Weapons and tactics tend to evolve over the course of longer wars. The American Civil War was no exception. The two years elapsing between the 1862 and 1864 Shenandoah Valley campaigns witnessed changes in both regards.
Death Valley‘s design seeks to reflect those changes. In previous articles, I described the way the game handles late war innovations in the infantry arm, including sharpshooters and “Open Order” tactics. This article focuses on the difference two years made for the Union and Confederate cavalry and other mounted troops confronting each other in the Shenandoah.
The 1862 Campaign
In 1861 few expected a long war. Given the extended training period required to produce effective cavalry and the expenses involved in raising, equipping, and maintaining such units, the Federal government approached the task reluctantly. After all, didn’t the longer ranges of the new rifled small arms and artillery render cavalry obsolescent? And with much of America still being hewn from the wilderness, how could cavalry hope to maneuver on the rough terrain it would likely find on the battlefield?
While the Confederates may also have pondered cavalry’s role in the coming fight, a much higher percentage of them not only owned horses, but preferred mounted service to foot-slogging. Promised a daily stipend for feed, they brought their mounts along when they marched off to war, and soon got the jump on their northern antagonists. The Union was thus forced to open its coffers to compete.
Early in 1862, however, cavalry still lacked the numbers and organization needed to constitute a major threat, at least in the Shenandoah. The Union cavalry’s sole accomplishment of note was running down several hundred fleeing Confederates as darkness ended the 1st Battle of Kernstown. The Confederate cavalry under Turner Ashby did better, acting as Jackson’s rearguard after the Kernstown debacle and lashing out at Fremont’s pursuing forces shortly before Cross Keys. But discipline was not Ashby’s long suit, and his cavalry botched opportunities to cut off or pursue Banks’ retreating forces when Jackson struck for Winchester late in May.
Like their counterparts in designer Greg Laubach’s Cedar Mountain (part of the Twin Peaks package), 1862-style mounted cavalry in Death Valley have no weapons designators on their counters and cannot engage in fire combat. Their strength points are used only for Shock. When dismounted they can indeed fire, being armed with carbines. But a look at the Range Effects Chart makes clear that their fire isn’t particularly effective. This isn’t due to any flaws in the carbines, but to the troopers’ lack of experience. Lower cohesion values when dismounted likewise mirror this inexperience.
Union cavalry have an added disadvantage. Death Valley‘s 1862 battles feature Confederate cavalry leaders, but the Union cavalry regiments must usually do without them. This reflects the north’s early tendency to split up its cavalry into penny packets, assigning them to escort wagon trains and top brass in addition to scouting, screening, and driving off enemy cavalry. The Confederate cavalry, on the other hand, profited from leaders like Stuart and Ashby, who had a clear vision of what the mounted arm could do on the battlefield. Better Confederate cohesion ratings help reflect this.
The way Death Valley‘s 1862 battles contrast northern and southern cavalry leadership has further consequences. The Confederate cavalry may automatically change orders during the Division Orders Phase if within its brigadier’s command range, and also have the option of attempting orders changes when activated, either as part of their brigade or individually. Each Yankee cavalry regiment or battalion, however, must individually roll the die to change orders from Advance to Attack, or back again. Lacking brigadiers, Union cavalry will in most instances also suffer a negative DRM when shocking.
Cavalry finds a role
A few days after the 1862 Shenandoah campaign concluded at Port Republic, Jeb Stuart began to show the world what cavalry could do despite broken terrain and the dangers posed by rifled artillery and small arms. He followed up his mid-June “Ride Around McClellan” with spectacular raids later in the year. His counterparts in the west, Nathan Bedford Forrest, John Hunt Morgan, and Earl van Dorn did even better, launching deep strikes on the Union’s logistical infrastructure and derailing the operations of Grant’s and Buell’s armies. If the mounted arm in battle was not yet a force comparable to what it had been during the Napoleonic era, its mobility guaranteed its continued importance in a war spanning half a continent.
The Yankees took the hint. During the spring of 1863 “Fighting Joe” Hooker transformed the Army of the Potomac’s cavalry into a force capable of challenging Stuart’s mounted hegemony. In the western theater Benjamin Grierson and Abel Streight likewise undertook impressive raids that spring, even if Streight’s ended in disaster when Forrest caught up with him in northwestern Georgia.
Developments that summer pointed to further changes to come. Preparing for the Gettysburg campaign and faced with Hooker’s revamped cavalry arm, Robert E. Lee reinforced Stuart with three mounted brigades from western Virginia and one from the Carolinas. Most of this force was not true cavalry, but Mounted Infantry armed with rifles impossible to reload unless dismounted. Adding nothing to Stuart’s fighting strength, the four additional brigades at least took over screening duties and provided wagon train escorts.
