78K Javelin missile (or a sub $1k drone!) destroying a $3M T-80 tank. That math won’t hunt for an attacking force.
- PROXIMITY: The Russo-Ukrainian War is playing out every day and will likely continue until a dramatic, possibly horrific, conclusion occurs. This war ends in the bunker (mad tsar deposed) or battlefield (Russian army mutinies yet again). Negotiating with a fascist dictator on the march has historically proven to be a poor choice (see Munich 1938). So, the war is in our face reminding us of the horrors of WW2 and what could have happened not long ago (a cold war going hot…that The Day After thing).
- MODEL: What is a decent strategic operational model of this particular conflict? Who has that? What existing models can be tweaked? Is there anything we can beg, borrow, or steal?
- EVOLUTION of this CONFLICT: The war began with a mad dash to Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Mariupol. Ukraine routed Russia in the Kyiv and Kharkiv campaigns, but Russia captured and held the other two locations. In the fall of 2022, Ukraine routed Russian forces in the Kharkiv oblast. Later, Ukraine liberated Kherson in grinding operational campaign. During the winter of 2023, Russia conducted a WW1 type trench warfare combat to capture Bakhmut. Since then, Ukraine initiated a slow, firm, smart operational push in on the southern front, while Russia began a push in the east in October 2023. Each operational campaign has been quite different.
One of us has four decades of experience in this space (modeling modern conflict), while the other has extensive contacts/experience with both Ukraine and Russia to help us manage the design challenges.
Gulf War
In 1983, Victory Games published the military simulations Gulf Strike and NATO: The Next War in Europe, following upon the success of SPI’s 1978 big game, The Next War.
Gulf Strike was designed to be a triphibious simulation to examine hypothetical conflict in the Persian Gulf. Seven years after its publication, one of its secondary scenarios became a reality, and the game for a short time was news. Herman’s favorite experience during the Desert Shield portion of the buildup was when he was on all the news networks, including a live interview on Fox. During one of the interviews the first question asked was “Why was I [Herman] trying to make money off the blood of dead Americans?” (and this from a Canadian news crew). Herman then mentioned that the game came out seven years earlier. The interviewer stopped the cameraman, looked at his notes, and then said, “Damn! Now I have to turn you from a scumbag into a seer.”
Without missing another beat, the interview restarted, and the first question was, “How did you have the foresight to do Gulf Strike?” Remember, if it bleeds, it leads.
In Herman’s subsequent book and numerous interviews, he indicated that a classified version of Gulf Strike was used the day of the Iraqi invasion to map out potential US policy reactions. At D+1 the report was delivered to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The story that is not well known is a week before Desert Storm (the offensive), the US Army used the game to look at their war plan, and the result was an Iraqi collapse within 96 hours. So, the more interesting story is Gulf Strike was considered a valid combat simulation by the DoD. One of the important features of Gulf Strike was its Theater and Operational level. When Herman subsequently did Flashpoint: Golan, he wanted to reflect the tremendous improvements in sensor-to-shooter architectures and how they would impact late twentieth century conflict. On February 24th, Russia invaded Ukraine, and we began to consider updating the Flashpoint system to examine early twenty-first century warfare.
A mid-June 2022 email and call
On June 13th, Herman received an email from a publisher wondering if he would be interested in doing a game on the war. The publisher was looking for something “simple/entry level.” That would not be us.
While we have collaborated on each other’s games, we’ve wanted to co-design a game for a bit. A quick phone call was placed by Herman to determine interest. Dockter had two issues with attempting the project:
- “I’m too close to the conflict: second generation Ukrainian, friends/family in the fight, and I’m busy trying to assist the rebel alliance in a number of ways. So, pass.”
- “And, I’m not happy with how modern conflict has been modeled at a strategic operational scale. The last decent design I’ve played is four decades old: The Third World War series by GDW. So, Mr. Herman, what model could we use for this war? Related, I have ZERO interest in developing something from scratch. So, hard pass.”
Herman’s response?
“Dr: This story needs telling—you can help tell it—and I’ve got a model that we can adapt. Promise. I’ve been designing modern strategic operational wargames for four decades. What I have in mind should work. And we’ve got a bench of highly interested play-testers, developers, and helpers for this game.”
And with that, off we went…roughing out a game….
