We intend to offer up our design notes regarding our simulation of the 2^nd Russo-Ukrainian War, Defiance, beginning with Volume 1: Miracle on Dnipro: Kyiv & Chernihiv Campaign, from time to time. Given that we are designing a simulation regarding an ongoing conflict, it’s a first draft of history. Consequently, at least you’ll get some insight into why we got some items wrong 🙂

In our third  article in this series, we discuss how we model combat during the initial six weeks of the 2^nd Russo-Ukrainian War. We’ll begin with a brief review of the Charles S Roberts classic CRT. Then, we take a look at CRTs in France 1944 and Flashpoint Golan, examining  the combat resolution system lineage of Defiance.  For a deeper dive into CRTs, check out Issue 36 of C3i: Mark Herman’s Clio’s Corner, Nr. 13 –  “Wargame CRTs or How to Resolve Chaos”.

As usual, we ramble on. So, feel free to break out a beverage of your choice. We always include a recipe for a cocktail, mocktail or appetizer at the end of each of our Defiance Design Happy Hour articles. This time, we go with the surprise early hit of 2024: the Shagroni (a shake on the classic Negroni).

Modeling Combat in Defiance

Overview: “…and then Charles S Roberts said let there be a 3 to 1 to win CRT…”.

3 to 1 (attacker odds vs defender odds) to win!. That’s what we were schooled on. If an attacker has a 3 to 1 advantage in combat strength (whatever is defined to comprise that), they win (except on a “1”…sometimes/it depends). Three views of that from Avalon Hill back in the day: a standard table, a play-by-mail (PBEM) using stock tables (in a galaxy a long, long time ago they were published in the paper along with baseball box scores and what not) and a combat table from The Russian Campaign.

You’ll notice a few things with the CRTs: no modifiers (die roll or column shifts…besides one for defending behind a river or city in some of the old Avalon Hill games).

In International Security, Vol 13 No 4 (Spring 1989), John J Mearsheimer authored an interesting piece: Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics.

Regarding the good ole 3:1, from that piece:

“Recently, however, Joshua Epstein published a criticism of others’ work that raises important methodological questions that merit close scrutiny. One of Epstein’s principal criticisms is directed against the well-known and widely accepted 3:1 rule of thumb….The 3:1 rule apparently emerged in Europe during the period between the Franco-Prussian War and World War 1. Brigadier General James E. Edmonds implies that this was the case in Germany…[assuming]…a position of ebernburtigen foe – that is a foe equal in all respects, courage, training, morale and equipment…a mid 1970s study performed by V Corps confirmed the 3:1 rule based upon a detailed analysis of 150 potential battle scenarios in the sector.…

The rule posits that the attacker needs a local advantage of at least 3:1 in combat power to break through a defender’s front at a specific point. Epstein purports to offer historical evidence that disconfirms the 3:1 rule. The 3:1 rule applies to just one aspect of a campaign, namely, breakthrough battles in which the attacker attempts to pierce the defender’s forward defenses. His criticisms, however, are not valid. Epstein’s case against the rule rests on misuse of a historical data base which is itself flawed.”

Fighting words. The article continues…

“…in a combat between forces of comparable quality, the attacker requires a large numerical superiority; otherwise he will collapse before the defender does, and the breakthrough attempt will be beaten. A combat unit collapses when battlefield losses destroy its cohesion, leaving it unable to execute its combat functions. The key to victory is to insure that the other side’s forces reach that threshold of losses first…”

The most popular measure [for assessing relative combat power] is  Armored Division Equivalent (ADE), a DoD measure that reflects the firepower, mobility, and protection of each force. The ADE does not capture differences in the quality of troops, but this does not significantly distort analyses of the European balance because the fighting skills of the troops in NATO and Warsaw Pact armies are roughly equal.

A few comments regarding the 3 to 1 CRT without modifiers…

It’s elegant design. No need to consult modifiers, just compute the battle odds (attacker divided by defender combat strength). Find the column on a chart, toss a six sider (or, in the old days, check out the volume of shares of stock sold – last digit – hundreds of shares…comical, considering the volume of shares sold today!) and apply the results. That simplicity helped make the Avalon Hill classics accessible.