Meanwhile the Union started to equip its mounted forces with Spencer breechloading carbines capable of firing seven shots before reloading. Initially only Wilder’s mounted infantry in the west and Custer’s Michigan brigade in the east were given the new weapon, but their successes at Tullahoma, Gettysburg and Chickamauga opened up new possibilities for mounted troops.
The 1864 Campaign
These possibilities were realized in 1864, and not least in the Shenandoah. At New Market the transformation was not yet complete, the Union cavalry being better organized and equipped but still wary of its foe. By late summer, though, most of the northern units carried Spencers, giving them firepower far exceeding that of their enemies. More importantly, the Yankees now had Phil Sheridan in command of the Army of the Shenandoah. The previous May he had stunned the Army of Northern Virginia’s cavalry at Yellow Tavern, where Stuart was mortally wounded. With the numbers and firepower now at his cavalry’s disposal, Sheridan would resurrect Napoleon’s grand tactical interplay of cavalry and infantry. Both at 3rd Winchester and at Cedar Creek his cavalry launched massed flank attacks once the blue-clad infantry had pinned Early’s lines.
The northern cavalry’s better cohesion values in Death Valley‘s 1864 battles indicate their now-veteran status and confidence in their new weapons. They can give a good account of themselves when mounted, but the Spencer-wielding units attain their historic apogee when they dismount, as only then can they maximize the impressive benefits the GBACW system justifiably awards these arms.
On the other hand, most of Early’s horse soldiers were the same mounted infantry that figured at Gettysburg. Fitz Lee’s division arrived in August as a reinforcement, but these still redoubtable warriors had to count solely on experience and audacity, as their equipment had changed little since 1862.
Death Valley captures the dire outlook for Early’s mounted troops. The 1864 Confederate cavalry can fire pistols while mounted, reflecting three years’ experience in the saddle, but pistols are no match for the enemy’s breechloading carbines. Dismounted, Fitz Lee’s troopers can use their carbines, but in general these are inferior to the models their enemies carry. The mounted infantry, on the other hand, carry only rifles and thus cannot fire unless they dismount.
How it all plays out
Although Death Valley accurately depicts the southern mounted arm’s early-war superiority, the fact remains that cavalry was more a nuisance than a threat in the Shenandoah battles of 1862. In playtesting, the cavalry regularly glare at each other at 1st Kernstown, 1st Winchester, and Cross Keys, but rarely do they come to blows. More often they must avoid being caught flatfooted by opposing infantry or artillery. As noted above, Civil War cavalry was an expensive investment. The game underlines that by awarding victory points for cavalry strength losses.
The 1864 battles are a different story. Both sides have plenty of mounted troops. Playtesting suggests the northern cavalry is quite capable of wreaking havoc. If facing only a mounted enemy or weak infantry, it can remain mounted. If the opposition is stronger; its best course lies in dismounting its Spencer-armed units and blasting away. A few good fire rolls will stagger the enemy, and the remaining mounted units can then swoop in for the kill.
Of course, when dismounted the northerners are a little more prone to failing UDDs, so the US player will want to have an infantry force not too far away, just in case of an upset. While not all the 1864 battles feature a strong Union infantry force, three of the five do.
When outnumbered, Early’s Valley Army is best served by combining arms on a tactical level, instead of attempting to mimic Sheridan’s grand tactical combinations. Superior Union firepower means the Confederates must dismount at least some of their mounted infantry or see it shot off their horses. When dismounted, they have a fair chance of blunting oncoming enemy horse. If fortunate enough to then shock a disordered enemy, they may hold their own.
More likely, however, they’ll need help from the line infantry, which boast better cohesion. Early may have difficulty sparing infantry for this job, but hard decisions are his usual lot in Death Valley. As cavalry/mounted infantry losses generate victory points for the other side, committing line infantry may be the more economical decision. Artillery also helps, but, like cavalry, its loss generates enemy victory points, so it cannot be used without proper support.
The genuine Confederate cavalry (as opposed to mounted infantry) will generally lose firefights. Thus, its effectiveness in the 1864 battles is limited to delaying action and shock. True, in GBACW shock is always more or less disruptive to the attacker, as it was historically. Thus, even a successful shock action will leave the Rebs vulnerable to a second enemy trump card: except at New Market and 2nd Kernstown, the Union also has superior numbers. Southern cavaliers pausing to rest their steeds and redress their ranks must stay on the lookout for the second or third wave of northern horse, or be swept from the field.
For this reason the Confederate player is again advised to combine arms at the tactical level. Block the Union cavalry using infantry in Open Order, forcing it to dismount and deploy. Dismount most of the mounted Infantry to ensure effective fire, but unless regular cavalry is available, leave some of it mounted to retain the option of shocking or even charging the foe. Carefully employ the horse artillery to provide an extra punch.
Lastly, Old Jube shouldn’t fuss too much about giving up meaningless ground — the alternative could well be worse!
Author: William Byrne
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