Falling Sky—The Gallic Revolt Against Caesar depicts each of its factions’ personalities in war and diplomacy—as in the all the COIN Series volumes—mainly through its diverse menus of commands and special abilities.  But the card deck adds more such personality to each player role.  Here we present just eight Falling Sky events that display particular ways and means of the Gauls to combat the Romans and, of course, one another.  With each card, we add background from the game’s Playbook, which provides historical notes on each of the 72 event cards (with thanks to Marc Gouyon-Rety for his assistance there and in suggesting several of the events that are in the deck).  Citations below are from Caesar’s Commentaries on the Gallic War in the format [book.chapter], quotations as translated by Carolyn Hammond, Oxford University Press, 1996.

Event #24:  Sappers

This card and others in the game such as the anti-Roman versions of #10 Ballistae and #23 Sacking represent several instances of Gallic ingenuity in counter-fortification that could surprise the Romans and for a time thwart their engineers’ vaunted siegecraft.

Background.  Avaricum, 52 BC:  “The Gauls used every kind of ingenuity to counter the extraordinary bravery of our soldiers.  They are an extremely resourceful people … They … started tunneling beneath our earthwork to undermine it:  this was all the more skillfully done because they have many iron-mines, and so are practised experts in every kind of tunneling. … They sabotaged the progress of the mines which we had driven by the use of timbers tempered and sharpened at the end, boiling pitch, and heavy rocks.  In this way they prevented us from coming close to the walls of the town. … Shortly before the third watch smoke was observed coming from the earthwork, for the enemy had tunneled underneath it and set fire to it from below.  At that moment a shout went up all along the wall, and the enemy made a sortie from the two gates beside our towers. …” [7.22, 7.24]

Event #27:  Massed Gallic Archers

The Romans had their pila and auxiliary archers and slingers, but the Gauls drew on their nation’s availability of skilled missile troops and other light forces in numbers that Caesar had to envy.

Background.  “Vercingetorix … gave orders for all archers (for Gaul has an enormous number of these) to be mustered and sent to him.  By these means he quickly made up the numbers lost at Avaricum.” [7.31]  At Gergovia, the incessant hail of these archers’ missiles onto the Roman ramparts wore down the legionaries and set the stage for the Caesar’s repulse in the main battle. [7.36, 7.41]

Event #28:  Oppida

The Gauls often built cities on naturally defensible terrain that they could quickly ready forwar in time of need.

Background.  The Celts’ cities and major towns (oppida) featured prepared fortifications that could deny entry to hostile agents and resist an assault.  Many oppida centered around a stronghold atop a plateau.  Even fortified oppida required preparations and sufficient garrison to resist attack, however.  The Romans in 52 BC stormed Cenabum (Orléans), the Carnutes’ fortified trading stronghold at the mouth of a tributary of the Loire, by coup de main before the intended defenses were in place.  The rapid success forced Vercingetorix to lift his own siege of pro-Aedui Gorgobina and march to his northern allies’ relief. [7.11]

Event #30:  Vercingetorix’s Elite

Vercingetorix—perhaps after exposure to Roman military methods while their guest some time in his youth—attempted to level the battlefield against the drill and precision of the legions.

Background.  One military advantage that Romans possessed over barbarians was that the latter tended to fight as individuals—for reputation or booty—while the Roman army fought as a team.  Vercingetorix appears to have realized this and attempted to force a new discipline upon his Celtic army.  “In his command he combined extreme conscientiousness with extreme severity.  He used harsh punishments to bring waverers into line.  For the more serious offenses, death was inflicted by burning and all kinds of torture, while for lesser faults the offender’s ears were cut off or one of his eyes gouged out.  He was then sent home as an example to others, to strike fear into them by the severity of the punishment.  By such penalties as these Vercingetorix quickly gathered an army.” [7.4-7.5]

Event #35:  Gallic Shouts

Caesar tells us of a remarkable iron-age communications system that the Gauls used to spread their revolt.

Background.  In discussing the onset of the Great Revolt, Caesar notes a form of Celtic telegraph that could transmit a distance of 160 miles in one day:  “News … spread rapidly to all Gallic states, for wherever an event of particular note or significance takes place the Gauls shout it abroad in the countryside and the villages; others then take up the cry and pass it on to their neighbors.  So it happened on this occasion, for what had taken place at dawn in Cenabum was made known before the end of the first watch in Arvernian territory….” [7.3]

Event #36:  Morasses

This card is one that reflects the Gauls’ exploitation of well-known local terrain (Event #67 Arduenna is another)—a frustration for the Roman invaders that Caesar frequently complained about.

Background.  A much larger presence than today of wetlands was general to temperate Europe before centuries of draining and reclamation virtually erased them.  Ancient Gaul featured both plentiful forest and frequent marsh and bog in which warriors might hide and suddenly reemerge, and where the Roman army dependent on formed maniples dared not enter.  The Menapii, for example, had no fortifications but instead relied on the protection of their lands, fleeing into their woods and marshes with their possessions when enemies approached. [6.5, 6.34]  In the 52BC campaign around Avaricum, Vercingetorix chose a place for his camp protected by marshes and woods and sortied from there to harrass Caesar’s foraging expeditions and dared the Romans to attack across the marshy approaches.  Caesar led his army there but—to the fury of his eager troops—had to back away for fear of defeat. [7.16-19]

Event #45:  Litaviccus

While the hurly-burly of Gallic politics clearly hindered the effort to organize against the occupier, it also presented opportunities to undo the Romans via battlefield treachery by their Gallic allies.  One such instance contributed to Caesar’s difficulties in the Gergovia campaign—and might have been far worse.

Background.  As the Arverni-Roman war escalated, the Aedui found themselves in an uncomfortable squeeze.  Their internal disputes now played out as treacheries for or against the two sides in the Great Revolt.  As Caesar moved on Gergovia, an aristocratic young Aeduan Litaviccus led a precursor to the larger Aeduan defection to Vercingetorix.  Litaviccus convinced an Aeduan army coming to reinforce Caesar that the Romans had betrayed and killed certain Aeduan nobles, and then attempted to lead the Aeduan column in ambush of the Romans from behind.  Another Aeduan friendly to Rome reported the plot to Caesar, who was able just in time to prove to the Aeduan warbands the falsehood of Litaviccus’s claims. [7.37-43, 7.54-55]

Event #72:  Impetuosity

Our final card represents the occasions on which the ferocity of Gallic warriors could take advantage of a less steady legion—or instead lead the Gauls to crash against the gladius and scutum as harmlessly as waves against a sea shore.

Background.  While the supposed warlike nature of Rome’s enemies could be fearsome, it also could be exploited.  Vercingetorix struggled throughout the Great Revolt against interference in his careful strategy by an over-eagerness of his warriors to strike the enemy directly and immediately.  As he explained to his chieftains in defending his guidance during an absence from part of the Celtic army, “It was by deliberate policy that he had not entrusted the supreme command to another man on his departure, to prevent popular pressure forcing anyone into fighting—and he could see that they were all lacking in resolution and wanted to engage only because they could no longer bear this degree of hardship.” [7.20]

By the end of the Gallic wars, even the Belgae seem to have learned from the Roman army’s deliberate style, however.  In the 51BC campaign, upon hearing from prisoners what his Bellovaci-led enemies intended, “Caesar judged that the strategy being proposed was very cautious and far removed from the rash haste characteristic of barbarians.” [8.8]

Author: Volko Ruhnke