Below you will find the second and final part in William Byrne’s “The Battle of Piedmont” AAR series. If you would like to read Part 1 first, you can find that here. Enjoy! -Rachel

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Part 2 – from 1500 through the end of the 1700 turn, plus Analysis

Note to the reader:  Part 1 of this AAR includes a full introduction, complete with an Order of Battle for both sides along with other possibly helpful information.  I reproduce here only the most essential elements from that introduction.

• Hexes worth victory points are indicated on the map by black stars on gold or green backgrounds.
• In the illustrations, red arrows indicate forward movement; yellow arrows indicate retrograde movement or retreats.  Green boxes indicate notable situations described in the text.
• Abbreviations used in the text:
  • AM = Activation Marker
  • SP = Strength Point
  • VP = Victory Point

1500

From his vantage point atop the rise west of Crawford Run, Grumble Jones could both see and hear Vaughn’s troops fighting for their lives.  He barked out an order for the artillery.  “Get those guns into the village where they can flank the forward Union infantry!”  In almost no time the Augusta and Lewisburg batteries were rumbling down the road to their newly assigned position.

As the long blue line down in the valley showed no sign of pushing further south, Browne’s and Harper’s infantry stayed put for the moment.  Buehring Jones, however, continued to pressure the Union right, taking some prisoners from 5^th New York Heavy Artillery but paying a price in a fire combat with 116th Ohio.  The Buckeyes finally withdrew rather than face a flank assault, but Jones called a halt to the advance.  His mission was, after all, defensive.  Although his men had mauled Ely’s brigade, his immediate advantage had dissipated.

Repositioning the two Confederate batteries was a wise move, because Stahel’s Union cavalry now developed its attack.  Having issued his orders, Stahel spurred his horse, restored order in his horse artillery, and advised the young lieutenant in charge of the section that he needn’t be in so much of a hurry to close with the enemy.

The advice was sound.  Across the battlefield’s eastern half, it was McReynolds sizable brigade doing the closing.  The dismounted units on the brigade’s right soon exerted a breaking strain on Vaughn’s right and Imboden’s left, at least a hundred Rebel cavalry becoming casualties in fifteen minutes.  But a battalion of the 1^st New York Veteran Cavalry had the misfortune of confronting a particularly well defended section of Imboden’s line.  It was sent reeling back with similar loss.  With more room to maneuver on the left, McReynolds’ mounted troops engaged Imboden’s refused wing.  Elements of the 1^st New York Lincoln Cavalry dealt a staggering blow to the Augusta militia, inflicting 25 per cent losses.

Opportunity abounded.  McReynolds, while not the most aggressive leader of mounted troops, exploited it.  350 dismounted Union troopers stormed breastworks occupied by the Rockingham and Davis militia.  The southerners stood their ground and paid the price, with Davis losing half his small battalion and Rockingham fleeing the field.  Showing no signs of slowing their assault, the Yankees exultantly leapt the breastworks and outflanked 43^rd Tennessee and 16th Georgia Battalion, both of Vaughn’s brigade.  Having witnessed the debacle Imboden’s troops had just suffered, Vaughn ordered his men to fall back.  They did so, just far enough to take the wind out of Union sails.  Meanwhile, McReynolds’ mounted troops routed the rest of the Augusta militia and forced a battalion of the 18^th Virginia Cavalry back in disorder.  The fight had rapidly taken a disastrous turn for the Confederate cavalry.

In desperation, Grumble Jones ordered his artillery to open fire on Thoburn’s troops, and appealed to the infantry nearest the embattled cavalry for help.  The Confederate gunners were just settling into their new position and delivered only an ineffective fire, but Kenton Harper’s militia responded, advancing against the flank of Thoburn’s lead troops.  The Rockbridge militia delivered a fire that inflicted serious loss on 54^th Pennsylvania’s right-hand element, sending it staggering to the rear.  Knowing that Harper’s 400 men were no match for Thoburn, Jones had Browne’s brigade sidestep south along the Staunton Road to fill the gap left by Harper’s advance.  Likewise, Beuhring Jones moved to the south to cover the ground Browne vacated.