Back to the Future: What are the major drivers/dynamics of the Russo-Ukraine war? First, what was Putin’s war plan? There’s a good depiction here by one of the whip smart Twitter war analysis geeks, @JominiW:
So how did it turn out; at least the initial phase we will model in Module 1? For that, we turned to Putin’s military strategist: General Gerasimov (of “little green men”/hybrid war fame). His construct of modern conflict was published in 2013. On March 5, 2022, we tweeted an assessment of Gerasimov’s implementation of his vision at that point: an epic failure.
There is some rich irony here. Russian army doctrine reflects RED WW2 doctrine, which does not remotely match how war is being conducted in this or the previous decade—or even General Gerasimov’s view of hybrid war.
Dynamics of the Conflict
Given how the war has turned out so far, what can we infer about why it played out the way it did? A few dynamics that we will reflect in our strategic operational model include:
Impacting both conflict participants…
Politics. We both love historical conflict simulations that bound military operations within political constraints. And, that political constraints respond to player choice and game developments. So, we’re building a number of political tracks that will provide/restrict operational capabilities.
Variable setup. We’re likely to get much wrong; such is the price of a first draft of history. Our planned answer? We’ll put a stake in the ground (our best guess jump off point): this is not a what if game, but rather a first draft of history. Players will choose which formations to activate and utilize in the critical first few turns through expenditure of Logistics Points (“the currency”…purchase of HQ chits, mustering, reinforcements, strikes, etc.). Base Logistics Points for each scenario will be adjusted by various political tracks in the strategic module.
A planned future expansion will include a base line starting scenario with four alternatives. A more Putin friendly/Putin appeasing White House/NATO? Lukashenko and the Belarusian military fully cooperate? Scenario RED. Earlier NATO aid to Ukraine and better prep by Ukrainian forces? Scenario BLUE. Two other scenarios tone down the extremes of each to complement our best-guess base case scenario.
Impacting Russia:
Boom. Basically, mid-20th century Red Army doctrine. MASSIVE artillery prep prior to taking ground. Go Grozny or don’t go at all. We think we’ve reflected the relative strength of Russian artillery forces in a number of ways.
A shortage of infantry. It appears due to Shoigu/ Gerasimov BTG lark, operational security and a desire to limit the political blowback from mobilization, Russia went “on the cheap” regarding infantry, failing to adequately staff up its BTGs with enough foot soldiers. Consequently, Russian formations are generally more brittle than Ukrainian units.
Combined arms? Huh? Lack of coordinated air/land operations. Lack of ability of Russia to establish air supremacy or even local air superiority will impact Russian offensive punch in our game. An outstanding recent article from CAN, “Russian Combat Air Strengths and Limitations: Lessons from Ukraine” by Justin Bronk dives into the air war aspect of the conflict.
Obsolete kit…to the point of putting “Javelin cope cages” on their constantly-exploding armored vehicles.
In-fighting. A lethal mix of contract, conscripts, and mercenaries. Inter-service and intra-service rivalry. The New York Times (March 31, 2022) reported that Russia lacked a central command for the operation for the first 45 days. Formations from four military districts, plus mercenaries, plus Russian national guard, paratroopers, and special forces. None of which integrate well with each other.
Miserable logistics. There’s a fantastic article regarding this at War on the Rocks, Feeding the Bear: A Closer Look at Russian Army Logistics and the Fait Accompli by Alex Vershinin (November 23, 2021). Essentially, Russian logistics are confined to about 50 miles or less from a railhead. As the war played out, there were a number of analysts, Trent Telenko (“the tire guy”) in particular, that focused on particular Russian logistical limitations. We’ve reflected this by placing fairly restrictive supply considerations on the Russian army.
Poor morale & lack of leadership. Significant leadership losses (and purges). No NCOs. Inability to react/adapt locally. Inability to conduct critical self-assessment.
Fifth column: A raid to kill Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy failed miserably, apparently with a tipoff from Russian intel services. However, Kherson is a great example of a treachery card that worked; the city was poorly-defended, and the key to its gates was provided to invading forces. Same with Nova Kakhovka.
Ethnic/cultural cleansing. Russia planned, permitted, and committed significant war crimes to increase morale of Russian population and its troops. Of course, this quickly hardened Ukrainian and NATO strategic will also.
Inability to conduct multi-brigade combined operations. Russia has not been able to effectively coordinate forces above the brigade/regimental level. Additionally, Russia has not demonstrated any significant offensive capability since the initial invasion: Bakhmut was pure meat vs metal effort which bled the Russian army white and eventually contributed to Prigozhin’s infamous march on Moskva.