The 3 to 1 CRT follows historical precedence…however. It represents “consensus view” based upon detailed analysis of combat results. Does it cover the preponderance of combat outcomes produced throughout history? No idea. How much of the range? No idea. It obviously doesn’t cover the outliers nor account for what produces outliers. The elegance of the 3 to 1 CRT is its limitation: no dials/levers to account for items that are frequently attributed to success (besides relative raw troop numbers).

The hobby evolved from the 3 to 1 CRT that helped start it (accessibility…low barrier to entry…small rulebooks!). While much has been written about this topic, if one just examines twentieth century military history, this hobby ‘fact’ has never been accurate. An outnumbered Japanese army captured Malaya in 1942. The Afrika Corps regularly prevailed at less than one to one odds. An outnumbered American Corps bent but didn’t break in the Ardennes in 1944 and survived. So, what mattered?

Quality, Time, Size and …Artillery

The Army Concepts Analysis agency that did an historical study regarding drivers of battle resolution determined that odds ratios, attrition, and other kinetic factors were minority factors. One of the reasons is unlike our beloved wargames, the soldiers on the ground cannot see the force ratio. Their perception of casualties is limited to what they can see and hear on a radio net. What has mattered since ancient times is the quality of the soldiers. Force ratio mattered in the pre-gunpowder era if you could not match the width of the enemy’s battleline, but only as it increased the chances of a flank being turned.

An analysis of World War II as represented in France 1944 (v1 Victory Games, 1986 and v2 Compass Games, 2020) acknowledges a statistical fact: modern artillery kills most. The higher the attacker force ratio, the higher number of attacking soldiers that are exposed to artillery, and the more dead warriors. The France 1944 CRT was controversial as it was not monotonic relative to force ratio. Sometimes facts and historical research creates inconvenient truths.

A outstanding new read in The British Army Review, Spring 2024, issue 187, “The Battle of Irpin River” supports the primary killer on the battlefield being artillery (well, prior to the age of drones, but, we believe it is still true even two years into the war). From that article, “It should come as no surprise that artillery played a pivotal role in the defense of Kyiv. As a means of combat it has a proven pedigree – inflicting 60 per cent of all casualties during World War I, 70 per cent of casualties on the Eastern Front during World War II and an estimated 85 per cent of the casualties suffered during Ukraine’s war in the Donbas in 2014-15. Known as the ‘King of Battle’, artillery’s reign endures, with some observers believing the current war has seen it hit figures as high as 80 to 90 per cent.”

A CRT is meant to create a model of combat that tells a story: Why does a particular game session battle resolves the way it does?. To be fair, the CSR 3:1 odds view of a battle is not so much a force ratio as a firepower ratio where the artillery and automatic weapons are being compared to the opponent’s equivalent capabilities. What that CRT is not saying is that having three soldiers to one is generating advantage. Rather, it is a metric of relative firepower. Another thing that this CRT is saying is that all battles are the same.

Contrast the standard CSR 3:1 odds with the France 1944 CRT:

• First, time. There is a clear distinction between a set piece battle (where the artillery has had time to deploy and register their guns) and a mobile battle (where armor with less indirect support is the dominant arbiter of the outcome).

• Second, quality. Using the historical data provided by countless studies, but most notably in the Concepts Analysis Agency research, troop quality and firepower dominate the outcome.

• Third, augmentation. In France 1944 troop quality as augmented by indirect support and the terrain determines whether an attack succeeds or fails.

• Fourth, size. Losses are an outcome of the battle but are driven by the size of the forces engaged and how they fared in the battle. Using the goldilocks principle, use too few and you inflict less losses. Too many and your losses are increased. If you use a force advantage in the goldilocks zone, you suffer the expected losses.

This is the thinking that was the basis of the Flashpoint Golan CRT, but more importantly is the direct ancestor of the Defiance CRT.

