In this InsideGMT article, I’ll give some historical comments on a few (but not all) of the strategy cards. I want to unpack the events and people at play behind these cards so you can better appreciate what they represent. But this is a high-level overview of the historical background, and detail here is sacrificed in the pursuit of brevity.

Note that this the second part of a two-part series of InsideGMT articles about the cards in Bear Trap—in the first part, I discussed how the different cards work and what the deck compositions look like in the game.

If you have trouble reading the card text on the card graphics presented here, take a look at the second page of the Bear Trap player aid, which can be found on the GMT webpage for the game, as the card text for all strategy cards can be found there. (And note that the cards depicted here are playtest components and still subject to possible change—including text, art, and graphic design.)

For those unfamiliar with how these strategy cards work in the game, here’s a quick overview: Each side has eight pairs of strategy cards (16 cards total). During setup each player will choose one strategy card and add it to their deck—thereby informing their initial strategic direction. Then, each time a player reshuffles their deck, they add two additional strategy cards to their deck. This allows them to develop their overarching strategy in reaction to the changing game state. It’s also worth noting that, during setup, each player will remove a random pair of strategy cards from the game. This means that a player cannot ever rely wholly on one pair of strategy cards to be a staple of their approach to the game, as it won’t necessarily be available to them in one playthrough or the next.

Soviet Strategy Cards

Landmines

Landmines use was rampant during the Soviet-Afghan war and Afghanistan remains one of the most heavily mined countries in the world. The use of “toy mines” by the Soviets (e.g. the PFM-1)—so called because of its superficially similar appearance to a toy—garnered them a degree of scrutiny from the international community. The use of such mines highlights the indiscriminate nature of the Soviet approach to the war: mines will kill or harm whomever, whether combatant or not. In the Soviet approach, this was a non-issue. After all, a mine which maims or kills wives or children would force would-be insurgents away from the fighting, as they became forced to adopt the caregiver role.  But both sides employed landmines during the war, and throughout the country. While the Soviets employed them on a much greater scale, the United States provided landmines to mujahideen fighters as part of U.S. covert assistance in the 1980s.

Soviet Air Strikes

Over the course of the war, the Soviets leaned heavily on their unique advantage—air power—in different ways. Air power was used, for instance, to quickly deploy special forces in air assault operations to try and trap enemy combatants as well as to resupply forces in remote and otherwise hard to reach areas.

Most notably, though, is the way Soviets used their air power to punish—to terrorize—those thought to support the mujahideen (e.g. supporters who might have provided the mujahideen with supplies or safe haven). That is, by destroying villages wholescale.

However, these actions only radicalized more Afghans, who then took up arms against the Soviets and the Afghan government. This Soviet action also played a key part in the ensuing refugee crisis, which saw over three million refugees flee over the Pakistani border, in turn garnering the Soviets negative attention from other countries.

Spetsnaz

The Soviet special forces (Spetsnaz) played a key role in the start of the war. In fall 1979, the Spetsnaz were covertly deployed into Afghanistan and executed the then Afghan President Hafizullah Amin so that the Soviet sympathetic Babrak Marmal could be installed as President—this was “Operation Storm-333”.

Once the war was officially underway, the Spetsnaz took on various roles. They often took carriage of what were considered more difficult operations. For instance “Operation Curtain”, roughly 1984-1988, saw the Spetsnaz used to enhance border security (both the Iran-Afghan border and the Pakistan-Afghan border) which was largely executed through ambushes and raids.

While the Soviets struggled to manage the counter-insurgency they found themselves fighting, the Spetsnaz proved to be more effective in counter-insurgency operations than their colleagues in the Soviet 40^th Army—which had trained to fight a traditional war on the plains of Europe against western powers.

Normative Fire

The idea behind normative fires—in which artillery fires a number of rounds during a specified period to produce a mathematically expected percentage of targets destroyed—is that the target will become so damaged that it loses its combat effectives to the desired degree.

In many ways, the application of normative fire typifies the Soviet approach the war. The Soviets were superior, technologically and in numbers, to their opponent. But their fighting style and assumptions were outmoded and ill-suited for the kind of conflict they found themselves in. The Soviet reliance on massed artillery firing barrages, to shatter defense of stationary targets before advancing, was unable to achieve the desired results in Afghanistan because guerilla fighters will not maintain a linear line of defense and will not hold  static positions.

