Here’s a look at the scenarios in Silver Bayonet, and some of the history behind them.

There are two kinds of scenarios in the game: Standard and Campaign. The Standard scenarios are smaller and, for the most part, cover some portion of the action which occurred during the campaign. The Campaign scenarios are larger and more involved, although they are also divided into two categories. There are three smaller campaign scenarios, each of which deals with a particular brigade’s operations during the campaign, and there are two Grand Campaign scenarios covering the entire campaign.

The Standard scenarios are intended to be quick vignettes of the major actions during the campaign. Here’s the current list of Standard scenarios:

Duc Co (10-17 Aug) – 8 Turns
Plei Me (19-25 Oct) – 6 Turns
LZ MARY (3-4 Nov) – 2 Turns
Catecka Tea Plantation (12 Nov) (two versions) – 1/2 Turn and 1-1/2 Turns
LZ XRAY (14-17 Nov) – 4 Turns
LZ ALBANY (17-18 Nov) – 2 Turns
Operation Than Phong VII (18-25 Nov) – 8 Turns

Duc Co

If you’re paying attention, you’ll notice that the dates for the Duc Co scenario don’t fall anywhere near the rest of the dates. Although not actually part of the Silver Bayonet family of operations (there were several operations conducted during the time period represented by the game which we’ve collected under the banner of “Silver Bayonet”), the action at Duc Co was easy to include since (a) it was on the map, (b) most of the units involved were already part of the Order of Battle, and (c) it serves as a microcosm example to the rest of the activities later on the year. The siege of Duc Co (this was just one of several by the way) showcases the NVA/VC Standard Operating Procedure (SOP): show up, attack the camp, ambush the relief forces, a.k.a. the “lure and ambush”. They had been doing it for years to the ARVN (and before that, to the French), and it generally always worked in favor of the NVA/VC’s attritional strategy of bleeding the enemy. In this particular case, although the camp was not overrun due to airlifted ARVN Airborne elements, the ARVN relief force made little headway along Route 19. Eventually, MACV organized elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade into a task force which moved from Pleiku to Duc Co. The NVA/VC withdrew in the face of the US relief force, and the siege was lifted. The 173rd patrolled the area until it was airlifted back to Bien Hoa in early September 1965. The scenario ends before the 173rd arrives, giving the ARVN the chance to change history by relieving the siege themselves. As an interesting side note, then Captain Norman Schwartzkopf, who would later become “Stormin’ Norman”, was the advisor to the ARVN Airborne units. This small vignette was simply a foreshadowing of what was to come:

This action [siege of Duc Co] served as prelude for what happened upon the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), known as “The Cav.” Cued by the fighting, General Westmoreland rejected other plans for these troops and sent them straight into the highlands. The Americans already in place secured An Khe in the foothills, which became The Cav’s initial base. Hanoi, aiming to study U.S. tactics and methods, chose a head-on battle at another Special Forces camp called Plei Me. (Prados, Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975).

Campaign Overview

As part of the Dong Xuan (Winter-Spring) Campaign 1965-66, Hanoi planned to secure a major portion of South Vietnam. Three field fronts, or divisions, were earmarked to operate between the 17th Parallel in the north and the southern boundaries of Pleiku, Phu Bon, and Phu Yen provinces and between the Laotian/Cambodian borders in the west and the South China Sea in the east. Within this  campaign, the three field fronts would conduct their own campaigns one of which was the Tay Nguyen (Western Plateau) campaign. It’s objective was the capture of Pleiku and Kontum provinces as well as portions of Binh Dinh and Phu Bon provinces. In addition, it had specific objectives of overrunning the Special Forces camps at Duc Co and Plei Me as well as capturing the city of Pleiku which housed the II Corps Headquarters and reserves for the region. This Field Front was commanded by Brigadier General Chu Huy Man, and it consisted of the NVA regiments found in the game’s Order of Battle: 32nd, 33rd, and 66th as well as the 20th Artillery. This was to be the first time that an NVA force would operate in divisional strength in South Vietnam.

