Disclaimer: All views expressed in this post are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or Army Training and Doctrine Command
Ian M. Sullivan is the Special Advisor for Analysis and ISR at the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Army Training and Doctrine Command.
Disclaimer: All views expressed in this post are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or Army Training and Doctrine Command
Ian M. Sullivan is the Special Advisor for Analysis and ISR at the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Army Training and Doctrine Command.
Ian M. Sullivan is the Special Advisor for Analysis and ISR at the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Army Training and Doctrine Command.
Disclaimer: All views expressed in this post are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or Army Training and Doctrine Command
Ian M. Sullivan is the Special Advisor for Analysis and ISR at the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Army Training and Doctrine Command.
Disclaimer: All views expressed in this post are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or Army Training and Doctrine Command
Ian M. Sullivan is the Special Advisor for Analysis and ISR at the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Army Training and Doctrine Command.
Disclaimer: All views expressed in this post are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or Army Training and Doctrine Command
Ian M. Sullivan is the Special Advisor for Analysis and ISR at the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Army Training and Doctrine Command.
Disclaimer: All views expressed in this post are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or Army Training and Doctrine Command
Ian M. Sullivan is the Special Advisor for Analysis and ISR at the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Army Training and Doctrine Command.
Disclaimer: All views expressed in this post are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or Army Training and Doctrine Command
Next War: Vietnam isn’t offering anything ground-breaking in terms of the overall series, but, as in all the games, I hope to provide a new and engaging situation that seems fresh and different even through it’s using the same rules as all the games in the series.
This is a guest post from a friend of a friend. It speaks to the relationship the world at large might have to our hobby as wargamers. We thought you might enjoy it… — Mitch
by Jerad Alexander
Davin has a problem. His advance on Poland is being gutted by the collective will of democratic Europe. His army of high-powered Russian and Belarus troops are being hammered by NATO air power across northeastern Poland and the Baltics. His casualties began to mount on the second week of his campaign—how many has it been? 5,000 dead and wounded? 7,000? Davin isn’t a military general. He hasn’t trained for any of this. He lives with his girlfriend Joanna in Chelsea. He collects soundtracks on LP and works as a webmaster. He’s not even Russian. He’s from
Fresno.
In preparation for a combined game of Next War: Poland, Next War: Korea, and Next War: Taiwan (coming up in April), I was asked to drop in to the Marine War College in Quantico, VA to show some of the students how to play the game as a teach the teachers exercise.
So, on a cold Monday night in Feb I parachuted in….well, not really. In game terms, I used Air Transport to move from the Airbase in St. Louis to the Airbase in Washington, D.C. Since there were no enemy Zones of Control (EZOCs), I was able to use half of my movement allowance to arrive at my assembly area in Quantico. [Translation: I hopped a flight from STL to DCA and drove to my hotel.]
