My previous article described how the Army of Northern Virginia’s sharpshooter battalions provided Death Valley with a way to level the playing field between the Union and Confederate forces that fought the Shenandoah battles of 1864. A second late-war tactical innovation offered us yet another solution to the problem of mismatched armies: “Open Order” formation, described by Fred Ray in his Shock Troops of the Confederacy.

Heavy casualties inflicted on traditional shoulder-to-shoulder lines of battle and the problem of maintaining unit cohesion while negotiating wooded, broken terrain led to the evolution of skirmish tactics during the war. Drill manuals available at war’s start prescribed intervals of five paces or 12.5 feet between each man in a skirmish line; thus, 350 men could cover a mile. Anywhere from a company to a regiment would form the skirmish line ahead of a brigade. But by mid-1864 skirmish lines were thicker and could include most of the brigade. Put differently, closed lines of battle were starting to disperse. Dispersion allowed the use of available cover in the way a closed line could not, and avoided the need to dress the line after crossing difficult terrain. At the same time the thicker line generated a higher level of firepower than the older skirmish lines, not only because of increased density, but because sheltered positions made for more accurate fire.

The best example of Open Order tactics in action may be the battle of Charlestown (now in West Virginia) on August 21st, 1864. There Confederate sharpshooters, reinforced by a regiment, took on Getty’s Vermont brigade, 2000 strong. Getty deployed three of his regiments in “open order” over a mile-long front.

Several blueclads commented on the new skirmishing tactics. According to Private Wilbur Fisk of the 2nd Vermont, “…we can string the whole brigade of us, in a line five feet apart, or ten if they want…” (Ray, p. 180). According to Captain John De Forest, “They [the Confederates] covered themselves more effectively, they could move in a swarm, without much care for alignment and touch of elbows.” (Ray, p. 185). After the battle of Cedar Creek De Forest added, “…their open-order style of fighting was an economical one. Moreover, when they retreated, they went in a swarm and at full speed, thus presenting a poor mark for musketry. We, on the contrary, sought to retire in regular order, and suffered heavily for it.”  (Ray, p. 200)

Ray comments, “…by 1864 (at least in some units) the line of battle looked a lot like the skirmish line, except for the intervals.” (p. 205). His evidence suggests all sorts of Open Order variations, not only in the intervals between men, but in the number of ranks and the distance between those ranks.

Open Order in Death Valley

We adopted the new tactical formation for our 1864 battles, calling it “Open Order”, following Ray’s usage. We went with a maximum density of a man every five feet on average, plus a reserve. In GBACW terms open order units could thus have up to three SP (150 men) per 145-yard hex. Primarily a defensive tactic, Open Order is well-suited to delaying actions. As such, it was exactly what the 1864 Confederates in Death Valley needed, as may be seen from the following excerpts from the Open Order rules in our 1864 battle book (illustrations added for this article).

— Units in Open Order can stack up to 3 SPs per hex. Units of 4 or more SP under Open Order must Extend their line at the start of movement. The extended unit can occupy a maximum frontage of three hexes. Each of its hexes must contain no less than 2 and no more than 3 SP. Each extension must end movement adjacent to its parent counter.

— The parts of a unit in Extended Open Order need not face the same way. All parts of an Extended Open Order unit can conduct Reaction Facing changes, as if they were single-hex units.

— Units in Open Order, including any or all parts of a unit in Extended Open Order may refuse, if eligible.

— An Open Order unit’s movement allowance is that for Advance Orders, no matter what the orders of its parent brigade. Open Order units do not pay movement costs to change Facing.

— Open Order units may not move adjacent to enemy units.

— Like cavalry, units in Open Order can Reaction Move (Retreat).

— Open Order units are not eligible for Prepared Fire.

— Small-arms fire targeting units in Open Order incurs a -2 DRM in addition to any terrain benefit (-1 because of formation; -1 because of enhanced ability to use available cover).

— Open Order units may not Shock.

— When the target of a Shock Attack, a unit in Open Order may Retreat Before Shock like any other unit. It may also “Disperse”, retreating up to 3 hexes away from the unit threatening the attack, passing through friendly units and/or enemy Frontal hexes. This includes attacks from enemy cavalry. It may not disperse if already disordered. After dispersing, the unit is automatically disordered.

— Units that Collapse immediately lose Open Order status.

— Each part of a unit in Extended Open Order disorders and rallies independently, using the parent counter’s disordered cohesion rating.

— Open Order units do not rout. No UDD is needed for 2nd Disorder UDDs that might result in Rout; instead apply a 1 SP loss and retreat 1-2 hexes.

— Adjacent friendly units do not UDD when a unit in Open Order routs.

Conservative military thinkers worried then and for the next 50 years that Open Order incurred a higher risk of shirking and desertion, as NCOs & officers could not exercise the same degree of supervision as over troops in denser formations. For this reason we chose to limit the Open Order option to Sharpshooters and infantry regiments of cohesion “7” or better.

The result in Death Valley is that the Confederates, with typical infantry cohesion ratings of “7”, can make far greater use of Open Order than the Union’s infantry, typically rated at “6”. The effect is consistent with the evidence Ray presents (see above). As for the cohesion difference, morale in the Army of Northern Virginia’s veteran formations remained remarkably high in 1864. Early’s II Corps was no exception despite its losses at Spotsylvania, and Breckinridge’s troops (Wharton’s division) had proven themselves both at New Market and Cold Harbor. Early’s Union opponents, on the other hand, were a little wobbly. Crook’s Army of West Virginia included troops who’d taken a beating at New Market and later fled from Lynchburg upon Early’s approach. Wright’s VI Corps suffered severe losses from the Wilderness to Petersburg before heading north to take on Early, and many of its veterans went home when their three-year enlistments expired. (We have, however, paid homage to the Vermont brigade, assigning its regiments “7” cohesion ratings.) Sheridan’s last formation, Emory’s XIX Corps, had been part of Nathaniel Banks’ failed Red River expedition in Louisiana, repulsed by Richard Taylor’s trans-Mississippi Confederates in rather ignominious fashion.

Playtesting indicates that the Confederates are well-advised to use Open Order heavily at 3rd Winchester and Fisher’s Hill. They do not need it while on the offensive, as at New Market and 2nd Kernstown. Nor does it seem particularly useful during the early stages of Cedar Creek, but probably will be if and when Sheridan counterattacks.

Author: William Byrne