Impacting Ukraine:
HIGH morale. Putin’s invasion managed to do to something previously thought impossible: unify Ukraine after hundreds of years of disunity. We’ve reflected this (and the item below) by giving Ukrainian units generally higher technical troop quality.
NATO-trained. Since Ukraine’s successful overthrow in 2014 (the Maidan Revolution) of Russia’s puppet leader, NATO has been training Ukraine’s built-from-scratch army. However, the Ukrainian army still exhibits “Soviet mentality/doctrine” throughout a number of formations, so it’s a mixed bag.
Smart/flex defense. There was an abundance of Stingers, Javelins (or similar), and intel (crowd-sourced plus integration with NATO). And drones: Ukraine has dramatically and innovatively accelerated the impact of drones on the field of combat. We’ve reflected this with Ukraine’s HQ capabilities.
Minimal deep strike initially. At first, Ukraine lacked the artillery and weapon systems to attack deep. Early in the war, we witnessed The Farce of the Mysterious Polish MIGs. And there was a reluctance of NATO to risk widening the conflict. NATO had to go up the escalation ladder from non-lethal aid, to purely defensive, to limited heavier weapons, to heavy weapons (such as HIMARS). NATO is still reluctant to provide deep strike weapons or modern air defenses (such as Iron Dome).
Minutemen/Joan of Arc citizen army. Ukraine has stood up a citizen army (with a significant component of women on the front line) around a professional core while being invaded by a neighbor three times their population size. Citizens/partisans helped save Kyiv. We’ve reflected this with a “wolves mechanic”: Ukrainian units pop up as the Russians push towards Kyiv.
Ability to conduct offensive operations with punch and flair. Ukraine had demonstrated some ability to push back hard during the 2014 invasion in Donbas—in particular, Zabrodskyi’s raid. We saw signs of that during the first six weeks of the campaign, 1st Tank Brigade in particular. In early September, Ukraine unleashed “Operation Kupcake” (Kupiansk, etc) and rapidly captured territory southeast of Kharkiv. Similarly, a slow, smart, firm push liberated Kherson. So, Ukraine has demonstrated offensive punch. Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive has slowly pushed forward against a determined Russian entrenched defense.
Impacting NATO:
Unified. USA-led, with STRONG backing from the UK, the Baltic republics, and Poland in particular. In fact, the mad tsar had done something impossible post the previous USA presidential administration: not only did Putin’s invasion unify NATO, but it precipitated NATO expansion (Finland, Sweden, and eventually Ukraine).
Prep. There was some warning and some preparation provided to Ukraine. NATO had been training the Ukrainian army since 2014 and ramped up assistance under President Biden in the fall of 2021 and just prior to start of the war. The information war conducted by Biden (ex: disclosing of intelligence), NATO, and Ukraine (outstanding social media campaigns) caught Russia off guard and set the stage for Russia’s lopsided defeat in the information war. Imagine what a Putin-friendly White House would have cost Ukraine on the run up to war. You’ll be able to game that particular scenario.
Eyes wide open. The West had to get past appeasement policies favored by some and European energy/economic integration with Russia. Most difficult, a disbelief of Putin’s Eurasian empire plans had to be overcome. And, many Western republics were/are battling their own fascist/fascist sympathetic minority parties.
Aid ladder. NATO began with almost providing non-lethal aid, then purely defensive light systems. They had to work up an “aid ladder/track” to supply heavy/deeper strike weapons and defenses. Russian war crimes significantly increased strategic will of NATO to march up that ladder.
Limited response. On Day One, NATO/USA indicated no troop involvement and a desire to NOT supply Ukraine with weapons that could actually hit Russia. So, that was a clear constraint on Ukraine’s ability to respond to the aggression.
Let’s stop there; it’s already a long list.
So, as with all things, one would need to break this into bits—to “bucketize.” There is a BIG need to distill. Less is more, as is often the case with the bone-crushing/soul-destroying experience of trying to simulate conflict dynamics with an elegant and engaging design that produces a compelling narrative.
So, which Strategic Model? Days of Dis? Great Statesman? A Hybrid?
