Disclaimer: All views expressed in this post are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or Army Training and Doctrine Command

Ian M. Sullivan is the Special Advisor for Analysis and ISR at the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Army Training and Doctrine Command.

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Turn 10

Turn 10 is over, and so is the Chinese effort to take Taiwan. This was another contested initiative turn. The Allies would easily have gained the initiative if it weren’t for the PLA’s destruction of the US carrier last turn. Furthermore, a UN ceasefire roll succeeded, meaning this was the last turn of the game.

The Allied Air Forces had Air Supremacy, as the PLAAF had only two fighter squadrons left, and both were roughed up and their missions were aborted by USAF F-22s, F-35s, and F-15s. The Allies then conducted another series of punishing cruise missile and air strikes against Chinese targets on Taiwan. The IADS was hit hard by F-16DJ Wild Weasels. B-2 bombers severely damaged the Tainan S-300 battery. B-52s again hit the Zuoying supply depot, and B-1s and Strike Eagles pounded various headquarters units.

At sea, the PLAN attempted to attack a US ARG with a KILO SS, but the attack failed, and USN escorts killed the submarine. That KILO was the last submarine left to the PLAN. US submarines launched a wave of SLCMs at the last PLAN SAG severely damaging it. Carrier based F-35C finished it off. One US Los Angeles-Class SSN was lost in the fight. The Allies now have complete control over the Taiwan Straits and its inshore, completely isolating the PLA invasion force.

The Allies launched three separate attacks on the PLA on the ground. Two USMC battalions and three ROC brigades, supported by ROC cyber forces, ROC Apaches, USMC AH-1Z, and USAF F-16s, smashed into two ROC brigades just north of Fongshan. The Chinese tried to support the defense with an FB-7 squadron, but Patriot chased them off. The attack was very successful, smashing both PLA brigades.

The Allies followed up their air assault up the Kaohsiung river valley by pressing the two BCTs from the 101st forward, along with the 3rd ACR and the USMC TF III. These units launched two attacks into the PLA lines. The first, by the US heavy units and supported by US Apaches from the 101st, USAF Warthogs, and US cyber, wrecked two PLA brigades. 

The second attack was bigger, with 1-101 and 2-101 catching the Chinese defenders of the Tainan river crossing in the flank in conjunction with 1-82, 3-82, 4-25, and the ROC Taipei Mechanized Brigade attacking across the river. The Allies dedicated two squadrons of the Apaches from the 82nd, USAF Warthogs, and US cyber forces. The PLA contested the cyber space, but the US succeeded nonetheless in winning that domain. The PLAAF tried to support the defense with a squadron of FB-7s, but USAF F-22s splashed them. The attack was very successful, destroying the PLA brigade holding the crossing and also the 91st Division’s headquarters. The Allies were able to push 3-82 and the Taipei Mech Brigade across the river.

The PLA was reeling from these attacks. They tried a desperate attack against 3-82 and the Taipei Brigade to try to re-take the river crossing. The PLA dedicated two brigades and two Armored Regiments to the attack, along with a squadron of H-5s. The US dedicated an Apache squadron from the 25th Division and USN F-35Bs, along with fires from the 82nd HQ and the ROC 10th Corps. USAF F-15s splashed the Badgers. The PLA attack failed, as they lost another brigade, although the Taipei Brigade was severely damaged.

Lessons Learned. Endgame. This turn was all about the Allies. They won in the air, destroyed what was left of the PLAN, and launched several lethal attacks against the Chinese beachhead. The Allies were able to use multi-domain capabilities in all of their attacks to push the Chinese back on all fronts. At this point, the deepest Chinese penetration is only four hexes from the sea. The Chinese position outside Kaohsiung is threatened by the Allied attack up the river valley, and the 101st, 3rd ACR, and the USMC TF III are in a position to shatter the beachhead. Just behind them are two Stryker BCTs from the 25th ID, which arrived by sea this turn from Japan, and two more BCTs from the 10th Mountain Division. Although the Allied advance force across the Tainan River is vulnerable, it also threatens the Chinese defenders, and the Allies can rely on fires and air power to support them, while the Chinese cannot.