Policy of National Reconciliation

Mohammed Najibullah, who became the Afghanistan President in 1986, sought to use a National Reconciliation Policy (NRP) as a mechanism to foster negotiation with various mujahideen groups and de-escalate the conflict. At the same time, Gorbachev sought to use the NRP as a mechanism to begin drawing down the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

The negotiations with the mujahideen met with varying degrees of success. In some case, they resulted in mujahideen groups becoming engaged the national political processes and their forces being folded into the DRA Army. However mistrust with the Najibullah government proved a persistent roadblock to the NPR having any real lasting success.

Insurgent Strategy Cards

Lion of Panjshir

Ahmad Shah Massoud, known as the Lion of Panjshir, was one of the most prominent mujahideen leaders in Afghanistan.

Rebels like Massoud also preyed on the convoy routes the Soviets relied upon, for instances through the Khyber Pass, often lying in wait to ambush them and then fade away into the terrain after striking. Massoud was a constant thorn for the Soviets. Massoud and his rebels repelled nine attempts to displace him from the Panjshir Valley, north of Kabul. Through a ceasefire agreement (1982-1984), the Soviets were able to turn their attention to other operations elsewhere, but it also allowed Massoud’s forces a period to recover.

After the war, Massoud went on to fight against the Taliban.

Afghan Identity

Afghans have managed to rebuff foreign invaders for centuries, and Afghanistan has become known as the graveyard of empires.  

The difficulty outside powers face, when it comes to controlling Afghanistan, doesn’t merely stem from its topography. The longstanding Afghan culture places a great deal of emphasis on bravery, honor, loyalty, and revenge. And the typical Afghan prioritizes family first, then village, tribe, and ethnic group. A national identity and sense of patriotism—as a westerner would conceptualize it—hasn’t taken root in Afghanistan.  A consequence of this is that war with a foreign power (e.g. the Soviets) is a very personal thing for Afghans as it only becomes real when the realities, and atrocities, of war breakthrough into their individual lives. At which point bravery, honor, loyalty, and revenge manifest in a determined way against the new enemy. This, in turn, manifests for the invader (e.g. in the Soviet-Afghan war) as a struggle against a collection of individually motivated opponents, instead of a struggle against a single unified political opponent.

CIA Intervention

Hundreds of Soviet helicopters and jets were reported lost during the war. The number shot down largely increased with each passing year—as more and more foreign aid and weaponry flowed into the hands of the mujahideen. Much of this aid stemmed from the United States, but Pakistan played a noteworthy role as well.

The Stinger missile, a relatively easy to use shoulder-fired heat-seeking surface-to-air missile system, is given a lot of credit for enabling the mujahideen to turn the tide on the Soviets. in the later segment of the war, insurgents were reportedly shooting down a Soviet aircraft every day. But while many argue that the ‘Stinger effect’ has been overstated in the media, the threat to Soviet aircraft from a variety of sources was certainly very real.

Western Media

In 1980, Dan Rather travelled to Afghanistan to report on the war. He crossed the border into Afghanistan with rebel fighters and spent six days in country. He also travelled to and reported on the refugee camps in Pakistan; camps with as many as 500,000 refugees. Congressman Charlie Wilson, who played a part in helping the CIA wage its covert operation to support the mujahideen, is said to have been influenced to act by Dan Rather’s coverage of the war.   Dan Rather wasn’t the only journalist from the West to cover the war, however he did so earlier than others and drew the eye of many to a conflict that may have otherwise remained out of sight and out of mind. Public scrutiny of the war, and criticism of the way the Soviets sought to achieve their aims, represented an important kind of pressure that was brought to bear on the Soviets.

Insurgent Tribal Warlords

Warlords have been a persistent feature in Afghanistan. They are individuals holding regional power for one reason or another (e.g. drug or weapons traffickers, but not necessarily so). Warlords survive by making themselves useful and in many cases war presents them with an opportunity to improve their position. For example, in the Soviet-Afghan war, many were able to profit by supplying arms to the rebel fighters as well as helping them cross the border unseen.

Eventually, after the war ended, the general disorder in Afghanistan allowed prominent Afghan warlords to ‘run wild’ and, in some cases, even gain political power or some semblance of legitimacy.

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Previous Articles: 

Resolving Combat in Bear Trap

Gameplay Overview—How to Play Bear Trap

Cards in Bear Trap (Part I of II): Card Types, Force Pools, & Deck Composition