I have been an avid player of the “Next War” series of games since I discovered them by accident a few years ago at a local war game convention.  I’ve played them all, and wrote a series of AARs which have been run on this blog.  As I played the games, I realized one of the things that I most enjoy about the system is that it is one of the only games I know of that makes the player fully integrate capabilities across the various war-fighting domains.  To win, a player must effectively integrate air, sea, and land capabilities, and the game has some excellent rules for strike warfare, integrating cruise and ballistic missiles, and even for the use of chemical and tactical nuclear weapons. 

My “eureka” moment came when I realized this game really makes one think about modern, multi-domain operations.  It became crystal clear when I acquired the Supplemental Rules, and first added cyber warfare to my game experience.  Supplement 1’s cyber rules are genius.  They mix simplicity and playability with game impact, and I saw that the game became something different.  It became multi-domain.

What I mean by that is best captured in the US Army’s concept for multi-domain operations. To win at Next War, a player must converge capabilities across all domains—air, land, sea, cyber, and space.  The game does a great job on the first four, and touches a bit on space, but as I played through them all, I started adding elements—what I termed “House Rules”—to make bring it even more in line with these ideas.

The most important aspect of this to me really focused on adding capabilities for Russia and China, who feature prominently in each game, to reflect their respective military modernizations and evolving approaches to warfare.  Admittedly, I devised many of these rules prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but I believe that many of my ideas still hold. 

The Army Multi-Domain Operations Concept states that Russia and China will rely on anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) to create stand-off in the competition period (the pre-war phase) to separate the United States from its Allies and partners, and allow them to “win without fighting.”  They then rely on stand-off capabilities in conflict to separate the U.S. Joint force in time, space, and function, to win quickly, often before the bulk of U.S. forces can arrive.^[1]  With this in mind, my “House Rules” attempt to get at this separation;  to expand the fight beyond the game’s operational, or even strategic maps, and see what these A2/AD capabilities and efforts to separate the U.S. and its Allies means for the Next War games.  All of my house rules assume that the players are playing the Advanced Series Rules and the supplemental rules found in Next War Supplements 1 and 2.

House Rule 1:  Separating the Joint Force

These particular rules get at the efforts, largely by Russia and China, to use whole-of-nation capabilities to target their adversaries’ alliance cohesion and to delay the flow of U.S. or Allied reinforcements.  The U.S./Allied player also has the opportunity to delay the Russian/Chinese reinforcement flow.  They represent a range of capabilities—both non-kinetic and kinetic—designed to target a nation’s “will to fight” and attacks against transportation, communications, and other infrastructure that would delay shipping reinforcements.

HR 1.1 Will to Fight

A combatant’s Will to Fight (WtF) is considered a target that an adversary can “strike” in an effort to compel that nation from withdrawing its forces from the game.  In game terms, Russia, China, and in a more limited sense, North Korea can conduct WtF strikes against their adversaries using kinetic and non-kinetic strikes.  Allied forces (the United States, Commonwealth, France, South Korea, and the Republic of China) can conduct non-kinetic only WtF attacks against any minor allies of Russia or China (Belarus, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, etc.) North Korea can conduct WtF strikes only against Japan.  India and Pakistan can conduct WtF strikes only against each other.  Russia, China, and North Korea cannot be targeted with WtF strikes.  The Republic of Korea (ROK) cannot be targeted with WtF strikes if it is invaded by North Korean forces at the start of a game.

Each individual nation involved in the conflict has a WtF target that can be struck with non-kinetic (cyber counters) or kinetic (ballistic or cruise missiles, air strikes, or SOF).  A Nation’s WtF target can take a number of combined hits (see below).  At the point it has taken more than its Will to Fight Points (WtFP) damage level, that nation immediately withdraws all of its forces from the game and its territory cannot be used for basing purposes.  It is too complex and busy to keep track of the WtFP and WtF attacks on the game track, so I suggest doing it on a piece of paper with a pencil.

