Drop Zone: Southern France Organization of Units – Part 4: German Army, Corps, Division, and Kampfgruppe

We will continue or analysis of unit organization with a look at the German Army, Corps, Divisions and Kampfgruppe involved. The German Nineteenth Army was responsible for defending the entire Mediterranean coast of France. The Army was comprised of three corps, the LXII, LXXXV and IV Luftwaffe. In the diagram below, the divisions comprising each corps are shown. In the east, LXII defended the coast from the Franco-Italian border west to Toulon. In the center, XXXV Corps defended the area from Marseilles to just across the Rhone River delta. In the west, IV Luftwaffe Corps covered the beaches all the way to the Spanish border. The allied invasion would be unleashed upon the center of LXII Corps.

In this Nineteenth Army organization chart, divisions in red committed battalion-level units to the battle of 15-16 August, the 189th Division in orange committed company-level units to the fight, divisions in green arrived too late to participate in the battle, the 716th Division in grey was uninvolved and headquarters are in blue.

By August 1944 German infantry division structure varied widely. The 242nd and 244th Grenadier Divisions each had three regiments of three German grenadier battalions each. Each regiment of the 242nd Division also had an ost battalion of Armenians or Azerbaijanis, and a division reconnaissance battalion. The 242nd had thirteen maneuver battalions while the 244th Division had nine. The 148th Reserve Division had only seven maneuver battalions.

In this 242nd Grenadier Division organization chart, units in red participated in the battle against the allied airborne forces.

The 242nd Division’s 765th Grenadier Regiment was directly in the path of the US VI Corps amphibious invasion. That is why only the III Battalion, which was the division reserve, was able to oppose the paratroopers. The other three battalions were deployed on the beaches and quickly engulfed in the deluge of allied firepower. The 242 Reconnaissance Battalion was deployed in the division’s rear area specifically to deal with the airborne threat. Of course, it could not fulfil the its usual role of screening in advance of the division’s front, as the front was the shoreline. The Service & Support Alarm Company is high-lighted, as it was assigned to the Kampfgruppe von Schwerin counterattack force. The 917th Regiment was engaged by landing forces on the left flank of the US invasion force, while the 918th Regiment was held back to defend the vital port of Toulon.

In this 244th Grenadier Division organization chart, units in red participated in the battle against the allied airborne forces.

The 244th Division was located on the coast just to the west of the invasion area. Therefore, it was natural that elements of this division were the first to arrive from the west. Units of the 244th Division formed the core of Kampfgruppe von Schwerin. The remainder of the 933rd Regiment was also ordered to join the fight against the paratroopers, but arrived too late. The 934th Regiment was held back to defend the major port of Marseille.

In this 148th Reserve Division organization chart, units in red participated in the battle against the allied airborne forces.

The 148th Reserve Division had only seven battalions—two regiments of three grenadier battalions each and a fusilier battalion. The fusilier battalion combined the roles of reconnaissance and division reserve. The fusiliers were armed and organized the same as a grenadier battalion, with the addition of a company’s worth of bicycles. The main difference was that the fusilier battalion was usually better manned with the division’s best troops and led by the most capable officers. The 239th Grenadier Regiment was also attacked by the invading troops of US VI Corps, and the 444th Grenadier Battalion and 661st Ost (Russian) Battalion were destroyed on the beaches. The 8th Grenadier Regiment was located further east, and lacked transport to arrive at the battle by D+1. So, the main counterattack was delivered by the 327th and 372nd Battalions of the 239th Grenadier Regiment.

Complicating re-construction of the German command structure even more, the 148th Division was undergoing a major re-organization just as the invasion struck. Foreseeing that the allies would likely land in the 242nd Division sector and not the 148th Division’s area further east, Nineteenth Army had ordered LXII Corps in early August to have the 148th Division create a third regiment, the 281st Grenadier Regiment or Kessler Regiment, by taking a battalion from each of the existing regiments and adding the Fusilier Battalion. In this diagram the battalion moved in the re-organization are in green:

148th Reserve Division Structure on 1 August 1944
Planned 148th Reserve Division Structure, unaccomplished by 15 August 1944

This new 281st Regiment, the strongest in the division, would be located just to the east of Le Muy, north of St Raphael. From there it could provide a strong force to repel airborne landings and counterattack the amphibious troops as they landed. Fortunately for the allies, the Germans were slow to execute these orders, and only the new 281st Regiment’s command post under Oberst Kessler and some advance planning parties and the new regiment’s 13th Howitzer and 14th Anti-Tank Companies were in position on 15 August. The 281st was never completely formed, but what remains uncertain is who commanded the 148th Division counterattack force (mainly the 327th and 372nd Battalions). It was probably Oberst Hahn of the 239th Regiment. However, it is possible the Hahn was fully occupied directing the defense of his 444th and 661st Battalions against the landings, so that Oberst Kessler may have been designated to lead the counterattack against the British paratroopers. The sudden rout of the 148th Division, and the death of many of the participants, has left no trail in the archives to answer this question.

Kampfgruppe von Schwerin

The best source for accurate order of battle information on the German forces comes from prisoner of war interrogations of key leaders conducted in the summer of 1946. In particular, the reports from Generals Botsch (B-696) and von Schwerin (A-878) and Colonel Bruendel (C-086) tell the most complete story of the formation and actions of the kampfgruppe.

