Disclaimer: All views expressed in this post are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or Army Training and Doctrine Command

Ian M. Sullivan is the Special Advisor for Analysis and ISR at the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Army Training and Doctrine Command.

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Okay, I’ve decided to give Next War: Taiwan a go. This is going to be a dramatically different game compared to Next War: Poland. I’m playing the Tactical Surprise scenario, but I chose the optional coup de main for China, with the PLA occupying the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Penghu, and the Senkakus prior to the start of the game. This brings Japan into the fight early, along with Vietnam and the Philippines on the Allied side. The US posture is aggressive, and because Japan is a combatant, the US also will be reacting at the highest level. Malaysia is supporting China.

There are several challenges intertwined in this game. China must figure out a way to effectively get enough combat power to Taiwan, which means a sharp, and likely brutal fight for control of the air and sea lanes to enable an amphibious/airborne assault. They’ll need to quickly seize a port and airfield to bring follow-on forces to bear, while simultaneously keeping the logistics flow open. But because I chose the optional coup de main, the PLAN’s amphibious forces are spread out across the First Island Chain. They will need to reconstitute it in China quickly to move before the US becomes fully involved. The Allies have a more significant problem of holding off the Chinese to amass enough force to aid Taiwan. They’ll have to slog across the ocean, into the teeth of China’s formidable anti-access/area denial complex. And Taiwan is a constricted battlespace with rough terrain and little room for maneuver.

One thing bothers me about the game, however, and it’s the lack of ballistic missiles for China. While they have a major cruise missile arsenal, ballistic missiles are strangely absent. Furthermore, the game does not simulate the PLA’s carrier-killer DF-21 and DF-26 ballistic missiles. I think they have rules for them in a supplement, but I don’t have it, so I’ve created some “house rules.” I’ve given China 25 SRBM/MRBM for use, and 10 IRBMs, which can be either conventional, and range out to Guam, or act as carrier-killers. 

I ordered the First Supplement, and will use its rules, as I really want to add the cyber component to the game. Furthermore, with the importance of the maritime domain in this game, I want to use the expanded submarine rules. 

Turn 1

China began their effort to liberate Taiwan with a series of cyber attacks, Special Forces raids, and cruise missile strikes, which severely damaged Taiwan’s integrated Air Defense System (IADS), a number of airbases, and ports. A squadron of a Taiwanese Mirage 2000s were damaged in these strikes. With surprise in their favor and a significant numerical advantage in terms of combat aircraft available, China was able to secure air superiority, causing some damage among three Taiwanese squadrons. In two cases, Chinese fifth generation aircraft engaged their USAF fifth generation counterparts, and the results were inconclusive. Numbers mattered in the air, though, which opened the way for a punishing series of Chinese air strikes directed at Taiwan’s infrastructure. The port of Su-ao and the airbase at Pingdong were destroyed in these raids. 

Having seized the Spratlys, Paracels, Penghu, and the Senkakus in a coup de main at the start of the game, the PLAN found itself in an uncomfortable position, with its amphibious assault ships spread across the First Island Chain. They attempted to consolidate their forces in the Taiwan Strait, likely in preparation for an invasion of a Taiwan, but Allied submarines and surface units complicated the effort. Only half the force managed to arrive off China. Taiwanese submarines attempted an attack on a Chinese carrier battle group in the Taiwan Straits, but were unsuccessful, and damaged in the process. A Chinese Kilo SS, however, was more successful, and in a coordinated attack with the PLAN’s carrier battle group, destroyed a ROC surface action group (SAG) in the Taiwan Straits. A second coordinated attack occurred inshore of the Taiwan Straits, where two PLAN SAGs roughed up a second ROC SAG. PLANAF carrier-based J-15s finished off the SAG with a maritime strike mission. China is now in a very strong position in the Taiwan Straits, and the way will be open for an invasion in the next turn. 

The Allies initially appeared as if they could achieve very little in the opening round, due largely to a lack of resources—particularly in the air—but they did deploy a USN ARG loaded with Marines into the Central Approaches, heading to Taiwan. 

The Allies, however, realized they had an opportunity to reverse China’s coup de main in the Spratlys, and attempted a move against the islands. Initially, a sortie of the Philippines Navy attempted to close on the Spratlys, but it was contested, and contained. A more successful operation occurred as part of a joint operation between the USN, which was able to move a CVBG into the Spratly Islands sea zone, where they linked up with elements of Vietnam’s Navy, which destroyed a PLAN amphibious group. Three battalions of Vietnamese Marines—one armored—stormed the Chinese-held Spratlys, destroying the PLAN’s 4th Battalion of the 1st Marine Brigade. The amphibious assault was backed by supporting naval gunfire and USN Super Hornets, launched from the deck of the arriving CVN. Chinese control over the Spratlys was short-lived.

