Historical Introduction
If there was a lull during the first day at Shiloh, it occurred between 11 AM and noon. The Army of Mississippi, led by Albert Sidney Johnston and Pierre Beauregard, had dislodged the Army of the Tennessee’s three forward divisions that morning, seizing their camps and sending thousands of blue-clads running for the safety of Pittsburg Landing. Prentiss’s 6th Division had been especially hard hit.
Almost everywhere the Confederates had gained or crossed the line of the Hamburg-Purdy Road. The cost was high, however, and not only a question of casualties. The exigencies of battle unraveled Confederate command and control to the point where not a single division or corps fought as a unified formation. Indeed, in many cases individual regiments found themselves fighting alongside troops from other brigades, even brigades of divisions other than their own. Both losses and the need to reform the troops brought the Rebel advance to a halt. For almost an hour the artillery did most of the fighting.
The Federals, too, used the lull to reform their troops, while reinforcements arrived from the rear. As a new line took shape south of Jones Field, William Sherman and John McClernand realized their divisions still retained a measure of fighting spirit. Both men had reason to consider taking the initiative. Earlier in the morning Sherman had ridiculed subordinates who warned of a Confederate attack. Perhaps he could now atone for his error. McClernand was an Illinois politician who was well aware that here, as at Fort Donelson, it would be best for his career to turn a morning defeat into an afternoon victory. The two assembled their most battle-worthy regiments and led them forward about noon.
Like this:
Like Loading...