• United States: (NW Poland or NW Korea) 14 WtFP; (NW Taiwan) 12 WtFP; (NW India-Pakistan or NW Vietnam) 10 WtFP
• Commonwealth: (NW Poland) 14 WtFP; All others 10 WtFP
• France: (NW Poland) 10 WtFP;  All others 8 WtFP
• Taiwan: (NW Taiwan) 12 WtFP
• ROK: (NW Korea) 14 WtFP
• Vietnam: (NW Vietnam) 14 WtFP, (NW Taiwan) 8 WtFP
• India and Pakistan: 12 WtF each
• Poland and the Baltic States: 14 WtFP
• Visegrad States, Denmark, and Sweden: 12 WtFP
• All Other NATO States: 10 WtFP
• Japan: 10 WtFP
• Belarus: 10 WtFP
• Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia: 8 WtFP

WtF attacks are resolved on the Advanced Strike table using the Hardened Target row.  The result is the number of “hits” are inflicted against a nation’s WtFP.  An “X” counts as 3 hits (a spectacularly successful operation.). Cyber counters attack at half of their strength, rounded up (so a “7” strength cyber counter attacks as a “4”).  The targeted player can attempt to use a cyber counter to defend against the cyber attack.  The operation is resolved on the Cyber Warfare attack table (Supplement 1) on the UN Resolution table.  If the defense is successful, the attacker must add a +2 DRM to their WtFP attack.  SOF attacks are resolved on the SOF CRT as an attack on an HQ in an urban area.  SOF attacks during the first two game turns  have no modifier.  After turn 2, they add a +1 DRM.

Battlefield events also effect WtF.  The first loss of brigade counts as one hit.  Any loss of a capital ship (CV, AMPH, SSN) counts as one WtF hit.  The occupation of an urban area hex counts as a WtF hit, while the occupation of five cities counts as a Wtf hit.

WtF also can be repaired.  The destruction of enemy forces reduces a WtF hit, where every 5 brigades worth of losses, every five squadrons worth of aircraft, the destruction of a capital ship, or the capture of an enemy urban hex repairs 1 WtFP.  Furthermore, at the start of every turn, both players get to make a WtF Check.  Using the most prominent efficiency rating of their nation’s formations (for example, US forces would use a “7”) the player gets a chance to repair WtF damage.  Any roll below that figure repairs WtF damage by half the result under the efficiency rating, rounded down.  For example, the U.S. player rolls a 5 for its WtF Check.  That is 2 under its efficiency rating of 7.  Dividing that figure in half means the U.S. player would repair 1 WtFP.

The use of nuclear and chemical weapons can impact WtF.  After each use, the nation that suffered the attack and the nation in which it occurred must make an Efficiency Rating check.  The roll suffers a +2 DRM, but if successful, 2 WtFPs are restored (demonstrating renewed resolve).  If it fails, 2 WtFP hits are inflicted on both.  As an example.  The Chinese player conducts a chemical attack against a Commonwealth brigade in Vietnam.  Both the Commonwealth and Vietnam must make Efficiency Rating checks to determine the WtF implications.

HR 1.2 Delaying Reinforcements

All actors with cyber capabilities can use them to try to delay their adversaries’ flow of reinforcements.  This represents cyber attacks against a nation’s mobilization effort, its infrastructure, and ability to move forces.  Cyber counters are used in the attack role against any one adversary to delay that nation’s reinforcements.  For NW Poland only, NATO, the United States, Poland, and the Baltic States count as individual entities.  In any scenario involving tactical or strategic surprise, Russia and China can dedicate 2 cyber counters to every attack for the first five turns, while the Allied player can dedicate 1. On turn 6 and thereafter Russia and China can dedicate 1 cyber counter to each such cyber attack.  A player also can dedicate 1 cyber counter to defend against these attacks.  The attack is resolved on the UN Resolution row of the Cyber Warfare table.  If successful, the player in question does not receive reinforcements that turn.  The entire reinforcement arrival is then pushed back (to the right) for the rest of the game.  For example, in NW Poland, Russia conducts a cyber attack to delay the reinforcement flow for the United States on turn 3.  It succeeds.  The United States was slated to received reinforcement “E” that turn.  Due to the successful attack, the U.S. player receives no reinforcements that turn.  It would receive “E” next turn, and then “F” one turn later.

House Rule 2:  Stand-Off Capabilities

These rules attempt to integrate capabilities that exist within the militaries represented within the Next War games that more fulsomely examine the impact of sophisticated stand-off systems and A2/AD capabilities.