Flashpoint: Golan: Modelling the Revolution in Military Affairs

Flashpoint Golan developed a land combat resolution model for RMA (revolution in military affairs) warfare occurring during late 1980s/early 1990s. Flashpoint Golan traces lineage to Gulf Strike. In a number of previous Defiance-related articles we delineated the background of that game as it relates to both hypothetical and actual conflicts occurring at the time. A bit about RMA.

Commander Fitzsimonds and Commander Van Toll (Herman worked for both officers) wrote in Joint Force Quarterly,  “Revolutions in Military Affairs” (1994), “Blitzkrieg has been termed a revolution in military affairs or RMA – a fundamental change in the nature of warfare that the Wehrmacht used to inflict a rapid, stunning defeat on a qualitatively comparable, numerically superior force. Many factors contributed to the Allied collapse, but the essence of the German victory was the innovative operational exploitation of systems common to both sides: the tank, airplane and radio. Speed, surprise and deception, combined with superior tactical and operational performance, gave the Germans a degree of relative operational superiority to which the Allies failed to adapt in time.”

“The stunning victory of the Armed Forces in the Gulf has stimulated increasing discussion of the possible emergence of a new RMA, which will again lead to major changes in the nature of conventional warfare. Such a revolution may be driven by the rapidly developing technologies of information processing and stealthy, long-range precision strike.”

“History suggests three common preconditions to the full realization of RMA: Technological Development, Doctrinal Innovation or Organizational adaptation.…It is synergistic effect of these three preconditions that leads to an RMA.

“Indeed, the most compelling lesson from the 1920s and 1930s is that some militaries were much better than others at developing and implementing successful concepts and also making the organizational changes to fully exploit new technologies…Many of the interwar innovations came at a time of low budgets and small forces.”

Part of modeling RMA (late 80s/early 90s) was the thought that units would suffer cohesion hits making them ineffective. The cohesion hit represents a lose of troops, kit and morale step. Cohesion is not a new concept in warfare.

Herman and Berg used Cohesion in their Great Battles of History line of games. In Great Battles of Julius Caesar, Herman and Berg write, “The Troop Quality” Rating is, by far, the most important number a combat unit has.” The combat system primarily involves inflicting cohesion hits on the enemy and trying to force units to rout. Of course, ancient armies had much less force augmentation tools and technology than today…so they relied upon other traditional force multipliers: leadership, tactics, morale and speed.

Recce-Strike Complexes (RSC)

The Russians (Soviets at that time), were also messing about in RMA and command/control/cohesion. Dr. Milan Vego , Soviet Army Studies Office, wrote in 1990, about their tangential efforts, “Recce-Strike Complexes in Soviet Theory and Practice”.

“The Soviets assert that qualitatively new possibilities for conducting reconnaissance, command and control, and target engagement have emerged in recent years. Hence, diverse tasks on the battlefield can be performed by Soviet Ground Forces in close cooperation with frontal and army aviation in much shorter time and at greater depth than was possible before.

There were several reasons for this development. First, conventional fire power of all services and combat arms of the Soviet Armed Forces increased considerably. The Soviets apparently agree that the most advanced conventional weapons had destructive power similar to tactical nuclear weapons. Consequently, not only with nuclear weapons but also with conventional weapons is it possible to weaken the adversary so that he cannot operate successfully. Hence, the uninterrupted reconnaissance and engagement of all enemy firing means before they are used is one of the most important prerequisites for the successful outcome of one’s own actions. Second, the development of mini computers with the capabilities equal to what until recently only large computer systems had makes it possible not only to use autonomous reconnaissance, command and control, and strike systems, but also to automate them, and above all to integrate all these systems into a fully automated system. These systems resolve the tasks of reconnaissance and target engagement faster, more accurately and more reliably than earlier systems. Recce-strike systems are capable of collecting more comprehensive and timely information on the situation. Errors and interference in each individual part of the system do not significantly influence the overall performance of the system, because these are neutralized as a result of the harmonious operation of other components of the same system.