The Chinese did try a desperate attack to smash the advance force across the Tainan River, but even though they threw in their armored formations, they could not budge it. The Chinese would be unable to support this force with the Allies controlling the sea lanes.

With the victory conditions tallied up, the game ends as a marginal Allied victory, although if it went one more turn, this very likely would’ve been more decisive.

Final Report

The game lasted ten turns, which I guess would be about a month. I played the tactical surprise scenario, as it was the middle course between a major Chinese advantage and a major Allied advantage. 

My first impression is that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is a more difficult task than I initially imagined. The Taiwan Straits is about 110 miles (130 km) wide, and there were times it might as well have been an ocean. Moving enough combat power across the Straits to matter is harder than it looks. It also requires true multi-domain dominance to hold open the sea lines of communication (SLOC), which also in turn requires control of the air, the use of cyber, etc. It is no mean feat.

The Chinese, by the skin of their teeth, held open the sea lines to Taiwan for most of the game. But they did it largely by pulling back the PLAN into the Taiwan Straits sea zone, and ceding control over the rest of maritime domain to the Allies. The PLAN dispatched submarines outside of the Taiwan Straits, but they were not terribly effective. I probably could have tried to play the PLAN more aggressively, but they lack the power of their USN enemies, and really proved more effective as an augmentation to land-based missiles.

The other mistake I made playing the Chinese was to be too ambitious early in the game by occupying the Spratlys, the Paracels, the Senkakus, and Penghu in coup de main operations. I dispersed PLA Marine formations into positions that they couldn’t hold, and more importantly, dispersed the PLAN’s limited amphibious shipping assets. If Taiwan was the objective, it would’ve been better to have kept the amphibious ships centralized in Chinese ports ready to spring across the Straits. I also could have used those formations earlier on the beaches of Taiwan. The only outer islands worth occupying early are Penghu and maybe the Senkakus. Yes, the Allies had to divert time and resources to reclaim them, but their occupation also brought the Philippines and Vietnam into the war for the Allies. Vietnam took the Spratlys on its own (albeit with USN air support) and the Philippines played the lead role in the Paracels, although with the help of the US Marines. The Japanese successfully took the Senkakus, with the help of US air power flying out of Japan. In the end, those were mere distractions. Retaking Penghu was more of a requirement, and the Allies devoted the 13th MEU for the job later in the game. They probably should have targeted the island earlier to help roll back Chinese control over the Taiwan Straits.

A clear and eye-opening lesson I learned was how difficult it was for the Allies, who had an advantage in numbers and types of naval assets, to effectively use them in the face of China’s land-based ballistic missiles. A carrier battle group is a potent force, yet two were wrecked by DF-21/DF-26 carrier killers. Naval air power played only a minor role in the fight, supporting the invasion of the islands, in the air superiority fight, especially early in the game, and in the anti-shipping role. If the carriers were seen, they were struck. And if they were struck, they died. The most effective naval weapon were US submarines. I played the optional submarine rules from. Supplement One, and they made for a much more interesting game. US subs, in particular, were lethal and survivable, and they were responsible for essentially destroying the PLAN. Chinese subs were less effective, but had some successes. The PLAN’s carriers played no real role in the fight, other than to contest the sea lanes. Their carrier-based aviation was too limited in terms of quantity and quality to truly impact the fight. If I were the PLAN commander, I would have rather had more Type 093 SSNs than those carriers.

One more word on Chinese missiles…..I designed some hasty house rules for their use. I also probably didn’t give them enough missile points in their arsenal. I added some to see their effects in the game as a learning experience, and they certainly made an Impact! But publicly available information clearly shows the PLA Rocket Force has WAY more missiles than I gave them credit for. I would have played the game differently for China if I had those capabilities. Namely, I would have doubled or even tripled my attacks with cruise and ballistic missiles on Taiwan’s airbases, airfields, and ports. I probably would have targeted Japan more than I did. I would have tried to reduce the Allied IADS to a smoking ruin before launching my invasion force. I did not have the numbers of weapons to try that, and the invasion probably was doomed because of it.