Meanwhile, John Imboden realized he could no longer contest the road junction at the apex of his refused line.  He pulled his troops back to the north edge of the woods along the Patterson Mill Road and again refused his right, this time further west.  While the Davis Battalion rallied, a battalion of 18^th Virginia Cavalry lost one-third of its strength in a shoot-out with part of the 14^th Pennsylvania Cavalry.  The survivors retreated and took their place in the refused wing.  Vaughn proceeded similarly, rallying the 12^th Tennessee Battalion while the rest of the brigade fought it out with the Yankees.  The results were mixed.  16^th Georgia Battalion was hit so hard that it would not be heard from again.  1^st Tennessee Cavalry’s right drove off 54^th Pennsylvania’s left, but its own left fell into confusion as 12^th West Virginia of Thoburn’s brigade trained a merciless fire upon it.

The Confederate cavalry had consolidated its wobbly line for the moment, partly assisted by a lull as Sullivan’s infantry reordered their ranks.  But now Sullivan’s men came on again.  No longer having to steer clear of the enemy’s artillery, Colonel Ely sent his left wing ahead cautiously, knowing Browne’s infantry were ensconced in breastworks and unwilling to risk his men the way Moor had.  On his right, however, Ely sensed an advantage, as Beuhring Jones men were out in the open.  Indeed, 5^th New York Heavy Artillery joined with 116^th Ohio to drive 36^th Virginia back through the woods, although the Buckeyes’ line broke down under the Virginians’ return fire.

Colonel Thoburn, his care for his men’s welfare wrestling with his envy of the way McReynolds’ men had vaulted the enemy’s breastworks, now sought to break Vaughn’s line.  1^st Tennessee Cavalry made sure 1^st West Virginia suffered heavily for their commander’s decision, but 34^th Massachusetts and 54^th Pennsylvania came up as well, and the Tennesseans fell back rather than face odds of five to one.  Further to the right, half of 12^th West Virginia boldly closed on Harper’s “brigade”, inflicting grievous losses, among them Harper himself, who was seen to topple from his mount during the fire fight.

Grumble Jones could see it all from Piedmont, the highest ground in the area.  He directed his artillery to do what it could to assist the center of the Confederate line.  Indeed, the gunners cheered upon witnessing the effect of their fire, which drove 1^st West Virginia back into the big woodlot and threw part of 54^th Pennsylvania into confusion.  Amidst the thunder of the big guns, Harper’s leaderless men streamed back to the main line.  Beuhring Jones was inactive, too far from Grumble to know what was expected of him, but Colonel Browne directed a sharp fire on 28^th Ohio’s left wing, with grisly results.

All this time, DuPont’s artillery brigade had failed to provide the kind of fire support Hunter had envisioned.  Two batteries took longer than expected to rally, while a third relocated to the higher ground east of Crawford Run. The fourth had to send back for ammunition before similarly seeking out higher ground.  Finally, all four batteries opened fire on Harper’s hapless militia, but without discernible effect.

Despite DuPont’s unexpected failure, Sullivan continued his assault.  On the Union right, Ely again sent his regiments into battle against Beuhring Jones’ men.  5^th New York Heavy Artillery drove 36^th Virginia further back, this time with losses that brought the latter’s total to 40 per cent.  Half the New Yorkers traded indecisive volleys with the 45^th Virginia Battalion, which now ran low on ammo.

Ely decided to bring up more strength before attempting to overrun his foe.  Thoburn’s efforts likewise ended indecisively.  He’d felt sure he was close to cracking Vaughn’s line, but the dismounted Confederate cavalry fought back tenaciously, inflicting three times the losses it suffered in this stage of the fighting.  With most of his brigade in disarray, and his heart heavy at the thought of the casualties incurred thus far, the ex-surgeon chose to delay another assault.

Vaughn and Imboden desperately tried to rally their men before Stahel’s cavalry could renew its attack, which wasn’t long in coming.  McReynolds again brought Imboden’s refused wing to the point of collapse, and Wyncoop’s 300 troopers cautiously made their way forward, hoping to soon use their Spencer carbines.  But Stahel, too, chose to bide his time, not wishing to exhaust McReynold’s brigade and preferring to unleash Wyncoop’s firepower when the time came for the coup de grace.

1600

Game Interlude #1.  I interrupt the narrative at this point to reveal some of the game mechanics driving the action.  The Confederates won the Initiative for 1600 and drew a “4” Efficiency chit.  The Union wasn’t far behind, drawing a “3”.  Nevertheless, with Hunter’s force pausing for breath, Grumble Jones decided not to have Imboden’s disordered units attempt Withdrawal Movement to disengage from McReynolds’ vulture-like cavalry.  Instead, he’d start with the CSA Cavalry AM, rally as many units as the dice allowed, and gamble on drawing another CSA Cavalry AM before Stahel drew his own.  If Imboden’s units rallied, they’d be better able to weather Withdrawal Fire as they exited the frontal hexes of McReynolds’ brigade.  Even if a Stahel AM preceded the second CSA Cavalry AM, rallied units might help stave off disaster.  Instead, Stahel drew two AMs before the second CSA Cavalry drew another.  With that look under the hood, we return to the story.