Nineteenth Army received only fragmentary and conflicting information on the unfolding allied invasion, as all wire communications had been cut by the paratroopers and French resistance. Once the location and extant of the invasion could be ascertained, by late morning of D-Day, the Army staff put contingency plans into effect. The only mechanized force available, the 11th Panzer Division, was ordered to the threatened area, but had a long way to go. To conduct a more immediate counter-attack from the west, General Botsch, the Nineteenth Army Chief of Staff, made a phone call the commander of the 189th Division, General von Schwerin, ordering him to assemble a kampfgruppe and lead it into the attack. Von Schwerin was initially slated to receive three regimental headquarters overseeing eight infantry battalions, the III/244 Field Artillery Battalion and a flak battalion, drawn from four divisions of the LXXXV Corps and IV Luftwaffe Corps. For the most part, only one battalion was selected from each regiment, allowing for the consolidation of limited transportation assets and permitting the selected battalion to be brough up to strength with troops and equipment from the units left behind. As the scope of allied invasion became clearer, Botsch decided that there was little threat of a second allied landing in the Marseilles-Toulon area or further west. So, later on D-Day he added the 933rd Regiment, located closest to the action, with its two remaining battalions to the planned kampfgruppe.  

In this Kampfgruppe von Schwerin organization chart, the units in blue comprise the initial planned organization, with the units in green added later that day.

The envisioned kampfgruppe was a robust reinforced division sized formation, with ten maneuver battalions in four regiments and a supporting artillery regiment. With this powerful force, von Schwerin was ordered to accomplish two major objectives: (1) crush the allied airborne force, thereby rescuing the German forces trapped at Draguignan and Le Muy; and (2) continue the attack to the beaches, driving the allied amphibious forces back into the sea, or at least pinning them in place as occurred at Anzio. Then the 11th Panzer Division could arrive in time to deliver the coup de grace.

This ambitious plan foundered on logistic realities. The ten battalions of infantry and engineers could be made ready in short order, and all were within a short drive of the battle area. Unfortunately, there were neither sufficient vehicles nor fuel to move all these troops quickly. What few vehicles that were available were used to tow artillery, and to transport heavy weapons, equipment and ammunition. Only the 305th Grenadier Regiment of the 198th Regiment had sufficient vehicles to carry its battalions, but it became stuck on the wrong side of the Rhone River, with only one of five bridges in operation after repeated allied air attacks. So, the 305th Grenadier Regiment had to compete with the 11th Panzer Division for ferry boats—and the panzers, of course, had priority.

General von Schwerin quickly realized that most of the forces assigned to his command would never arrive in time. Instead of the planned ten battalions, he more realistically hoped to muster four infantry battalions of the 244th Division’s 932nd and 933rd Regiments by the morning of 16August. Von Schwerin adjusted his mission to eliminating the American paratroopers in Les Arcs and Roche Rousseau and then advancing up National Highway 7 to Le Muy in order to rescue the beleaguered 242nd Reconnaissance Battalion. If successful, he would set up blocking positions in the high ground around Le Muy to delay the advance of US VI Corps from the beaches. This is what the kampfgruppe was expected (or hoped) to look like by the morning of D+1, 16 August:  

This is the composition of the Kampfgruppe that General von Schwerin expected to have on the morning of D+1, 16 August.

Somehow, this organization shown above made its way into the official US Army Center for Military History’s Riviera to the Rhine, which describes a German attack by four battalions, and other histories of the campaign. Initial play-testing was conducted with such a four-battalion kampfgruppe, and the paratroopers were unable to stop this formation. Further research based on interrogation reports, as outlined below, corrected and reduced the order of battle for Kampfgruppe von Schwerin.

Around mid-day on D-Day General von Schwerin raced forward with a small kampfgruppe command post and assault company from his 189th Division headquarters, and the headquarters of his 15th Regiment under Colonel Rehbock. They arrived in the vicinity of Vidauban (just off the southwest corner of the game map). Leaving the Rehbock’s 15th Regiment HQ to coordinate the reception and staging of the combat troops trickling in, von Schwerin met with General Baessler of the 242nd Division for an intelligence update and to coordinate his attack. He also met with Colonel Bruendel of the 932nd Regiment and Colonel Tyroler of the 18th Flak Regiment (88-mm).

Bruendel had already consolidated all the bicycles of his regiment and the neighboring 933rd Regiment to move the first two infantry battalions. These troops arrived during the evening and night of D-Day, after a grueling 100-kilometer bike ride in mountainous terrain, while enduring the August heat of the Riviera. The III/932 under Captain Matte and the I/933 under Captain Ebert arrived piecemeal and exhausted. Captain Kutscher’s III/244 Field Artillery Battalion, with 105-mm howitzers, and one 88-mm anti-tank battery of the 18th Flak Regiment were the only fire support units to show up. An unidentified platoon of panzers was the final combat element. These were all the troops that arrived in time to fight on 16 August, organized as below. After a short night’s rest the much reduced Kampfgruppe von Schwerin kicked off its attack at 7:00 AM on D+1, August 16th.

This is the composition of the Kampfgruppe that General von Schwerin expected to have on the morning of D+1, 16 August.

Previous Articles:

Drop Zone: Southern France Organization – Part 1: Infantry Units from Squad to Battalion Level

Drop Zone: Southern France Organization – Part 2: Regiments and Brigades

Drop Zone: Southern France Organization of Units – Part 3: The 1st Airborne Task Force (ABTF)

Dan Fournie
Author: Dan Fournie

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