So, what do we want players of the simulation to be able to manipulate? How much do we want them to be a victim of the strategic situation? A few wargames contain engaging strategic models within which the operational model rests. A number of these we like: Triumph of Chaos, CoA, 2005 (we’re biased) or Days of Decision, ADG, 1990 (which both built off Persian Gulf, GDW, 1986) utilized cards to push/pull “factions” and “tracks” to one side, which could work. Or, something from Churchill or Pericles (we’re biased), GMT—where players manage fronts/theaters. We’ve stolen from all (as Ted Raicer has said, ”Good designers steal. Bad designers invent.”).
Basically, we’ve designed a game with a strategic map and an operational map. The operational map “sits within” the strategic map. They are interrelated. We’ve settled on less player control of strategic events and more being on the receiving end of them. There’s some modest ability to nudge in one direction or the other, and there’s a relationship to events occurring on an operational map. And a bunch of interconnected strategic tracks, which in turn unlock or restrict capabilities. All with a small rulebook footprint. For Module 1, we’ll likely hold back the strategic map and roll that out as an expansion—assuming the game is well received/much played.
How the Sausage Gets Made…
So, how are we attempting to tackle the challenge of producing a wargame on a current conflict?
First, research, research, and more research. One of us stood up a Twitter feed seconds after the war began and scraped OSINT data on the web regarding the conflict.
Besides the incredible social media campaign being conducted by Ukraine to galvanize support (“strategic messaging”) and attack on Russian strategic will, it is clear that junkyard analysts are crowdsourcing intel for the resistance. Those junkyard analysts have provided some outstanding insight. A sampling below:
The open-sourced metrics, firsthand accounts, and analysis regarding the war spew like a fire hose every day. We supplemented that with on-the-ground reports from our Ukrainian/Russian contacts as it happened. Same was the case regarding the buildup prior to the war, beginning in the fall of 2021. Cataloging, distilling, and capitalizing upon insights gleaned from the data is required to produce a strategic operational simulation of what did happen and what could have happened (that which survives the infamous giggle test).
We’ve put together a reference list of bits of analysis that have most shaped our design (included at the end of this article).
Basic Simulation Model
Using a strategic and operational map model will allow us to embed the various operational offensives within a theater context, as Herman did with Gulf Strike. The idea is to cover each of the offensives not as ‘what if’ excursions, but as the first draft of history within a year of their occurrence. This way we can use the best information available to try and gain an understanding of how and why things resolved themselves. As of the writing of this article, we think we have a relatively accurate, but not precise, understanding of the failed Russian attack on Kyiv (less so with Chernihiv). We have pretty decent research on the failed campaign to take Odessa and the liberation of Kherson. We are developing an understanding of the battles in the East and #OperationKupcake. So given that, what have we learned since the 1990s?
Flashpoint Golan
Our first conclusion is large conventional operations haven’t changed that much from expectations developed during the end of the twentieth century. The United States has invested huge quantities of treasure and brainpower in developing what the Russians first called the reconnaissance strike complex. The DoD who invented it stole the branding and called it the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Flashpoint: Golan was designed to simulate the RMA. At its core, if a battalion or larger unit moves it will usually be seen and if seen it will be struck by long range fires. The side with the information advantage prevails. From everything we have seen in the current conflict, this not only holds true but is now augmented by cheap swarms of drones. This was predicted in work that Herman collaborated on with the late Admiral Cebrowski, who used a Herman article on munitions-based warfare and rebranded it, “network-centric warfare.” Network-centric Warfare predicted that information would enable swarming tactics, which the Ukrainians (with their small hunter-killer teams) have proven to be correct.
One of the non-surprises is the enduring effectiveness of long range artillery and missile systems. In the early phases of the war, the Russians had a significant advantage in long range systems that will be reflected in this first volume’s (module’s) order of battle research. As we do additional operational modules on campaigns in the east and Kherson front, you will see this Russian advantage erode and perhaps be surpassed by the Ukrainians. Another long range fires lesson is one that was witnessed during the Gulf War. After the initial US stikes on Iraq, the US stocks of precision munitions were being expended at a prodigious rate. After Day 3 of the Shock and Awe air campaign, the US began using ‘dumber’ munitions to preserve the high-end munitions for the ground offensive that was to come. What we’ve seen is the Russians have gone through a similar evolution. At this time (Spring 2023), they are mostly using ‘dumb’ munitions.
To accommodate all of this, Defiance: 2nd Russo-Ukrainian War 2022-? will have drones added to the Flashpoint detection mechanics while streamlining the procedures. The current simulation already uses the full spectrum of long range fires, but they will be tweaked for hypervelocity and some of the newer classes of missiles.