On 28 July 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson uttered those famous words, “I have today ordered to Vietnam the airmobile division…” and set into motion the events which would culminate in the battles of the Ia Drang Valley. On 28 September 1965, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) assumed responsibility for its Tactical Area of Operations in Vietnam. This was fairly extraordinary, as General Kinnard (Commanding General), noted:

This was 104 days from the date Secretary McNamara announced the formation of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, and 90 days after General Orders activated the unit on 1 July, 1965. Somewhere in the annals of military organization there may have been outfits activated, organized and moved 12,000 miles to combat, all within the space of 90 days, but none comes immediately to mind. That the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) did just that not only is a remarkable achievement, but a tribute to the men of the division who devoted an unbelievable amount of time and effort to accomplish the task. (Coleman, Pleiku: The Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam).

The stage was thus set for a titanic clash in what was to be the first division-sized battle between the U.S. Army and the NVA.

Plei Me

Before that clash occurred, however, the US was still primarily serving as an advisory force to the ARVN. So, initially, when the NVA struck and besieged Plei Me, it was the ARVN’s responsibility to organize and send a relief force down the highway to relieve the siege. As had happened countless times before, though, the NVA was using it’s usual “lure and ambush” tactics and stalled the relief force on the highway. It was in this instance that everything changed as the ARVN appealed to the US for assistance, and the 1st Cav was tasked with responding. What began as a reactive move to assist a bogged down column and relieve a besieged camp turned into an offensive mission:

[The division] was released from a small, confining zone of operations and provided a tactical area of operations that covered nearly twenty-five hundred square kilometers: the entire vast sweep of terrain from Route 14 on the east to the Cambodian border on the west, and from Highway 19 on the north to the province boundary on the south – nearly one-half of Pleiku province. The division was given the mission of searching out, fixing, and destroying enemy forces that provided a threat to Plei Me, Pleiku, and the entire central highlands. The 1st Brigade was given the divisional mission. (Coleman, Pleiku: The Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam).

This scenario shows the opening stages of the campaign with the NVA beginning the siege of Plei Me, and the ARVN relief force attempting to reach and relieve the siege.

LZ MARY

After successfully relieving the siege, the 1st Brigade switched over to search and destroy operations. They swept the Ia Drang Valley with helicopter observation missions and patrols pouncing on isolated remnants of the besieging force as it withdrew.

As Coleman describes it:

[The] concept was to conduct an intensive search for the enemy, looking everywhere – in the villages, in the jungles, and along stream beds. By widespread dispersion, made possible by excellent communications and helicopter lift, the brigade was to sweep large areas systematically. Each battalion was to be deployed with supporting artillery and then was to further disperse its companies. Vigorous and intensive patrolling from company bases was to be conducted. When contact was established, a rapid reaction force was to be assembled swiftly and lifted by helicopters to close with the enemy. The immediate artillery strike capability would be provided by the unique aerial rocket artillery batteries, along with prepositioned tube artillery. If fire support reinforcement was needed, it could be provided by additional batteries of tube artillery, moved rapidly into position by medium-life helicopters. The tactical fire support plan included extensive use of Air Force tactical air strikes.

This concept now seems so elemental and commonplace; but in October 1965 it was revolutionary. No one had tried it before. This was to be airmobility’s acid test. (Coleman, Pleiku: The Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam).

Both sides were learning to adjust to this new method of airmobile warfare as the US continually over-estimated the intentions of the NVA while they were withdrawing whilst the NVA continually under-estimated the speed with which the airmobile troopers could relocate and the unnervingly accurate artillery, air, and helicopter gunship firepower that could be brought to bear when they were found.

LZ MARY is indicative of one such mission in which intelligence had determined a likely infiltration route across the Cambodian border, and the airmobile troopers were sent to ambush the NVA. It was a close run affair and led to the reassignment of the infamous, colorful, and outspoken Lt. Col. John B. Stockton, commander of the 1/9 Cavalry Scouts.

Catecka Tea Plantation

With all of the helicopter movements, the 1st Cav decided it needed to create “forward operating base”, and it moved it’s brigade HQ to the Catecka Tea Plantation. From here, the helicopters could operate and support the troopers far more quickly without having to stage all the way back to An Khe. Everything for the HQ was supplied via air using helicopters, C-123s and other aircraft. Recognizing it as a target, the VC staged an attack on the night of 12 Nov. It was beaten off with liberal use of the Aerial Rocket Artillery helos (Hueys armed with lots and lots of rockets) based there, but it was harrowing night for all involved.