HR 2.1. Hypersonic Missiles

Both China and Russia currently field hypersonic missiles, which are extremely capable systems that are difficult to defend due to their high speeds and maneuverability.  In game terms, three systems can be replicated; the Chinese DF-17 Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM), the Russian Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM), and the Russia Tsirkon Cruise Missile.  Each of these weapons is handled slightly differently.

• The DF-17 MRBM is equipped with a maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicle^[2].  In game terms, this means these weapons are immune to any ballistic missile defense.  Their attack simply gets through and is resolved on the strike table with no defensive modifier.  As an MRBM, these systems can strike ground targets out to two areas on the strategic map.  In all scenarios China adds 10 separate DF-17s to their missile inventory.  Create a marker to track them.

• The AS-24 Killjoy/Kinzhal is a hybrid “hypersonic” system, which really is nothing more than an air-launched Iskander short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) that be carried by Russian bombers (Tu-95 or Tu-160) or by MiG-31^[3].  In game terms, these systems can be carried by aircraft to a launch point on the strategic map, and then may be fired against targets up to one additional zone on the Strategic Map.  They ARE subject to SAMs and can be engaged, but defensive fire suffers a +1 DRM.  Russia should be assigned 6 Kinzhal strike points at the start of the game.  Make a counter to keep track of how many they have in their magazine.

• SS-N-33/Tsirkon is a Russian developmental hypersonic cruise missile that can be launched from Russia surface ships (SAGs) against naval or land targets^[4].  It travels at high speeds (Mach 8-Mach 9) and is maneuverable.  It can be launched at targets up to one zone away on the strategic map.  Only US and UK maritime assets can attempt to defend against a Tsirkon strike, and they do so at a +3 DRM.  For naval strikes, they attack on the Naval 3 column.  Russia should be assigned 3 Tsirkon strike points at the start of the game.  Make a counter to keep track of how many they have.

HR 2.2 Advanced Chinese Ballistic missiles

China is one of the world’s leaders in the production of advanced ballistic missiles.  In all games where China is a combatant, it gets a set number of Ballistic Missile points, which represent mostly SRBM capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF).  These weapons can strike land targets out to one zone on the strategic map (or any target on the operational maps.). However, China also possesses other advanced systems. The DF-17 hypersonic was referenced above.   China also should be credited with their DF-21 and DF-26 family of missiles^[5].

• The DF-21/CSS-5 is a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM), which can hit targets up to two zones on the strategic map.  For game purposes, two variants are relevant.  The DF-21C (CSS-5 Mod 4) is an MRBM that mounts a conventional warhead.  It can hit targets out to two zones on the strategic map.  It can be intercepted by SAMs, and these are adjudicated normally.  The DF-21D is the unique “carrier killer” anti-ship ballistic missile.  It can be used for strikes against CVs or AMPH out to two zones.  Only U.S. or UK ships can attempt to engage these weapons when they are used in an anti-ship role (representing the U.S. AEGIS system with SM-6 SAMs and the UK Sea Viper PAAMS with ASTER missiles), and they do so with a +1 DRM.  A DF-21D uses the Naval 3 column for attacks against ships.  At the start of the game, the Chinese player receives an additional 1/3 of its Ballistic Missile points as DF-21.  For example, in NW Vietnam, Tactical Surprise Scenario, China gets 35 Ballistic Missile points. One-third of this figure (rounded up) gives China 12 DF-21s for the game.  This is IN ADDITION to the 35 points they have representing SRBMs.  There is no need to keep track of variants; they can be used either as conventional MRBMs or as anti-ship weapons.  Create a counter to keep track of their stocks of DF-21 MRBMs.

• The DF-26 is an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) that the Chinese call the “Guam Killer” or the “Guam Express.”  It is intended to range Guam, and China can use it to strike targets anywhere on the Strategic Map (but not the US/Hawaii holding box).  There is some evidence that China also is developing an anti-ship variant.  This can be an optional rule.  If the Chinese player wishes to use DF-26s in an anti-ship role (targeting CVs or AMPH anywhere on the strategic map), they take a +8 VP penalty at the start of the game.  In this case, they are treated exactly like the DF-21D above, with the only difference being the extended range.  Whatever the number of DF-21s the Chinese player receives, halve it for the DF-26.  In the example above, the Chinese player would get 6 DF-26 strikes for the game.  Create a counter to keep track of their stocks of DF-26 IRBM.