Other changes from Flashpoint: Golan include:
Logistics Points: Players get LPs each turn to decide how to spend on activating formations, generating replacements, and a few other items.
Variable capabilities for each formation HQ: A chit is drawn for each HQ which provides it with a range of capabilities. The composition of the capabilities is reflective of command abilities and limitations of each side.
Streamlined air campaign & strike weapon rules: We’ve abstracted the air campaign/strike weapon dynamic to keep the emphasis on the ground campaign.
Partisans/5th columns/etc: Enemy units pop up and cause some chaos.
SitRep Cards: A card will impact the overall strategic situation each turn that the operational campaign occurs within by impacting various political tracks. The political tracks produce penalties and bonuses for each side.
Chit Cup: Formation chits, momentum, bonus/penalty, random event ,and variable turn ending chits are drawn by each player to determine how the turn plays out.
Supply: Russia is a logistic train bound army. Accordingly, supply rules reflect significant constraints on the invader.
Hopefully, coming soon to a theater near you…
Defiance will go on preorder in December 2023, and, with any luck, be published in 2024. Of course, life could intervene. Or, the war could go in a truly horrific direction and expand well beyond its current area of conflict. Or some other event on the Richard Berg random events table could pop up. Barring that, we’ll see if our fool’s errand is successful: if a compelling story is told well. And, maybe, a decent strategic operational model is produced for students of this fight of a European republic against a Eurasian fascist aggressor. Will Putin be thwarted? Will a European republic prevail? All is still unknown in late 2023. But it’s fantastic fertile ground upon which to tell a tale.
Example of play…Turn 1…Outbreak of war…
The Russian player begins Turn 1 with an air assault on Hostomel. Two small airborne units from the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade attack the airbase. Ukraine fails to detect the units with any Ukrainian HQ (special turn 1 rule) and Russia receives a -2 drm on their attack roll.
Combat strength of attacker (Russian) is 8…defender is 2…Battle Odds of 4-1…in a town. All units are Normal morale. Russian rolls a 5…applies a special turn 1 initial air assault drm of -2 to make the die roll 3 (in this game, low rolls favor the attacker). Per the Battle Resolution Table (BRT), the result is a “5” TQ (troop quality) check for the attacker and a “7” TQ for the defender. Meaning…Russia checks his two units and both have TQ’s of 7…they pass their troop quality check. However, the Ukrainian Territorial Defense unit has a TQ of only “4.” Since that is less than the “7” TQ generated by the BRT, the Ukrainian units fails…flips (reduces TQ to disorganized) and retreats a hex. Russians advance and occupy Hostomel.
The Ukrainian player then attempts to successfully react unit(s) to the air assault. The player rolls a die, consults a reaction table, and is able to react a unit from the 4RRB. The unit moves out, crosses a river at Irpun, and considers attacking Hostomel or awaiting reinforcing friendly units. The Ukrainian player decides to wait.
The Russian player then decides whether to attempt another air assault on an airport south of Kyiv but decides against it.
Play then proceeds as normal with the Russian player using a HQ activation chit selected during the Strategic Phase which allows the 35th Army to activate. A 1st Tank regiment of the 35th Army crosses the border and attempts a river crossing. A draw from the Ukrainian VOVK (partisan/SOF) cup is triggered. The Ukrainian player reaches, pulls a unit out. Unfortunately, it is a low quality unit: a combat strength of “1” and TQ (troop quality) of “3.” The Russian player checks the random HQ capabilities chit associated with the 35th Army for this turn to support the attack.
The chit indicates the HQ could use electronic (detect and jam) capabilities. Jamming & detection works against enemy HQs—none are within range—so, no applicable HQ capabilities of use at the moment. A HQ chit with battlefield or missiles capabilities would have helped but likely wouldn’t have been needed given the imbalance in the upcoming battle. The HQ capability chit remains with the HQ for the entire turn.
The Ukrainian player lacks an HQ within range, so no help for the lone VOVK unit.