Imboden’s couriers reported to Jones one after another, and all with the same story – the brigade was being cut to pieces.  Jones could not ignore them.  With the late afternoon sun heralding the end of an already long day, he issued Imboden written instructions to rally his men and then conduct an orderly retreat.  Knowing that might not be as easy as it sounded, he added that help would come from the center.  A copy of the order went to Vaughn, who still seemed to be holding.  At the same time Jones sent word to Colonel Browne to send half his brigade to the right to shore up the embattled cavalry.  While the prospect of driving Hunter into the South River was now just a distant dream, stopping the numerically superior Yankees here at Piedmont could nonetheless mean victory.

Imboden obeyed orders but was not feeling quite as sanguine as his superior, when lo and behold!  His men responded, rallying smartly despite the close proximity of the enemy.  The general dispatched what strength he could to shore up his endangered right.  He also had the Staunton battery limber up and head for a safer position behind Vaughn’s brigade.  Meanwhile, Vaughn’s men continued to give as well as they got, although Vaughn was aware that the seam between his and Imboden’s brigades was only thinly defended.

Colonel Browne acted on Jones’ order, sending half of Brewer’s battalion to support the Staunton battery.  The other half unleashed a lethal fire upon 12^th West Virginia, but suffered as lethally from the enemy’s return fire.  The Thomas Legion occupied Vaughn’s left-most breastwork position, and 45^th Virginia marched to the right to cover the resulting gap on the western edge of the valley.  Beuhring Jones followed suit, withdrawing his left to enable him to shift troops to the right.  Harper’s minuscule brigade, now under Captain James Jones of the Niter and Mining Battalion due to Harper’s wounding, drove back half of 12^th West Virginia, while the Lewisburg battery did the same to the other half.  But Dupont’s gunners answered for the West Virginians, dispersing the Confederate militia with loss.  Captain Jones later rallied his men and then led them into Piedmont to support the artillery.

Grumble Jones’ artillery was not well placed to assist Imboden, but could and did make life miserable for the Yankees facing Vaughn’s men.  Part of 12^th West Virginia again fell back with loss, stampeding through a portion of McReynolds’ dismounted cavalry and leaving them in disarray.

Joseph Thoburn didn’t need messengers to know his brigade needed a pause after three hours of offensive combat.  Order had broken down.  1^st and 12^th West Virginia were both at half strength.  54^th Pennsylvania was in only slightly better shape.  He set about reforming his command.  Colonel Ely, however, sensed opportunity, despite half his brigade also needing to rally.  With the Reb lines opposite his brigade visibly shifting southward, now was the time to crush them and thus secure Hunter’s right flank.  Ely ordered an advance by those units capable of closing with the foe.  The results were most encouraging.  5^th New York Heavy Artillery smashed Beuhring Jones’ left wing.

The other end of Hunter’s line was also in motion.  With Imboden reeling and Vaughn holding on by a thread, the moment had arrived for Colonel John Wyncoop’s Spencer-armed cavalry.  20^th Pennsylvania Cavalry dismounted and caught part of 18^th Virginia in the flank, inflicting devastating loss.  22^nd Pennsylvania’s 100 troopers knocked the remnant of Davis’s Maryland Battalion completely out of the fight.  While Julius Stahel concentrated on rallying McReynolds’ dismounted units, the latter led his mounted troops forward, sweeping all three battalions of the 18^th Virginia Cavalry from the field.

Stahel paused to scan the battle’s panorama, elated at his men’s performance.  He turned to his adjutant, a German émigré, and exclaimed, “Das wird den alten Kerl imponieren!” (Loosely translated:  “That’ll show the old coot!”  For some reason Hunter had a poor opinion of his cavalry leader.) 

Stahel’s cavalry drove on, smashing Vaughn’s 12^th Tennessee Battalion and driving surviving elements of 23^rd Virginia.  Colonel Browne’s infantry was arriving just in time to save what was left of the Confederate cavalry.  Part of his brigade continued to defend the center, along with Captain Jones’ two militia units supporting the artillery in Piedmont.  The artillery continued to thunder at Thoburn’s brigade, reducing part of 54^th Pennsylvania to a demoralized remnant.  Thoburn feebly persisted in pressuring Vaughn’s line, but with the arrival of Browne’s infantry, it was clearly a losing proposition.