The fight in the air was really interesting to me. Early on, China had air superiority, which was a very uncomfortable place for the Allies to be. China had some time where they either dominated the skies or fought the Allies to a stand-still in the air to try to accomplish their objectives. They were aided by S-300 SAMs that helped nullify, or at least mitigate Allied strike packages. The PLAAF, however, could not keep up over time with the Allies. They had many capable aircraft, including Fifth Generation fighters that were a match for US F-22s and F-35s. In the end, Allied aircrew and numbers were the difference, although the two sides had roughly equivalent capabilities, the Allies often were getting the benefit of pilot skill die roll modifiers. They also had more high quality fighters, which the Chinese could not overcome. This, plus the arrival of reinforcements turned the tide in the air. The number of high quality, long-range fighters that the Allies flew out of Japan, medium range fighters out of the Philippines, and other aircraft rushed to Taiwan meant that the Allies eventually were able to dedicate more aircraft to air superiority missions, and then to intercept missions. The PLAAF lost a staggering 31 squadrons of aircraft, almost all in the air. Three more Malaysian squadrons also were downed by the Allies. Only three operational squadrons were left to the PLAAF at the end of turn 10. The Allies lost 22 squadrons, but only 9 in the air. Most were ROC or Vietnamese. The others were killed in missile strikes on Allied air bases, aboard the two US carriers that went down, or to Chinese SAMs while flying strike missions.

It also turned out that the Allies had an embarrassment of riches in turn of strike aircraft. I often had more aircraft than targets, particularly with the game’s simplification of targets in China. There are only one port and one airbase to strike. Perhaps a newer printing could add more targets, similar to the way the holding boxes for Russia and Belarus are designed in “Next War: Poland.” Still, in the end, the Allies were pounding away with strike aircraft and bombers, and the PLAAF simply couldn’t match it.

It is probably also time to talk about the cyber war. I absolutely loved the cyber rules from supplement one. They added a whole new dimension to the game, which, with SOF rules, clearly gave both sides flexibility to weight attacks. The cyber fight played a huge role in the air. When China succeeded, they often mitigated US advantages with their stealthy fifth generation aircraft. Indeed, the two Fifth Generation squadrons the Chinese killed in the air—an F-22 and a USMC F-35B—were downed in turns where the Chinese won the cyber fight. For the Allies, cyber was very important, particularly in the ground fight, allowing them additional advantages in set piece attacks. The cyber rules are a great addition to the game.

The ground fight also was interesting. It hinged upon my decision to invade Taiwan’s southwestern corner, between Kaohsiung and Tainan. I chose that area because I thought it offered the Chinese some key advantages. It offered a quick capture of air and naval bases at Hunei which would be needed to fly and ship in follow-on forces and supplies. I also saw two cities that could quickly be taken—Tainan and Nanzih—that could become defensive bastions and supply hubs for the invasion force. I really liked the river that flowed in front of Tainan into the interior as a defensive line to protect the northern flank of the beachhead. And I thought that its proximity to Kaohsiung—Taiwan’s second largest city—offered a quick source of key victory points. It didn’t quite go as planned for the Chinese.

The initial invasion went pretty well. The PLA occupied the facilities at Hunei and expanded their beachhead toward Tainan and Nanzih. The problem China had was reinforcing it after initially landing its Marines and airborne forces with follow-on heavy forces. The Chinese attempted to break out northward, focusing on Chiaiyi and eastward toward Kaohsiung. This was probably too ambitious. Although successful early in pushing back the ROC defenders on both fronts, the PLA encountered heavy resistance around Chiaiyi and the Kaohsiung suburbs. The drive against Chiaiyi was halted by the timely arrival of US reinforcements, namely the 82nd Airborne Division, while the USN and USMC was able to slip the 11th MEU through the PLAN’s control over the Taiwan Straits to reinforce Kaohsiung. As the Allies gained control over the air, it became increasingly difficult for the Chinese to get reinforcements through, particularly through the air. 