LZ XRAY & LZ ALBANY

Although often treated separately, these two actions were two halves of the same operation. Most people have, I’m sure, seen the move, We Were Soldiers, or, better yet, read the book on which it was based, We Were Soldiers Once…And Young. The movie is a fine piece of cinematic production although it distorts the history to favor the dramatic narrative; in many respects it still captures the general historical flavor of the action.

Historically speaking, the LZ was chosen specifically because intelligence gathered at the time pointed to a concentration of enemy activity in the area. Unfortunately, the size of that concentration was unknown. Unbeknownst to the US at the time, the area, known as ANTA village, was a staging area for additional NVA troops supporting the unsuccessful attack on Plei Me:

This final bit of intelligence cinched it for Moore. He would land his battalion at LZ XRAY. The map coordinates were YA935019. If a North Vietnamese were plotting these same coordinates, he would not have called that spot XRAY; its proper name, as far as the NVA were concerned, was ANTA Village! A North Vietnamese regiment and an Air Cavalry battalion were now, inexorably, on a collision course. (Coleman, Pleiku: The Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam).

These two scenarios recreate two desperate fights which were nearly polar opposites of each other. The first was a successful, albeit costly fight, to maintain the LZ at XRAY as wave after wave of NVA attacked. The second, after the fight at XRAY was won, was a near-run debacle which threw away many of the hard lessons just learned and nearly resulted in wiping out a US battalion. It is for this reason that these are the only two historical LZs which are marked on the map (although they are there ONLY for historical purposes; they are not, necessarily, LZs in a game sense unless a player marks them as such).

Operation Than Phong VII

This operation was an entirely ARVN operation conducted at the tail end of the campaign in the area near Duc Co. As part of the general mop-up operations, the ARVN were tasked with a search and destroy mission to head off the NVA retreat to Cambodia. Leading this operation was one of the better ARVN commanders, Lt. Col. Ngo Quang Truong, as described by General Norman Schwartzkopf:

Simply by visualizing the terrain and drawing on his experience fighting the enemy for fifteen years, Truong showed an uncanny ability to predict what they were going to do. (Schwartzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero).

The operation was successful and highlighted what the ARVN was capable of given competent leadership.

Campaign Scenarios

There are two types of campaign scenarios: the smaller brigade level scenarios and the larger Grand Campaign scenario. The primary difference between the Standard and Campaign scenarios is that the US player finally gets to use his helicopters in the latter. The first three, smaller scenarios simply reflect that the fact that, at any one time, only elements of a single brigade of the 1st Cav were actively involved in operations in the Ia Drang Valley. The campaign was characterized by the three phases of the operation: (1) the relief of Plei Me and subsequent search and destroy operations, (2) the assault on the Chu Pong Massif area of operations, and (3) mop up operations as the NVA withdrew. Each of these was conducted by a different brigade of the 1st Cav, and they are represented by the three smaller campaign scenarios:

1st Brigade (19 Oct – 5 Nov) – 18 Turns
3rd Brigade (9 Nov – 18 Nov) – 10 Turns
2nd Brigade (19 Nov – 26 Nov) – 8 Turns

The Grand Campaign scenario covers the entire 39 day action from the start of the siege of Plei Me (19 Oct) to the final mop-up operations at the end of November 1965 (26 Nov). This scenario comes in two forms: one has a prescribed setup for the NVA (the Grand Campaign scenario), and the other allows the NVA to choose its own setup (the Free Setup Campaign). In both cases, the US player conducts a relief in place of his brigades.

Game as History

We have striven, as much as is possible, to provide systems and components which allow you, the players, to understand the capabilities and history of the opponents here. Each side will find itself gravitating toward the tactics which made them successful historically. Hopefully, we’ve also created a game which not only honors the participants but provides enjoyment to you as players.

I’ll leave you with Pres. Johnson’s words as he awarded the Presidential Unit Citation to the 1st Cav (the only division in Vietnam to receive the award):

America’s history books are filled with the names of places that are far removed from America’s shores, where her strength and will were tested, and where it triumphed. We know most of those places very well: the Argonne – Anzio – Okinawa – the Pusan Perimeter…Now they will add the Ia Drang Valley in the central highlands of Vietnam.