Lessons Learned: So far, I’ve enjoyed the differences between this game and Next War: Poland. With a danger of seeming like Captain Obvious, the maritime and air domains predominated on turn one. It was eye opening to see the amount of air power the PLAAF was able to dedicate to the air superiority mission. Their geographic advantage gave them an edge, as the Allies had only two long-range fighter squadrons based in Japan. This opened the door to a punishing series of strikes. Still, the Allies certainly were not powerless, and they were able to catch the Chinese overextended. Vietnam’s move against the Spratly’s was a significant victory. It also was eye opening to see the huge PLA Army sitting in the China Holding Box, unable to move for want of lift. I imagine the PLA commanders sympathizing with Richard III at Bosworth Field….my kingdom for an amphibious assault ship….I wonder if the PLA reads Shakespeare?

Next turn should be exciting, as China may have enough lift to perhaps conduct an invasion of Taiwan. They will certainly be mindful of the USN carrier in The Spratlys, and if they can detect it, we might see a debut of my house rules DF-21/DF-26 carrier killer missiles. This will be a glaring cyber target. The Allies also will have options to move against the Paracels and Senkakus. The 82nd Airborne Division arrived in a Japan, and the USAF did manage to move a squadron of F-16s to Taiwan.

Turn 2

China began the turn with several successful Special Operations strikes against Taiwan, severely damaging Lujhu Airbase, Singfang Airfield, and the Allied IADS network, although two SOF teams were destroyed in the process. The Chinese tried to conduct several cyber operations, targeting the Allied IADS, airborne command and control, and to stimulate a US CVBG they knew was operating somewhere around the Spratlys. None proved successful, as US and ROC cyber warriors ably defended against each effort. The Allies had greater success with their cyber attacks, and snarled the PLAAF’s airborne command and control. 

China followed up its SOF attacks with a barrage of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan’s infrastructure. Each of the facilities damaged by earlier SOF raids were destroyed under the onslaught. A squadron of Mirage 2000s were destroyed on the ground in one strike.

The fight in the Air tipped to the Allies in this turn. Allied cyber attacks made the difference, as did the Allies’ ability to get more aircraft engaged in the fight, particularly long-range fighter from Japan. Losses were close to even, though, with the ROCAF losing a squadron of Vipers and two of Ching-Kuo in the air. The Chinese lost squadrons of Su-27, Su-30, and Finback, and the Malaysians, who entered the fight on the side of China, lost a squadron Su-30 to USN carrier-borne F-35C. The allies gained Air Advantage, and the AWACS picture is now contested. 

There was a great deal of action at sea, as China prepared for its amphibious assault on Taiwan. ROC diesel boats attempted an attack on a PLAN CVBG, but were unsuccessful. The PLAN destroyed a Chien-Long SS in the process. Although operating with only half of their amphibious assault force, the PLAN Marines stormed ashore on Taiwan just outside of the Hunei Airbase and Port facility. The PLAAF’s 45th Airborne Division also conducted a jump north of the city of Tainan. Marines and paratroopers tried to press on against Tainan, which was defended by the ROC 395th Mechanized Brigade. Although supported by naval gunfire and close air support, the 395th held on. Unfortunately for the ROC, the PLAAF had saved enough sea and air lift to bring ashore more Marines and a brigade of the 45th Airborne Division. A second push did the trick, destroying the 395th and allowing the airheads to link up with the beachhead. The Chinese invasion force cleared Tainan, and captured intact the facilities at Hunei, which will allow for the arrival of follow-on forces by sea and air.

The Allies were in no position to smash the Chinese incursion on the beaches. The ROC moved two brigades—a Motorized and an Infantry—to form a line running north from Nanzih. The ROC 10th Corps, expanded its positions a slight degree southward, but was unwilling to abandon its defensive positions in the event China launches a second assault.

The Allies were moderately successful at sea. The USN ARG in the Central Approaches, escorted by a Philippines Navy SAG forced their way into the Taiwan Straits. They broke through the Chinese blockade, destroying a PLAN amphibious group in the process, and landed the USMC’s 11th MEU in Kaohsiung, where it will soon enter the fray. Additionally, with the US wresting an advantage in the air, the 82nd Airborne Division was able to deploy to Hualien Airbase, along Taiwan’s eastern coast.

Lessons Learned: China’s control of the air was fleeting. On turn one, they overwhelmed the allies with numbers. However, when they had to recover a significant number of squadrons, the Allies had the numerical edge. The Allies’ successful cyber attack against the airborne C2 provided a serious edge, and with more long-range squadrons from Japan now operationally available, the Allies turned China’s air superiority into an Allied air advantage.

China’s invasion went very well. For minimal losses, they were able to seize a significant lodgment. Allied air defenses, damaged by SOF and missile strikes, were relatively unsuccessful in defending against the parachute landings. China’s ability to quickly clear Tainan, and most importantly, the airbase and port at Hunei, were major successes.

China had several options for their assault. I discounted the eastern beaches as too difficult to support. I also discounted the west central beaches between Taichung and Hsinchu as too well defended and too far from needed ports and airbases. I thought hard about the beaches just east of Kaohsiung, but taking the needed facilities would’ve been more difficult. Hunei seems the perfect option—a veritable two-fer of facilities. It also rests along a seam between the ROC 8th Corps and 10th Corps.

