Those of you who have taken Next War: Korea (NWK) for a spin have probably noticed by now that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and Air Force (KPAF) are fairly formidable in the game (the latter for only a little while, of course). One of the underlying assumptions of the game is that somehow, either through relaxation or negligence on the part of the international community and its enforcement of sanctions combined with the willingness of the PRC to surreptitiously defy those sanctions, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has managed to overcome several of its economic and military challenges in terms of food, spare parts, new equipment, etc. It’s not a completely unreasonable assumption if you consider that a tip regarding possible drug shipments was the only reason a recent load of weapons and spare parts bound for North Korea was found and seized by the Panamanians¹. That indicates that there are active elements of a strategy to circumvent the sanctions. Stopping one shipment should make one wonder how many others got through.

The fact is, though, while the KPA and KPAF are dangerous looking forces on paper, the reality lies somewhere below the capability as depicted in Next War: Korea. Although there is no denying that the KPA is a large, relatively well-armed force composed for the most part of troops who have been brought up within the philosophy of Juche (basically, extreme self-reliance), that force is also largely underfed and under-trained. However, as Stalin is reputed to have stated, “quantity has a quality all its own.”

That sentiment can also be applied to the KPAF, which maintains a large inventory of aircraft ranging from relatively capable aircraft such as the MiG-29 to Korean War vintage MiG-15s. Although numbers can matter in terms of controlling a particular patch of sky, as is represented in the Air Superiority calculation within the game, it only applies if you can actually get the planes in the air. Within the game, the KPAF is generously assumed to have parts, pilots, and fuel for the vast majority of its airframes to fly. The Pilot Skill modifiers portray fairly well the fact that KPAF pilots only fly around 25 training hours per year (more for the MiG-29 pilots)², but the reality is that it is highly unlikely the North could sortie many of their older airframes at all in a combat situation. In 2014 alone, they’ve had three MiG-19s crash after take-off or during training³.