Design Considerations for Opportunity Fire in the Last Hundred Yards

One of the major design objectives for The Last Hundred Yards was to give players the feeling or sensation that actions are occurring simultaneously. One of the ways to achieve this was to break up the distance a unit can maneuver into smaller increments, a maximum of 2-3 hexes. So, for every 2-3 hexes a unit maneuvers, it will suffer at least one fire attack and possibly more depending on the initiative. In general, I deliberately chose to abstract as much as possible (including opportunity fire), allowing players to focus on fire and maneuver and tactics without getting bogged down in the details.

Opportunity fire at long ranges was rare. The engagement range during WW2 for the vast majority of the small arms fire occurred within 100 yards or less. Soldiers, for self-preservation, were loath to fire too soon for fear of divulging their position prematurely and drawing enemy fire or even worse mortar or artillery fire. Assuming the enemy unit was even seen, firing at ranges greater than 100 yards would at best only suppress an enemy unit. Allowing the enemy to get close before firing was significantly more effective, increasing the possibility of an ambush and pinning the enemy in the “kill zone”.

One must also consider real life LOS conditions. Typically, the posture of most defending units at ground level was either they were dug-in, prone, or kneeling behind a wall or window of a building. From this lower perspective, a unit’s LOS would be no more than 2 to 3 feet off the ground and when firing at advancing enemy units at ranges greater than 50 to 75 yards could be problematic, even across open ground. In addition, in the LHY it is assumed as in real life that even open ground has some undulation and vegetation unless it’s a beach, parking lot, airfield, etc.

From a game mechanics perspective, I wanted to avoid the typical opportunity fire situation when maneuvering where a unit must stop in every hex to allow the opposing player the option to fire, (i.e., “do you want to shoot”) and then wait for him to decide if he wanted to do so. Furthermore, you see the results immediately and then can base your next move accordingly. Not only is this disruptive in the flow of the game but with the increase in the number of die rolls it slows play. Most importantly it voids the simultaneous aspect of the game that I am seeking to achieve.

From a behavioral perspective and the reasons stated above, I decided that opportunity fire from small arms would not be considered at ranges greater than 100 yards. For 100 yards and in, the +1 DRM against a unit that maneuvered within two hexes was the simplest and best option for opportunity fire.


Mike Denson
Author: Mike Denson

Please note: I reserve the right to delete comments that are offensive or off-topic.

We'd love to hear from you! Please take a minute to share your comments.

6 thoughts on “Design Considerations for Opportunity Fire in the Last Hundred Yards

  1. It’s always interesting (to me at least!) to hear a designer’s thoughts. Thanks for sharing!

    The mechanics take some getting used to, especially the way an existing SAF counter can move out of a hex with a unit moving out of a stack.

    The only questions I’d have for you concerning Op-Fire is if you feel MGs are modeled realistically since there isn’t really any way to establish a Fire Lane or interdict troops crossing a (hex-wide) street?

    I don’t mind squads often being limited to 1-2 hex interdiction ranges but it seems like dedicated MG teams should have a greater ability to defend their position. I’d be really interested to hear your thoughts!

    • I know there were times when fire lanes were used to interdict enemy units crossing a street. But most of the time, a MG or any unit for that matter, would not fire unless it had a target. In addition, enemy units would work to distract or suppress the MG team prior to crossing the street. Technically, I did not think it necessary chose to not interrupt the flow of the game with the details and necessary rules to cover this case.

      • That seems right, but IMO it does feel a bit weird. Not everything is happening simultaneously really; coordination of units separated by 100+m wasn’t super-easy with no tactical radios. Machine guns were really effective at longer ranges at could potentially engage multiple targets at the kind of time scale we’re talking about. If a turn is 5min, it’s hard to imagine that a MG being rushed by a couple squads would have *no* capability to engage both.

        While I know you’re designing something quite different, I think this is something ASL does quite well – portray the dangerousness if heavier machine guns with its rate-of-fire and firelane mechanics. Rate-of-fire allows MGs to *potentially* engage a number of targets. In LHY a MG is just a squad with a lightly longer range. This is often a problem in tactical games like Conflict of Heroes or Lock n Load, where you know each defending unit can only fire at most at one target so it’s fairly easy to predictably “flood the zone”; if you have more available units you know you can overwhelm a given defensive position. But one of the things about MGs was their ability to bring a lot of firepower quickly and potentially hold off multiple attackers.

        I should say, I haven’t really run into the “flood the zone” tactics in LHY the way we did in other games that don’t do any kind of modeling of how MG firepower (especially heavier MGs) is pretty different from squad firepower. So it seems to be working for us. But I do find I miss squad leader’s slightly more detailed model.

        • All squads and MG units in the game with a small arms value (SAV) of one includes a MG and may use Split Fire to fire against two separate hexes/targets and therefore can engage multiple targets. Squads of all major belligerents in WW2 had inherent MGs and in most cases, (except for US BAR) the ROF for a squad’s LMG and a MG section’s MMG was the same and in the case of the MG34/42 the same MG. The primary difference between an LMG (squad) and MMG (MG section) was the type of mount employed, (i.e., bi-pod vs tri-pod).

  2. Very nice explanation, Mike. Your viewpoint in LHY is a unique one, and I can see why some have misunderstood your intent. After reading this, it is clear that opportunity fire is NOT a “missing element” in the design!