As I write this, my solitaire Peloponnesian War design, published in 1991 under the Victory Games label, has made a successful P500 debut as an enhanced version with GMT. To all those who supported bringing this one back from the past, thank you.

I was contemplating what to write for an article about the game, so I went into my Victory Games copy of the Peloponnesian War and found that my old habit of putting all reviews and articles about a game into the box turned this simple act into a walk down memory lane. Everyone who wrote or corresponded with me about the original published game was in the box, to include my articles in The General Vol. 28 #1.

Based on going through all of this correspondence from over 25 years ago, there is nothing to change in the solitaire design. However, the rules will be totally rewritten, and I am going to add two new solo scenarios. For those who have never seen and only heard about this design, it covers the 2^nd Peloponnesian War (see my recent Pericles design to see what the 1^st Peloponnesian War was all about). I will incorporate all of the new research I used for Pericles to create a 1^st Peloponnesian War scenario, with accompanying AI charts (plus an Egypt campaign mini-map extension). The new version will also include the sequel to the Great Peloponnesian War, covering the Fall of Sparta, also with tailored AI charts. So, although the design is the same as the original VG version, you will be getting essentially three games in one package – with new leaders, new counters, and new AI to handle the two new scenarios. In essence it will be three games in one box using the same system.

Now to be clear, this is an AI (as in Artificial Intent) solitaire system that has never been copied or reused by others or myself. It does not use ‘Bots, because you are the opponent. You begin the original game as Athens and as the game progresses, you gain/lose points for victories/ defeats. As your SCI (Strategy Confidence Index) climbs, you are likely to have to change sides and bring your AI opponent back into the game. If your SCI falls, you get to try and climb back into the game. In the end, like golf, your performance is entirely up to your decisions and performance. Based on reviewing my solo game forms (with dates when I played), I hold a losing record with the original game.

Back in the early nineties The General published a Victory Games issue, General Vol. 28 #1, with the three lead articles focused on The Peloponnesian War. As I contemplated writing a new article I realized that my 37 year old self (I’m now 63) knew a lot more about my thinking on this design than I remember now, so instead of trying to recreate a young man’s view of the world, lets hear from him directly. So without further ado, I would like to introduce ‘me’, a quarter of a century ago, to tell you about the design and strategy in Peloponnesian War.

Deus Ex Machina

Struggling Against the Vicisstudes of the Peloponnesian  War Game System

Thucydides said of the Spartans that they were “a convenient enemy”. He was referring to the many times Sparta missed opportunities for a riposte when Athens was vulnerable. Soli­taire game systems tend to be convenient enemies, even when computerized, because they usually miss strategic opportunities. To solve this traditional weakness of solitaire systems, I enlisted in my design the services of the person we see in the mirror. If you believe the old adage that we are our own worst enemy, then Peloponnesian War lets you experience this literally.

Those of you who already own Peloponnesian War know what I am talking about. For those who do not I will briefly digress. Peloponnesian War is based on the premise that the sum of good tactics is not strategy. Solitaire systems both computerized and manual tend to handle tactics well but the combination of these moves is usually disjointed and bereft of logic. I chose to take this problem and turn it into an opportunity. The player supplies the long term game strategies for both sides while the system handles the short term tactics of the opponent. Mechanically this is done by the player controlling one side while the game system operates the oppo­nent. As the player gains strategic momentum and begins to defeat the system, he is forced to switch sides and rectify the former opponent’s situation. This constant change of identities allows the player to challenge himself in the true style of a Greek tragedy.

The game mechanic whereby the player changes sides also serves historical purposes. One of the characteristics of this 27-year war was the constantly shifting domestic and coali­tion priorities that caused a commensurate shifting of state policies. These often illogical strategy shifts are recreated by both the tempo­rary loss of direct player control over a particu­lar side and the opposition leader’s influence on enemy objectives.

The Spartan strategy was driven by the yearly change in the composition of the five Ephors, picked at random, who made Spartan political policy. Traditionally one of the two Spartan kings lead the army on operations while the other stayed home to handle domestic security. As Spartan military operations expanded from their traditional raid and battle strategy (“Attack Athens”) a host of new lead­ers emerged. These leaders (e.g., Brasidas and Lysander) gained their positions due to the patronage of various Ephors (or the kings), and represent their policies.

Theoretically, Athenian policy was deter­mined by majority vote of the electorate. In actual practice the electorate was dominated by charismatic leaders, initially by Pericles and later by wealthy patrons (Cleon, Alcibiades, and Nicias), whose ability to employ blocks of votes dominated Athenian policy. In the past when these demagogues had reached impasses, one of the opponents was ostracized by the electorate, allowing the survivor to implement his policy. After the death of Pericles and Cleon this political mechanism failed. Nicias and Alcibiades temporarily joined forces to ostracize a third opponent, allowing both of them to continue in office and clash over pol­icy. This political Tug-of-war resulted in the Syracusan expedition and the loss of Athenian naval superiority. Later, an oligarchy temporar­ily took control of Athens, but the fleet located on Samos refused to acknowledge the new gov­ernment which was subsequently ousted. In the waning days of the war the electorate self destructed, preventing any coherent strategy from forming prior to defeat.

These radical changes in policy are embed­ded directly into the solitaire game system. When you control a side you determine its strategic direction. If you control the same side for two or more game turns a period of political unity is simulated. At the same time, the non­player side is usually characterized by chaotic changes in policy. When you cease to control a side it now experiences a radical shift in strategy. Although on the surface the political component of the game looks simple, it accounts for the impact of political turmoil upon the course of the war.

Your opponent (the game system) is driven by the historical strategies available to both sides. The opposing political entities employed these strategies in pursuit of their shifting polit­ical agendas. It is the intent of this article to acquaint you with the logic and motivations of the strategy matrix lo improve your perfor­mance in and enjoyment of the game. Along the way I hope to supply some historical back­ground to illustrate how the game simulates these strategic factors.

Know Your Enemy

What is the System Trying to Accomplish?

The heart of the solitaire game system in Peloponnesian War is the Athenian and Spartan strategy matrices. Only one strategy matrix is active during any game tum. Historically there were a number of strate­gies used by both sides over the course of the war. The strategics on the matrices represent the policy responses that Athenian and Spartan politics imposed on their military leadership. The leader chosen at the beginning of each tum is the key policy maker, whose influence affects which strategy is implemented.

An examination of any particular strategy reveals three key parameters: Which areas and their associated spaces on the map are potential objectives, the area/objective probability, and the size and composition of the forces to be sent. The combination of these factors will pro­duce a series of operations consistent with the historical examples which they simulate. Although working from similar principles, the implementation by each side (that is, Athens and Sparta) is unique lo the cultural and histor­ical precedent set by the war as described by Thucydides.

MAP A (Graphic Representation of Spartan Strategy Matrix):
KEY: 1: Defensive Strategy; 2: Cut LOC; 3: Cause Rebellion; 4: Attack Athenian Ally; 5: Attack Athens

Historically, neither side sent out on average more than one expedition per year. With the game turns representing three years, the game system launches from one to four operations per turn. The larger operations, such as the Spartan invasion of Attica, represent a series of expeditions to the same region over three years. The medium and small operations are represen­tative of individual forays that are coordinated around a basic strategic theme.

Stay tuned for Part 2 of this article series, where Mark’s “Deus Ex Machina” article published in The General will continue…

Articles in this Series: Part 1  Part 2  Part 3  Part 4

Author: Mark Herman