So now, the rush to reinforce is on. China will need to break out of its lodgment and bring follow-on forces to the fight. The Allies will need to contain, and then annihilate the beachhead.

Turn 3

Next War: Taiwan, game turn 3 is complete, and it was very eventful. The turn began with several successful Chinese SOF attacks against Taiwan’s infrastructure and IADS. Both sides fought a series of cyber attacks meant to confuse AWACS and C2, but neither achieved any real success. 

The opposing air forces again rose to contest the air domain, and with more aircraft available to both sides, neither was able to gain an advantage. The PLAAF was on the short end of the exchange, though, losing two highly capable squadrons in the air; one Su-30 and a Fifth Generation J-20. A Malaysian squadron of Hornets also was downed, ironically by USN F-35B. The Allies lost one squadron of ROC Ching Kuos in the air. Chinese missile strikes tapered off slightly, although cruise missiles did destroy the Zuoying Airbase. A squadron of ROC F-16s and USMC AH-1Z were destroyed in these strikes. The difference this turn, however, was that the Allies had enough assets in theater to strike at the the Chinese mainland. Cruise missiles and a strike by Japan-based B-2 bombers and Strike Eagles destroyed several port facilities and heavily damaged some air bases. Allied SOF strikes against the Chinese IADS, however, were unsuccessful. 

Because the Taiwan inshore was contested, the PLAN only had a limited success in reinforcing its beachhead. China was, however, able to sneak though a mobile supply depot, but no follow-on troops. Taiwanese air defenses prevented another airborne assault, but were unable to interdict the air transport of the 36th Infantry brigade to Chinese-controlled Hunei Airbase. 

China’s most significant success of the turn came when it was able to detect—with the assistance of the cyber warriors of the PLA’s Strategic Support Force— the US CVBG steaming in the South China Sea. The PLAN and the PLA Strategic Rocket Force launched a coordinated attack against it with cruise missiles from a Type 093 SSN and land-based DF-21s, severely damaging the carrier, which had to withdraw to the Philippines for repairs. 

On Taiwan, the Chinese successfully expanded their beachhead, with Marines and Paratroopers destroying the ROC 564th Armored Brigade, which was holding the city of Nanzih. Chinese forces quickly took control of the city, pressing further inland. On the beachhead’s left flank, the 44th Airborne Division roughly handled the ROC’s 925th Reserve Brigade, forcing it back. The only blemish on the PLA’s ground offensive occurred when ROC F-16s successfully intercepted a PLAAF close support package, downing a squadron of J-10s, and then bouncing and destroying a squadron of H-5 Badgers that were attempting to support the fight at Nanzih.

The ROC was unable to contest the expanding bridgehead, but it did prepare a hedgehog defensive position around the urban metropolis of Kaohsiung, bolstered by the now fully deployed 11th MEU. Additionally, the 82nd Airborne Division moved over the mountains from east coast to help contain the Chinese advance.

The Allies were very active and fairly successful on the periphery. The Japanese, supported by a USN SAG and Japan-based USAF A-10, conducted a joint airborne/amphibious assault on the Senkakus. The Chinese are still holding on, but lost a Marine battalion in the fight. The Allies were even more successful in the Paracels, where a joint USMC-Philippines Marines amphibious assault, supported by a Philippines Navy SAG and USMC AH-1Z Sea Cobras, successfully captured the islands, destroying the PLAN Marine defenders in the process, although a battalion of Philippines Marines also were lost.

Lessons Learned: This conflict is frustrating on many levels. The Chinese have a huge ground force that they just haven’t been able to get across the Taiwan Straits in the face of the Allies’ frantic efforts in the air and at sea. But the Allies lack the combat power to crush the Chinese invasion. The ROC Army is relatively weak, and the Allies are putting so much into the air superiority fight, that they haven’t been able to dedicate aircraft to combat support missions. The Chinese have been unable to successfully defend the islands it occupied, but they are forcing the Allies to slowly “Island hop” their way to Taiwan. The vulnerability of the US carriers to submarines and ballistic missiles was apparent, and the USN was lucky it’s damaged flattop was able to limp away to Subic Bay for repairs. 

The Chinese beachhead is relatively secure, but they will be unable to expand it much more unless they can establish a supply depot. But that will require clearing the sea lanes and trying to win air superiority. They’ll need to get some heavier formations ashore and get the logistics support infrastructure set to truly break out of the beachhead. 

The Allies will have an opportunity to push back, but the ROC Army is not proving very effective thus far. The Marines and the All-Americans will have to bolster their capabilities, but it is likely the fighting will move to the outskirts of Kaohsiung. They should be aided by arrival of several US fighter squadrons to Taiwan. The Japanese also will continue their attack in the Senkakus, and it will be difficult for the Chinese to hold on there.

Next Time: Turns 4-6

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