The subsequent combat eliminates the Ukrainian unit, and advancing Russian units move into Chornobyl, triggering another draw from the VOVK cup (whenever a Russian unit enters an unoccupied Ukrainian controlled town, forest, or bridge, the Ukrainian player draws a chit). The subsequent battle at Chornobyl is another Russian walkover, and the Red Army rolls south towards Hostomel and Kyiv…
Defiance: 2nd Russo-Ukrainian War 2022-? Reference List: Part 1: Fall 2023
Defiance: 2nd Russo-Ukrainian War 2022-? Reference List: Part 2: Fall 2023
Playtest Counters: Fall 2023
Playtest Map: Fall 2023
Author: D. B. Dockter and Mark Herman
Great idea to publish. Cannot wait for it. Cannot think of a better designer than Mark Herman. As war progesses hope Mark and his team will bring out subsequent module updates.
Thank you for your kind feedback.
I think that almost two years in we recognize the similarities between the American Civil War and this war. Yes, there were some exciting tactical fights in the beginning and a lot of marching but ultimately, once the maneuver phase failed to deliver a victory, we have ended up in a rather conventional war of attrition.
For the war of attrition, there seems to me, to be several factors that have to be tracked and which are inter-related; national morale (both sides seem equally motivated), manpower (advantage Ukraine early on when they did a full mobilization / advantage Russia long term due to the disparity of numbers), economy (advantage Russia / they are generating more new weapons and ammunition than Ukraine and her allies), finance (advantage Russia / they have more cash reserves while Ukraine is reliant upon western support), intelligence (both sides seem to have equal capability) and technology (This shifts as each side escalates and deploys new systems / Initial advantage to Russia until stingers and javalins showed up / followed by Russian advantage in cyber and EW / followed by the deployment of HIMARS and precision NATO fires, et cetera)
But there is also the operational struggle for air superiority (as Ukraine runs out of radars and ammunition they lose the ability to protect their units. Western kit is good but was not really designed for the mission in Ukraine because the west relies upon aircraft for air superiority. The is also the operational struggle for logistics, fires and long range missile fires. Russia is trying to take down the Ukrainian electrical grid and Ukraine is trying to take out the Kerch Bridge and Russian economy. Lots of SOF that strategically are irrelevant but which impact the operational.
So, you are designing a tactical game but I think you should be looking instead at a strategic/operational game. Whatever you do, I shall be fascinated to see what you come up with.
Thank for the thoughtful post.
Ukraine 2022! Module 1: Miracle on the Dnipro is at the strategic operational scale. Each module (assuming the first well received) will deal with a particular operational campaign (that sits within the larger strategic dynamics – our political tracks). Basic formation is brigade – with its battalions. Sides draw a chit and activate a formation (there are other chits in the “cup of chaos” – Berg random event chit, turn enders, etc).
Russians call brigades, “armies” – but these are not your grandfather’s WW2 Red armies.
Delicate subject matter but if anyone can handle it with the respect and attention-to-detail it deserves, it’s Mr Herman. Wonderful read.
I have two requests:
1) Please have solo method to play the Russians, or the game will never be played.
2) Please include the “Russian Warship, Go F*** Yourself” Snake Island hero moment in the game. May I suggest the box cover. 😉
Wonderful read and I wish you both the best during the design process.
Thank you for the kind feedback.
We are planning to have a bot for both sides.
Cover? Undecided yet, but, have some ideas.
This is a bold and ambitious step for wargaming, and the designers certainly seem to bring the bona fides to elicit excitement in the community for this production. Nothing would make me happier than one day to see that “playing through” a thesis becomes almost as natural as reading any article or series of articles carrying the same. But there are also real stakes to mainstreaming the representation of contemporary issues in game format. This seems true especially when, to my knowledge, such a production as this is for profit. If there’s a publisher I trust to take this topic on, it’s GMT. But that’s not a pass; that’s simply a hope that they can rise to the level needed to do this right. It’s a tough act. And GMT has a recent history of pulling a game from production if there is a certain type or level of community/optics pushback (I am uncertain what the combination is here.) So it will also be a learning process I’d imagine as it continues to explore where it will draw its own lines. Here’s hoping we get a game that constructively challenges its audience and breaks new ground the right way: with an abundance of humility that allows future projects like this one to come out.
Thank you for your comments.
I can assure, Mark & I, that we are not “doing this for profit”. Evidence? All in per hour rate? We may hit minimum wage…maybe. Easy to do the math…take copies x retail rate x royalty rate divided by hours invested.
Safe to say, Mark and I, after a number of decades in our professional fields, earn more than minimum wage. So, why if profit is the motive invest the time (the expected value equation is sub optimal) and take the noise? The same with GMT…much SAFER (no baggage) and more profitable subjects to produce games on exploding kittens, some euro without soul, WW2, or something without 32 pages of rules plus 32 page playbook, etc. It is just too much hassle (the sound and fury on the discussion boards) relative to economic returns to do a complex military simulation on an ongoing war.