Isolated on the left end of Grumble Jones’ line, Beuhring Jones managed to slow down one of Ely’s units, but the rest irresistibly came on, crushing the units on Jones’ left.  In an effort to form a final line of resistance, Jones summoned elements of 60^th Virginia to abandon the original front line.  28^th Ohio ensured that the Virginians did not get away easily.

Game interlude #2.  The prospect of capturing the victory hex (6021) beyond B. Jones’ line has much to do with Ely’s drive.

Over on the Confederate right, Imboden’s survivors sheltered behind the Staunton artillery.  The big guns now had a host of targets from which to choose, and pounded McReynolds’ dismounted units.  Vaughn’s men gave a cheer, not only at the momentary respite, but even more as Browne’s infantry relieved them on the front line.

1700

The sight of his retreating cavalry froze the blood in Grumble Jones’ veins.  He could not allow the Yankees to seize the crossroads south of Piedmont without endangering all his troops north of that point.  He snapped out orders to a nearby aide.  “Tell Colonel Browne to attack immediately and repulse the enemy’s cavalry on our right!”  The young officer bounded off, and Browne’s troops quickly went into action.

Game interlude #3.  The Confederates having won the Initiative for 1700 and looking for victory points, I reasoned that Browne’s infantry might be able to inflict some SP losses on Stahel’s cavalry.  Placing the brigade under Attack orders seems a poor decision, however, as Jones’ Efficiency was only a “2”, and the Union cavalry line so strong that any of Browne’s units moving adjacent to it would likely take fire from multiple enemy units.

Browne did not share his superior’s reckless confidence.  McReynolds’ Union cavalry was largely on the reverse slope of the high ground in front.  Browne’s men would have to close with them to bring them under fire, and at that range the cavalry’s carbines were a little too effective for the colonel’s taste.  If only he could take the cavalry under fire at longer range!  In any case, the advance came to an uncertain halt on the right.

In the center, however, Browne’s men did well against Thoburn’s brigade, inflicting sufficient loss on a battalion of the 2^nd Maryland Eastern Shore to end its combat-worthiness.  When the badly-hit 12^th West Virginia attempted to pivot its line to assist, about a quarter of its remaining men fled for the rear, and the rest fell into such confusion that their colonel ordered a retreat.  While the Confederate cavalry under Imboden and Vaughn could do little more than strengthen Browne’s line, the southern artillery continued to torment Thoburn.

Thoburn’s recoiling lines threatened to swamp Henry Dupont’s artillery positions.  A response was imperative.  The enemy artillery in Piedmont might be too sheltered to effectively target, but Staunton’s battery was out in the open.  DuPont’s gunners grabbed their handspikes, swiveled the guns sixty degrees left, and opened fire with explosive shell.  It turned out to be their most impressive accomplishment of the day.  The enemy battery and its supporting dismounted cavalry seemed enveloped in fire and smoke; wood fragments, broken wheels, the bodies of men and even horses hurtled through the air.  When the smoke finally cleared, two enemy guns were disabled, and the surviving crews were too busy taking cover to respond.  Imboden’s supporting units were equally scattered.

Game Interlude #4.  Despite nine Union and only three Confederate AMs remaining in the Draw cup after Jones’ initial AM, the Confederates drew their three prior to any Union AMs being drawn, except for two of DuPont’s.  Grumble Jones had read his Clausewitz and was hoping to counterattack Stahel’s cavalry, rather than attack.  The game dictated otherwise; moreover, the AM sequence left Staunton no opportunity to rally.

On the opposite end of the line, Colonel Ely led his men up Walker’s Hill, brushing aside the meager resistance of Beuhring Jones’ surviving troops.  Thoburn, despite his brigade being close to dissolution, doggedly led part of the 2^nd Maryland Eastern Shore versus the Niter & Mining Battalion, doing it grievous damage but suffering from the militia’s counter-fire.  Ely’s men came up to deliver the final blow versus the Niter & Mining Battalion, but could not affect the situation further south.  That would be up to Julius Stahel.

Major General Stahel felt immense satisfaction.  All afternoon he’d delivered a one-two punch.  His dismounted units provided the firepower, and his mounted units the mobility needed to defeat the enemy.  He saw no reason to change recipes at this point.  His troops now threw back even the enemy’s infantry, a nearly unprecedented feat.

