Last week’s installment included a synopsis of the Battle of Cross Keys, along with a brief description of the way in which the Death Valley scenario seeks to simulate the caution that characterized John C. Fremont’s generalship that day. It concluded with the first part of my playtest AAR, describing the scenario’s 1200 turn. Here we pick up where we left off.
1300. The US retained Initiative. US Efficiency = 2; CS Efficiency = 4. Fremont placed Schenck under Attack Orders, and Milroy, aggressive as always, achieved Individual Initiative. The wooded terrain opposite Ewell’s left wing proved tough for Schenck, however, and Ewell’s artillery & infantry along Mill Creek hit Milroy’s approach hard. Meanwhile, Richard Taylor’s powerful brigade entered the map via the Port Republic Road.
1400. Again the US started with Initiative. US Efficiency = 3; CS Efficiency = 3 (+1). Fremont switched his Attack Order to Stahel, as Schenck’s progress seemed so slow. Koltes failed his Individual Initiative roll. Trimble counterattacked, just as in the actual event. By the end of the turn Fremont had lost 22 infantry SP and one gun. Ewell had lost 6 infantry SP and 2 guns. Half the 3rd West Virginia (Milroy) routed after losing 4 of its 5 SP; both 8th and 45th New York (Stahel) routed after losing 1 SP each. These were severe blows, but Fremont had a slight lead in Victory Points. Taylor’s men came up alongside Trimble’s, and John Patton’s brigade came on as reinforcements (mistakenly called “Campbell’s brigade” in the illustration captions — Patton had replaced Campbell, but I forgot to flip the counter).
1500. The US kept the Initiative. US Efficiency = 2 ; CS Effciency = 2 (+1). Koltes failed his second Individual Initiative roll. Taylor rolled a Loose Cannon and suffered as much damage as he inflicted, but Stahel’s brigade was now in deep trouble, as Trimble’s brigade continued its attack. Patton’s brigade headed for Ewell’s left, where Schenck continued an outflanking move using the forest as cover.
1600. Once more the US had the Initiative. US efficiency = 3; CS Efficiency = 3 (+1). As Stahel was in no condition to contribute, Fremont switched his Attack Order back to Schenck, but Clusaret flunked his Individual Initiative roll. The main fight thus remained that between Blenker’s division and Ewell’s right wing. About midway through the turn losses stood as follows:
35 Infantry SP, 4 guns
19 infantry SP, 2 guns.
By turn’s end the US artillery had knocked out three more of Ewell’s guns while losing only one, erasing Fremont’s VP deficit.
1700. Ewell finally won the Initiative. CS Efficiency = 3 (+1); US Efficiency = 3. Clusaret passed his Individual Initiative roll, so Fremont’s right was ready to attack. It made progress against dogged resistance. But Trimble and Taylor continued to hammer Blenker’s divison, and by turn’s end losses were:
US:Â 61 Infantry SP, 1 Cav SP, 10 guns
CS:Â 34 infantry SP, 6 guns.
Counting the 10 victory points awarded to Ewell for two combat ineffective US brigades (Stahel and Koltes), Fremont could not have placed anyone under Attack Orders for 1800, and Milroy & Clusaret would have had to roll for “Recall”, switching to Advance Orders if unsuccessful. Unfortunately, I did not count the VP for the two ineffective brigades. Milroy and Clusaret would probably have passed their Recall rolls, so I don’t think I skewed 1800 too badly.
1800. Ewell retained the Initiative. CS Efficiency = 3; US Efficiency = 1. With that US Efficiency draw, failure to roll Recall didn’t much matter. Schenck’s & Clusaret’s drive went nowhere; indeed, Steuart’s brigade counterattacked. Milroy belatedly headed east to help Blenker’s remnants. With the Rebs ahead by 14 VP (a “tactical victory”), I called the game after both sides drew “1” Efficiency chits for 1900.
Playtesting Conclusions
My waffling with Fremont’s Attack Orders did not help his cause, leaving Stahel exposed to a riposte. It would have been better to stick with Schenck’s attack, especially as Milroy had already rolled Individual Initiative. Clusaret might then have successfully rolled Individual Initiative sooner rather than later, thus committing Fremont’s whole division to the effort.
Since Taylor arrives so early, Stahel is best advised to await Koltes and then set up as strong a line as possible, keeping well back so as to force the Rebs to come forward if they choose to attack. If Schenck’s attack fails to turn Ewell out of his Mill Creek Line, Fremont can always switch his Attack Order to Stahel at some opportune moment.
Old Bald Head’s artillery line along Mill Creek is truly formidable. Milroy should not have risked his troops against it. As the game progressed, Milroy was forced to pull back and amounted to no more than a potential threat thereafter. The Union artillery is best advised to duel with the Reb artillery on its own, seeking out available cover, however meager, and exploiting any height advantage it can find. The eastern terminus of the Mill Creek line is indeed on lower ground than the plateau to the north.
Losses were astronomical compared with the real battle. We wargamers are known for pushing our cardboard armies harder than a real commander would, and playtesting may encourage an extra degree of recklessness. Next time I’ll attempt to refine the Union tactics as described above. This should reduce losses for both sides, but especially for the Union, whose units are larger but more brittle than Ewell’s.
Based on these results, the “Fremont’s Caution” rule will undergo a little tweaking. Then it will be back to the table for another test, but I feel “Cross Keys” has the makings of a winner.
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