However, as we state in the article, we think, along with GMT, it is a compelling story that should be told.
Additionally, we think we have some insight regarding modern multi-domain conflict and the revolution that has occurred in warfare. Mark has pretty convincing track record on that account (ex: Gulf Strike).
Many will not think we have that insight – or have qualms about content on this subject. If so, steer clear. Spend your hard earned money elsewhere.
Hi guys,
If you need play testers, I would be absolutely thrilled to participate in any manner you folks see fit. I cannot imagine a better design team, and I see great things for this title! Some of the comments above demonstrate a fascinating perspective on the current conflict. Of course, the Russian State perspective is not necessarily the perspective of the Russian people, particularly those minorities doing most of the dying
Thank you RC: we’ll drop you a line and take you up on that offer.
YES!
I look forward to the module in this series that will deal with this summer’s (2023) Ukrainian offensive.
With regard to your comments about the disparity of resources between Ukraine and Russia in the current conflict, I agree. Without Western support this war would have ended already in Russia’s favor. As this support begins to wane Ukraine’s future looks bleak. Ukraine could have had peace in April of 2022, but Zelensky listened to the West and disregarded the interests of the Ukrainian people. How many Ukrainians have died since Zelensky spurned peace who did not need to die?
Putin as a maniac? If you believe that I think you’ve spent too much time absorbing Western propaganda. Mad, Putin is not. You may not like him, but he is a canny strategist and seems to give careful consideration to his options before making a decision. Again, like it or not, Putin has gained a place as one of the great figures of Russian history. We live in interesting times.
As for the Nord Stream pipeline – cui bono seems a fair question to ask. The US government has hated this pipeline from the beginning, has threatened its destruction before this war started and, as you’ve noted, has reaped great piles of cash since its destruction. These facts suggest a motive and a perpetrator.
A NATO expeditionary force to Ukraine like the Allied effort against Germany in WW2? Seriously? That would require more effort than the West would be able to put forth presently, and if it did happen that would be WW3 and would be nuclear. Game over.
I think that the War in Ukraine is tailor made for a strategic, CDG, campaign game that focuses on DIME (diplomatic, information, military and economic) elements of National Power. At the start of the war the Russians attempted a quick maneuver war which failed. Russia then attempted to negotiate an end to the war and Ukraine, with help from the West, refused. The Russians launched the invasion with a technologically superior force that was well trained (by the standards of an Army that had not been to war in 40 years) and attempted shock and awe. In some cases they achieved their goals. They took alot of land and caused heavy casualties. However, their logistics broke down and they stumbled to a halt.
Ukraine then did a full national mobilization. Over the course of 2022 the Russians were rapidly outnumbered and their pre-war cadres were destroyed. This culminated with the Ukrainian summer / fall 2022 offensives which resulted in major gains in Kharkiv and Kherson. At this point the Russians finally realized that to avoid defeat they would also have to mobilize and that until they could bring the mobilized forces to the war they would need to go on the strategic defense. They hoped that Ukraine had exhausted their reserves and launched a winter offensive in late 2022 with forces composed mostly of volunteers released from jail and ethnic minorities. Mostly though, they increased the size of their forces to mirror Ukrainian mobilization. This went on until the Russians ran out of reserves with the spring thaw.
Ukraine spent the winter on strategic defense and expanded their army yet again and stood up new brigades. Please understand that a Ukrainian brigade has morphed three times already. They started the war with 3 infantry battalions, a tank battalion, an artillery battalion and a support battalion. First, they all became mechanized with whatever the west provided. This includes the territorial brigades. Second, a typical brigade now has four to five mech battalions, a light infantry battalion, a tank battalion, three artillery battalions and a support battalion. They are really small divisions. The Ukrainian forces also are decentralized. There are no division headquarters. There are essentially four corps headquarters/regional HQ that collectively command 40-60 brigades. The brigades are divided between services that have different political interests and priorities. There is the regular army from the the pre-war. This force has the tank brigades and mech brigades from the pre-war Army of 200,000. It has roughly 6 tank brigades and 10 mech brigades. Then there is the marine forces of the Navy. This is another 2-3 brigades. There is a separate airborne and air assault service with another four brigades. The territorial brigade force of roughly 20 brigades belongs to yet another service. And lastly, for the ground forces, there is the national guard with another 7 fighting and 8 regional brigades. The national guard is really a combination of the border guards, intelligence service, presidential protection brigade, ideological volunteer units like the Azov Brigade, foreign fighters (although some serve with the territorial force) and secret police. Each is fighting for equipment, manning and resources.