HR 2.3 Alternative AEGIS Ashore Rules

The AEGIS Ashore counter in NW Poland uses rules that were developed before the release of alternative air defense counters for advanced SAMs in Supplements 1 and 2.  To bring it into compliance, the AEGIS Ashore counter should be treated like an immobile THAAD, as depicted in Supplemented 2.

House Rule 3:  Space Warfare

The one domain that the Next War games largely ignores is Space.  Space capabilities are integrated throughout the game, underlying all intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities and precision navigation and timing (PNT) which allow for successful strike operations.  Space warfare is amazingly complex, and a whole separate game could be dedicated to it.  These proposed rules admittedly oversimplify warfare in the space domain, but they do give a taste of it, and demonstrate how critical this domain is to modern combat.

Counterspace operations will be integral to potential military campaigns by the PLA, and China has counter space weapons capabilities intended to target US and allied satellites.”

“Russia continues to train its military space elements and field new anti satellite weapons to disrupt and degrade US and Allied space capabilities.”

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 2022.

HR 3.1 Non-Kinetic, Reversible Counterspace Attacks

China, Russia, and the United States can employ non-kinetic counter-space weapons.  These represent cyber capabilities, jammers, dazzlers, and other such capabilities designed to cause temporary, non-destructive degradation to enemy space capabilities.  Any of these nations can use their cyber counters to conduct non-kinetic space operations.  The attacking player must commit two cyber counters to the attack, and no matter what the attack strength, a combined space attack attacks with a strength of “7”.  A defending player can use one cyber counter to defend.  The attack is resolved on the Cyber Warfare table under the Electronic Detection column.  If successful, all electronic detection, maritime detection, and strike operations receive a +1 DRM for that turn.  A player can conduct multiple attacks — up to three, but each requires two cyber counters — which would gain additional +1 DRMs, up to +3.  These attacks occur only for the turn in question^[6].

HR 3.2 Kinetic, Non-Reversible Counterspace Attacks

China, Russia, and the United States also can employ a limited number of kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) systems to target their enemy’s satellite constellations.  Each successful kinetic attack adds a permanent +1 DRM from the time of the attack forward, throughout the game.  A kinetic ASAT attack is adjudicated as a 5 strength cyber counter on the Air Superiority column of the Cyber Warfare table.  The side that first uses a kinetic ASAT, however, suffers an immediate penalty of 15 Victory Points, and each subsequent use by any actor adds another 5 Victory Point penalty.  This represents international condemnation for creating orbital debris fields—space junk—that could impact civilian satellites.  China and Russia each get 4 kinetic ASAT attacks per game, while the United States gets 2.

A side can reconstitute its satellite constellation by expending Supply Points.  For the cost of 4 Supply Points, a side can remove one of the permanent +1 DRMs.  For example, if Russia conducted 3 successful kinetic ASAT strikes against US satellites, its permanent cumulate DRM would be a +3.  The U.S. player could reduce that to +2 by expending four supply points.

Conclusion

I have used these “House Rules” in several different iterations of Next War play, and I have appreciated how they impact the game.  I believe they allow players to have a more holistic view of modern combat by making a handful of additions that augment the gaming experience by increasing the multi-domain characteristics of modern warfare.  Next War’s rules stand on their own.  These “House Rules” represent the tinkering of one guy who thinks a great deal about modern warfare and sees the potential for the Next War family of games to even more accurately represent modern, multi-domain warfare.  Enjoy!

By Ian Sullivan

The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense or the Department of the Army.

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^[1] U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, “The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028,” TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 6 December 2018.

^[2] Center for Strategic and International Studies, “DF-17,” Missiles of the World, 2 August 2021.

^[3] Ibid., “Kh-47M2 Kinzhal,” Missiles of the World, 19 March 2022.

^[4] Thomas Nilsen, “Russia’s New Hypersonic Tsirkon Missile Was Fired From Norwegian Sector of Barents Sea,” The Barents Observer, 23 February 2022; Mark Episkopos, “What is Behind Russia’s Hypersonic Tsirkon Missile?,” The National Interest, 29 January 2022.

^[5] CSIS, “DF-21 (CSS-5),” Missile Threat, 28 March 2022

^[6] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, February 2022.