The fighting on the ground was intense and also a slog. It was difficult for the Chinese to maneuver, due to Taiwan’s formidable terrain and the Allies’ ability to hold key urban areas and the numerous rivers running north from Kaohsiung as defensive barriers. The Chinese could never quite push through the Allied defenses, which were increasingly augmented by strike aircraft, which interdicted movement, pounded Chinese headquarters, and supported key fights.

I think two things made the difference on the ground. The first was that the Allies were better able to provide multi-domain support to its key attacks and in some defensive operations. As the PLAAF lost increasing numbers of fighters, the Allies were able to dedicate strike aircraft, while using their fighters to intercept Chinese strikes and CAS missions. The Allies also had a huge advantage in attack helicopters, which made a significant difference in fight after fight. Furthermore, the Allies ability to use air assault gave them an ability to maneuver across the battlefield. Once it arrived, the 101st Air Assault was able to support several key fights. The 1-101 beefed up the defense of Kaohsiung, and then the rest of the division moved to support the defense of Chiaiyi. They then disengaged from both and conducted an air assault that smashed the Chinese defense of the Kaohsiung river valley, opening up an attack by the USMC’s TF III and the Army’s 3rd ACR, which shattered the PLA lines. This required the mitigation of the Chinese IADS, but once whittled down, the helicopters made a big difference. Naval support also was key in the retaking the islands and even in some support operations. Finally, the Allies had an edge in the cyber fight, which made a major difference on critical set piece attacks.

The other edge was troop quality. Although light in combat power, the arrival of the 11th MEU stiffened the ROC defenders, and bled the Chinese dry in attack after attack, particularly within the Kaohsiung metroplex. Similarly, the arrival of the 82nd Airborne and the 101st Air Assault turned the tide at Chiaiyi, and led the Allied effort to push back the Chinese to the Tainan River. This quality allowed the allies to survive a potentially dangerous thrust by three PLA tank regiments, and with significant support, to actually secure a river crossing just east of Tainan. Additionally, the US organizational edge allowing BCTs to get support from any Army headquarters allowed the Allies to split the 101st when required, and then to reassemble it for a critical attack. 

Nevertheless, this was a lethal, intense fight. The PLA lost more than 28 maneuver brigades. The Allies lost more than 21. The majority were ROC formations, but the USMC lost two-plus brigades worth of formations and the Army the 2-82.

So ends Next War: Taiwan. I’ll probably play this one again some time to see if there’s is another way to skin the cat. I’d also note that the decision to play the tactical surprise scenario was critical. China likely would’ve taken Kaohsiung if the strategic surprise scenario was played, which again demonstrates the centrality of the competition and crisis periods. 

This was fun, and definitely a different experience than “Next War: Poland.” Although the fight was completely different, I am reassured that some of the same lessons I learned playing the last one hold true here, too. The centrality of competition, the difficulty in maneuver, the lethality of modern combat, and the often forgotten quality of troops all mattered. As befits the scenario, the maritime domain played a central role, and the vulnerability of carriers to land-based missiles was clear. 

Thanks so much for following along.

Ian Sullivan is the Special Advisor for Analysis and ISR to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence at the Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command. A Senior Executive-level officer since 2013, Mr. Sullivan has in his 24-year career served in analytic or leadership positions at the Office of Naval Intelligence, Headquarters, US Army Europe and Seventh Army, and as an Office of the Director of National Intelligence cadre member at the National Counterterrorism Center.

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Previous Articles in this series: 

A Hop, Skip, and an Amphibious Assault — Playing Next War: Taiwan (Part 1)

A Hop, Skip, and an Amphibious Assault — Playing Next War: Taiwan (Part 2)

A Hop, Skip, and an Amphibious Assault — Playing Next War: Taiwan (Part 3)

Next War: Vietnam AAR Series: China’s Red River Dance — Playing Next War: Vietnam