It’s no secret that the Next War Series incorporates variations of mechanics from other distinguished games. One of those games is Mark Herman’s Flashpoint: Golan (FpG). I contacted Mark during the design and development of Next War: Korea regarding using a version of FpG’s International Posture Matrix, and he graciously agreed. There are differences, naturally, in the execution, and the Matrix is evolving even further in Next War: Taiwan. The intent, however, remains the same: it provides a method for players to randomly determine the effects of international influence in the primary operational area. Of course, players are always free to experiment with simply assigning Intervention Levels to explore various “what if” scenarios of their own devising.
Use of the Matrix requires a player, usually the attacked side, to roll a die to determine the sentiment of three “factions” of a particular nation: the Administration (i.e., executive and/or legislative branches), the Military, and the Popular Vote (i.e., the willingness of the people). Each faction can end up in one of the three Postures: Passive, Moderate, or Aggressive. Each Posture has an assigned value (-1, 0, +1 respectively), and the player simply adds each faction’s Posture value to generate a Posture Sum. This Posture Sum is then compared to a table to determine the overall National Posture: Passive, Moderate, or Aggressive. This National Posture is, finally, cross-referenced against the particular scenario and generates an Intervention Level. While it sounds complicated, it probably took more time for you to read how to do it then it takes to do it.
The secret sauce, if you will, is in determining which nations would or can intervene and at what levels would they intervene given enough provocation as represented by the various scenarios. The general underlying assumption is that the longer a particular nation has had to consider the issue at hand, the more likely they are to intervene at higher levels.
In the case of Next War: Taiwan, the two nations with the most at stake, potentially, are the U.S. and Japan. Unlike with the Republic of Korea, the U.S., has no treaty obligations to come to the Republic of China’s (ROC) aid in the event of an attack. This is shown in two ways. First, the U.S. has a good chance of intervening with Supplies, Special Operations Forces, Intelligence activities (as represented by Electronic Detection), but it becomes increasingly difficult and less likely that the U.S. will intervene with naval & air forces and even more unlikely that ground troops would be sent to Taiwan. The second way involves that last point; even if the U.S. does intervene with ground forces, the assumption is that only “lighter” units would be sent such as the Marines, 82nd Airborne, and 101st Airborne (Air Assault). As for Japan, while they also have no treaty obligations, they will, rightly, see any attack on the ROC as a pre-cursor to further People’s Republic of China (PRC) aggression in the East China Sea and environs, and they will act accordingly. The underlying assumption for the Japanese, though, is that they will conduct a limited response. Their naval assets will move to ensure control over particular island groups and their air force would participate in a limited manner to ensure such protection, but they will be unlikely to bring the full weight of their forces to bear. Thus there are restrictions to the amount of force the Japanese have and can use as well as where they can use it. (Note, however, that when playing the combined NWT/NWK game, the Japanse use the counters from both sets of games, so their response becomes far more expansive.)
The other nations represented in NWT are Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, but their entry into the conflict, if any, is governed by whether or not the PRC uses the opportunity of an invasion of Taiwan to also fully seize and annex the Paracels and/or Spratlys rather than from the Matrix.
One final item of note for the Matrix is that it also generates a DRM for the U.N. Resolution Die Roll. This is another mechanic borrowed from FpG. Any conflict will eventually come to the attention of the U.N., and it’s possible that they would issue a Resolution for a Cease-Fire. Players must contend with determining whether or not to Veto such a Resolution and/or if they’ll violate a Cease-Fire. In many cases, this can be a no-brainer depending on the current Victory Point (VP) differential, but, in others, it can be a strategic move to change world opinion (via the loss of VP) which might, ultimately, affect victory. In NWT, of course, both sides have the ability to Veto a UN Resolution as the U.S. and PRC are both members of the Security Council.
p.s. The initial idea for this article came from a question by Gene:
Btw, have you thought about a blog article about japan and how they fit , or could fit, into the NW series? Maybe even a new scenario for a pure Japanese chinese naval clash over those worthless islands in the East China Sea using a small naval map kinda like the one in NW Taiwan?
To which my response was:
There’s not enough in the NWT game for that kind of a scenario…. That would be another small game in itself, I would think.
So…stay tuned!
Looking forward to Next War: Taiwan.
Me, too!
Very cool. Is there a similar posture matrix in India-Pakistan?
Lucas, absolutely, although the players with variable entry are different, of course: PRC, US, and Russia.
Hello folks,
I’m a big fan of Next War Series.
Possible future issue would be Next War : Ukraine.
This is not desirable in reality but a quite interesting matter for wargaming…. with mounted map 😉
I tried the system yesterday in the Drive on Seoul first scenario.
I was intrigued by DRM (+1) penalty assigned to japanese forces even if they attack alone.
It was a choice made under JSDF capabilities or political issues?
Thanks.
p.s. the system is awesome.
I meant: “based on” JSDF capabilities or political issues 🙂
Marco, thanks for the kind words; I’m glad you’re enjoying it. That DRM represents the fact that the JSDF hasn’t been offensively minded for over half a century. Although doctrine and training are changing, it’s tough to erase that from senior commanders’ minds.
Thanks for your prompt answer! 🙂
Very interesting.