The Crossroads was now in sight, and the ordinarily staid McReynolds drove hard for the goal, surprising Stahel.  But Browne’s infantry doggedly resisted, and the mounted Union cavalry found themselves as disorganized after their assaults as the enemy was.  Colonel Wyncoop’s dismounted troops hurt the Confederates with their Spencer carbines, but were unable to dislodge them.  In one last effort, McReynolds attacked with his dismounted troops.  Despite suffering heavy losses, they could not reach the crossroads.

Stahel, not far behind the lines, witnessed the repulse of the last attack.  After the day’s successes, his disappointment was manifest.  Behind him two riders approached at a canter.  It was Hunter, accompanied by Colonel Strother.  Stahel had a moment to prepare himself for the usual upbraiding.  He saluted as the two reined their horses in, and was then astonished as his commander grasped his hand and said, “General, your division has done splendidly here; my heartfelt thanks for your initiative, without which Colonel Thoburn’s men would certainly have fared poorly.  Please extend my congratulations to your troops on their victory.  I believe you’ve shown these Rebels how the Union cavalry can fight.  Mark my words, we’ll soon see this rabble turn tail.”

And so it came to pass.  David Hunter’s Army of the Shenandoah had laid waste William Jones’ command.  Half the gray-clad division had been all but annihilated.  Jones turned to his aides.  Through the smoke of battle he caught sight of a dull red sun hanging low in the sky.  When he spoke, his voice broke with emotion.  “We can do no more here.  Order all commands to retreat toward Staunton.  Do not despair!  We will rest, reform, and take the field again to drive these invaders from our land.”

His words, however hopeful, sounded hollow even as he uttered them.  The agony of a battle lost suddenly transported his mind back to that terrible day in the Gulf of Mexico.  The memory heightened his inner turmoil, and he involuntarily closed his eyes, as if to avoid it.  But then he could suddenly see his Eliza before him, as lovely as the day he married her.  He realized how thirsty he was, and beholding her tender smile was like drinking deeply of cool water far more refreshing than any he’d ever tasted.  He lingered before her for a moment, then spurred his horse toward the setting sun.

Wrap-up & Commentary

The Union scored 20 more victory points than the Confederates, one over the minimum needed for a Strategic Victory, the highest level of victory defined.  Two Confederate brigades, those of John Imboden and Beuhring Jones, ended the game “combat ineffective”, generating 10 VP for the Union.  The Staunton battery lost three guns, each worth another VP for the Union.  Finally, Imboden’s cavalry brigade was not only combat ineffective, but suffered 22 SP eliminated, each worth a VP.

Grumble Jones managed to hang on to two of five “victory hexes” lost during the actual battle, thereby accruing 10 VP.  The Union received 2 VP each for the other three victory hexes.  Finally, Stahel’s troops paid a significant price for their success, suffering 11 SP eliminated.

I believe the Confederate problem was my tendency to channel “Grumble” Jones’ dream of driving Hunter into the South River.

• Beuhring Jones should never have attacked during the early going.  His mission is defensive; let the Union burn time and strength coming to grips with him.  While during the actual battle the Confederates did counterattack, here B. Jones’ job is to hang onto Walker’s Hill.
• Imboden must trade space for time rather than square off with Stahel’s better-armed troops.
• Browne should never have been assigned Attack Orders to start off the 1700 turn.

The game could easily have gone differently.  The Union drew a “2” Efficiency for 1400 and 1500 while moving into position and trying to avoid Fatigue.  But then they drew a “3” for 1500, 1600, and 1700, exactly when they could profit by it.  The sequence of AM draws also favored the Union during both the 1600 and 1700 turns, as noted in the “Game Interludes” (above).

Thoburn’s brigade was close to being combat ineffective, and Walker’s Hill is not easy to take.  If the Confederates had held onto it, preserved B. Jones brigade, and done a bit better versus Thoburn, the Union VP lead would have been reduced to three, or a drawn game.

Even with all those “ifs”, Imboden’s brigade is the key to victory or defeat.  Eliminated cavalry SP were the greatest factor contributing to the outcome.  With Stahel requiring two turns to deploy, there was no reason not to shift Vaughn eastward and redeploy Imboden behind Vaughn.  Better to let the Union cavalry blunt the tip of its spear against Vaughn, saving Imboden for possible counterattacks.

Grumble Jones fell in the fight at Piedmont.  Fighting in his stead, I guess I can expect to be cashiered for my performance, but before that happens, let me thank Greg Laubach for his wonderful proofreading help.  Lastly, I offer my best wishes to all who play “Piedmont” and the rest of the Battles for the Shenandoah.

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