The Soviets describe the Recce-Strike Complex (razvedyvatel’no-udarnyy kompleks/RUK) as the unified automated system which provides support and combat employment of high precision, long-range weapons. Generally, it consists of reconnaissance, target designation, vectoring, navigation, and communications assets. Specifically, a recce-strike complex encompasses four basic components: an automated system reconnaissance and vectoring or automated system of fire, mobile ground-based center of control or center of fire a high precision means of destruction, and a system for determination of the location of a recce-strike complex.… A Western source recently defined the Soviet recce-strike complex as a combination of new artillery systems, including new remotely piloted vehicles (RPV), advanced counterbattery radars, new munitions, including both advanced unguided and guided ammunition, new command and control systems to coordinate target acquisition, designation, and engagement, and new weapons subsystems…According to a Western source, Soviet tactical recce-strike complexes are intended to destroy targets at a depth of 50 kilometers.

Perhaps potentially the most serious weakness of the entire Soviet C3 system, and especially of operational and tactical command echelons, is the pronounced penchant on the part of Soviet senior commanders not to delegate authority to their subordinates. Despite Soviet claims to the contrary, the widespread habit of waiting for orders and unwillingness to take risks cannot but have a deleterious effect on the accomplishment of assigned tasks. This will have a greater effect on the work of lower command echelons, especially in the work of commanders of tactical units.

Distilled? Integration of sensors with strike capabilities to augment force capability; specifically targeting enemy command and control. Deeping battlespace. Quite the perspective, given AI, AWS, crowd sourcing, OSINT, drones and an integrated net were a few decades away. Soviet recce-strike complex has deep roots in Russian military thought. Ditto regarding a primary weakness of Russian military execution: inability to delegate – or initiative – or ability to conduct critical self-examination. Check out Strategy by Alexsanr A. Svechin if you want to dig a lot deeper into Russian military thought (beginning post Russian Civil War).

Back to Flashpoint Golan…

Morale hits…not step losses per se: At its core, Flashpoint Golan’s combat resolution system utilizes quality of unit and an odds ratio (that varies according to terrain). One table handles both meeting engagements and set piece battles. Essentially, a ten sider is rolled, an odds column depending upon terrain is consulted and the resulting number is cross referenced to the morale level and the technical quality (TQ) of a unit. Higher than the TQ? The unit takes a morale loss. That is it. Baked into this are troop and kit losses; operating under the principle that a unit that endures 20-30% losses is out of action and needs regrouping.

Meeting engagement or set piece battle. Another major mechanic that is directly used in Defiance is the distinction between a Meeting Engagement and a Set Piece battle. Due to the more granular scale than France 1944, the individual battalions and brigades are activated and advance toward their objectives. When a moving force (stack of units) encounters an enemy unit, it stops and either chooses to engage in a meeting engagement or cease movement. At the beginning of all activations, PRIOR to movement, opposing units that are in each other’s Zone of Control must either conduct a set piece battle, withdraw, or attempt to hold their ground. Only after any set piece battle situations have been resolved, do unengaged forces begin to maneuver and either engage in meeting engagements or create the conditions for a future set piece battle.

To see this in action, check out any readily available videos with advancing Russian armor being targeted by aerial drones, long range indirect fire and close range anti-tank systems. The more Russian armor tossed in, the more Russian casualties. With trench on trench engagements in the various urban areas (ex: Bakhmut, Mariupol, etc.), artillery destroys everything; reprising scenes from Stalingrad. These videos, and an increasing pile of analytical research, drive how we are simulating this particular conflict. There’s more. Toss in the power of special intelligence, air defense, HQ capabilities (pictured below) and engineering assets. Taken together, a model of  RMA and explicit Flashpoint Golan design elements are present in Defiance.

So what? FATQ: Force Augmentation & Troop Quality:

How one successfully augments their forces (the troop quality component…that morale thing Napoleon riffed about… well trained, motivated, smartly led, equipped, aware, and cohesive) as they maneuver into meeting engagements and, when required, initiate necessary set piece battles, are the critical skills needed to understand modern 21^st century warfare. Force augmentation and quality. We’ve updated that view from France 1944 , then Flashpoint Golan, and now its next evolution in Defiance.