Ukraine then launched their summer offensive which I think failed due to lack of air superiority. In the process they chewed up alot of people, equipment and morale. The air superiority would be a key element to model in this war. Soviet doctrine was to substitute artillery fires for air power and to use integrated air defense to deny their NATO adversary the ability to mass fires by airpower. I am a minority but I think that Russian IADS are alot better than we think. So far we have seen the advantage in the air fight swing back and forth. Initially Russia had it when they took down Ukrainian C2. But once Ukraine addressed that issue the S-400 systems in Ukraine made it impossible for Russians to fly at altitude. And Stingers and other MANPADS demonstrated how vulnerable low flying fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft are. So, Russia responded with long range fires and cheap drones. Ukraine then responded with anti-radiation missiles and HIMARS to knock out radars in corridors to allow air application. Russia responded with SAM ambushes, EW and other techniques. Ukraine responded to this with MALDs and their own long range fires and drones. And it goes on back and forth. Soon F-16s will give Ukraine a short advantage.
Politically there is the struggle to maintain NATO will. Ukraine has to made progress in the war to keep NATO logistics flowing. Ukraine went to a full mobilization and as the casualties mount they are experiencing significant national will issues. Already many units don’t want to attack and there are reports of draft fatigue. The economy is beyond wrecked. Similarly, Russia also has war fatigue. The prisons have been emptied. There are continual mobilization waves. They are having to buy munitions on the world market. I have to wonder what deals are being made diplomatically to get munitions from Iran, China, and North Korea. Plus there was the Potemkin coup of the Wagner Group. This war has probably two to three more years to go but is a fascinating study.
Perhaps a title for this module might be “Summer of Triumph”. No? Maybe “Steppes of Illusion” would fit better.
Per my previous comment – I think the game you are designing is interesting but the game I would really like to see is strategic. I think that Vietnam 1965-1975 would actually work for a game design. They key players are Ukraine, Russia, the US and NATO. I would set different draft levels and their impact on reducing national morale. For example – no draft is 1-1 ratio of personnel versus population controlled. Limited Draft would be 2-1, Full Draft 3-1, Emergency Draft 4-1. Each would impact national morale each season. Limited draft might be -1 to national morale, full -3 and emegency -5. The population and supplies to create units would be similar to the current game. The Air War would have to be updated because it is more than fixed wing anymore. Artillery has become a big element. In Vietnam the Free World was limited to half firepower unless they declared a free fire zone. I think in Ukraine it would be a supply cost to fire at full artillery level. The Ho Chi Mihn Trail would become the Ukrainian Freedom Network. Essentially, the maturity of the network would determine how much of NATO and EU aid in the form of supplies makes it to Ukraine. Finally I would add cards for specific events on the battlefield. E.g. Russia cleaning out prisons would reduce draft level and Western volunteers would provide free population to Ukraine. US providing MALD would negate airpower losses for that season and reduce by 50% the next season and 25% the third season. The Russians would have SAM trap that would allow them to double Ukrainian air losses for one season. Nordstream Pipeline explosion would both reduce Russian organic supply production and reduce the morale of the EU while raising the national morale of the US, Ukraine and Russia. Similarly, Strategic bombing would either address the Ukrainian Freedom Network or Russian Supply Points. It would be an interesting game to play given the conflict is ongoing.
Reading through your assumptions and understandings of this conflict’s early stages and it looks like what you guys are going to produce is a playable annex to Ukrainian propaganda handouts. This game won’t age well if it is published, but it may turn out to be a collectors’ item. Like those misprinted stamps that are so valuable.
I agree comrade! Nazis will be driven out of Kiev in 3 days tops! Maybe 4…
Our liberators will be greeted with flowers, ribbons, and I guess some fucking free washing machines.
We’ll see how well you cope with reality when the wheels come off the Ukrainian war effort. When the Russian archives are opened we will see that most of the Ukrainian and Western understanding of this war has been propaganda based, with too many in the West suffering narrative intoxication.
Mike Johnson stop posting on this forum!