Defiance : Modeling Combat

Defiance takes the 90’s version of the RMA and evolves it. Flashpoint Golan centered on the concept that if you move and are seen, you will be engaged by lethal indirect fires. The major change is not conceptual, but technological. As predicted in Cebrowski’s Network Centric Warfare and my [Herman] earlier paper Munitions Centric Warfare, the proliferation of cheap networked unmanned systems has replaced the 20^th century’s reliance on large expensive sensor platforms. Impact? The traditional notion regarding the value of air superiority has radically changed as expensive manned aircraft have almost no capability against cheap small drones  that are the size of a serving plate.

Whereas Flashpoint Golan, circa 1990s, gave advantage to the side with air superiority that protected the large sensor aircraft, this is no longer the case. Initially the Ukrainians, who now have numerous special unmanned platform units (diversity of types and scale…and linked into a network to various degrees) used drone types of nascent capabilities to their advantage. What you will see in Defiance future expansions is current adoption of Ukrainian methods and innovations by the Russians …and a new form of the skirmish combat of old.

Defiance uses two procedures to resolve conventional combat: Meeting Engagement and Set Piece Battles. Our previous Defiance Design Happy Column (“VOVK”) indicated that the Ukrainians, out of necessity and some preplanning/training, created small guerrilla style mobile anti-armor taskforces that ambushed, slowed, and devastated  the Russian advance in wooded and urban terrain. Although initially we tried to incorporate this into the conventional combat system, we collectively determined that this unique element of warfare was here to stay. Hence, the genesis of our third leg in our combat stool: the VOVK Table (SoF/partisan warfare). Each procedure is meant to model a different aspect of the initial six week campaign to defend Kyiv and Chernihiv.

The two conventional combat models are branches of a common root: how soldiers engage in combat. For this design, we used the concepts from the Flashpoint Golan combat system, but used the techniques and graphic presentation from its obvious France 1944 (20^st century) roots. In both cases, troop quality is the primary variable as augmented by indirect fires and specialized capabilities that are drawn from their commanding HQ. Force Augmentation and Troop Quality. FATQ.

A 3-legged combat resolution system:  Defiance combat resolution tables…

Three charts below detail the combat resolution system we are using: one each for meeting engagements, set piece battles, and SoF/partisan combat.

The CRTs are designed to tell a narrative of a combat as to how the soldiers fared in the battle. We measure this reaction through their troop quality and how set piece battles can have a more nuanced set of results across a spectrum of units. The impact of force ratio drives losses, but not combat outcome. If one then examines the VOVK combat system, the results generate losses in Russian momentum as measured against the survival of the VOVK units.

We will in future articles show examples of how these systems interact and how they empower you to see the history that unfolded beginning at the crack of dawn, February 24, 2022…nearly two years ago today. Finally, we think this combat resolution system will help provide insight into the initial campaigns in the north and the south in 2022. 2022 fall liberation of Kharkiv oblast and Kherson? 2023 Bakhmut? 2023 Ukrainian counter offensive? We may need something different, given the frightening pace of battlefield innovation, changing political dynamics and respective operational doctrine of both Ukraine and Russia.

Defiance Design Happy Hour Cocktail Recommendation

We’re true to our word. Given that it is happy hour somewhere, a recipe for one of our favorite cocktails; a shake on a classic: the Shagroni. A Shagroni is best sipped while playing a conflict involving Italian forces: Paths of Glory while rolling for a trench after Italy enters the war, any Punic War game, Durchburch: The Austro-German Attack at Caporetto, All Is Lost Save Honor, La Guerra di Gradisca 1615-1617, or any number of other fine games with an Italian presence.

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Previous Defiance InsideGMT Articles:

First Draft of History: Designing a Military Simulation of the Russo-Ukraine War 2022-2023

Defiance Design Happy Hour: Partisan/SOF Operations vs. Regular Russian Forces

Defiance Design Happy Hour: Modeling the Political Dimension of 2nd Russo-Ukrainian War