Casual readers of Civil War history may come away thinking Abe Lincoln mismanaged the 1862 Shenandoah Valley campaign, but chose his commanders wisely in 1864. Actual battlefield performance in these campaigns, however, suggests a more nuanced assessment. In this article we’ll take a look at the northern leaders depicted in Death Valley, one for each battle in the box. A future article will do the same for Confederate leaders.

1st Kernstown (March 23rd, 1862)

Colonel Nathan Kimball commanded Union forces at the 1st Battle of Kernstown. The day before the battle his immediate superior, James Shields, suffered an arm wound in a skirmish with Jackson’s advanced guard. Shields spent the following day recuperating a couple of miles north in Winchester.

Kimball took over Shields’ division while retaining command of his own brigade. He started cautiously, allowing Jackson to deploy and thus gauging southern strength, but then requested reinforcements and went over to the attack. After a tough fight along a stone wall on Rose Hill at the northern end of Sandy Ridge, Kimball drove Jackson off. Despite his performance the idle Shields was credited with the victory.

Kimball’s subsequent Civil War career was rock solid. He led a 2nd Corps brigade at Antietam and again at Fredericksburg, where he suffered a thigh wound. After recovering he was sent west, where he saw action with Frederick Steele’s doomed “Camden Expedition” in April, 1864. Soon afterward William T. Sherman assigned him a 4th Corps brigade and then a division during the Atlanta campaign. Kimball would go on to lead that division at the Battle of Nashville.

Kimball wasn’t the only one who gave Jackson trouble during the 1862 campaign. At the Battle of McDowell on May 8th, Robert Milroy teamed up with Robert Schenck to bloody Jackson’s forces before retreating northwestward into present-day West Virginia. And the following month Erastus Tyler made a gallant stand near Port Republic, as we’ll see later in this article. While all three battles were strategic victories for the South, these northern commanders bested Stonewall on the tactical level.

Death Valley includes a short Kernstown scenario focusing on the fight at the stone wall, as well as a full battle scenario providing plenty of grand tactical options for both players.

1st Winchester (May 25th, 1862)

Nathaniel Banks was one of Lincoln’s “political” generals, a fellow Republican and former governor of Massachusetts. Having pulled himself up by his bootstraps from humble beginnings, Banks was an American success story. Probably no one aside from regular army officers doubted the president’s wisdom in making him a major general in 1861, and no one ever impugned Banks’ bravery or administrative ability, but three severe defeats marred his military career.

After succeeding to command of Union forces in western Maryland in mid-March, 1862, Banks took Winchester, Virginia, after Stonewall Jackson evacuated the town. In so doing, Banks lit the fuse touching off the first Valley campaign. He remained behind the lines with Shields during the campaign’s first fight at Kernstown, but then cautiously pursued his beaten foe. With Jackson seemingly neutralized, Banks wired the War Department, “There is nothing more to be done by us in the valley”. Washington thereupon directed him to send Shields’ division, the more experienced of the two in his command, for service against Joseph Johnston’s main Confederate army. Banks’ remaining division retreated back down the valley to Strasburg.

That’s where it was in late May when Jackson, having combined with Richard Ewell’s division, drove north on both sides of the Massanutten Mountain. Aware that he was outflanked and hopelessly outnumbered, Banks successfully retreated to Winchester. Jackson caught up with him on May 25th. After some stiff but inconclusive fighting Jackson sent in Taylor’s Louisiana brigade, which shattered Banks’ right flank and routed his force.

Death Valley‘s “1st Winchester” scenario depicts Banks’ dilemma: he must hold his positions south of town long enough for his wagon train to escape, but not so long that Jackson’s superior numbers utterly destroy the Union force.

Later in 1862 Jackson would trounce Banks again at Cedar Mountain, spelling an end to his career in the east. But Cedar Mountain was a tough fight, and an argument could be made that Banks, again badly outnumbered, performed better than expected, surprising Jackson with a sharp attack that crumpled Stonewall’s left wing before A.P. Hill’s division arrived to turn the tide.

Eventually Washington sent Banks to New Orleans to command the Army of the Gulf, where he once again confronted his nemesis from 1st Winchester, Richard Taylor. Banks temporarily chased Taylor’s Rebs out of southern Louisiana and then captured Port Hudson in July, 1863. But his final debacle at Taylor’s hands on the Red River in April, 1864, overshadowed these successes and finished him as a general.

Cross Keys, June 8th, 1862

John C. Fremont could well have been the most famous of the North’s early leaders. A celebrated explorer of the American West, he was also a major figure in the conquest of California from Mexico in 1846, although an insubordinate tendency foreshadowed later events. Fremont’s achievements were not quite enough to gain him the presidency in 1856, but they did bring him command of the Department of the West early in the Civil War. Unfortunately he again exceeded his authority, issuing an early emancipation edict that ran afoul of Lincoln’s policies at the time.

Relieved of his duties, Fremont’s fame nevertheless sufficed to land him command of the Mountain Department (present-day West Virginia) in March, 1862. In that role he was summoned to the Shenandoah Valley after Banks’ defeat at 1st Winchester. Crossing the Alleghany Mountains into the Valley, he chased Jackson’s army from Strasburg to Staunton in early June. Fremont then turned southeast toward Port Republic, but suddenly got a case of cold feet, fearing he was about to tangle with Jackson’s whole force rather than Richard Ewell’s rearguard. Fremont’s two divisions outnumbered Ewell’s force approximately two-to-one, but he approached hesitantly. When Isaac Trimble’s brigade ambushed the 8th New York, inflicting severe losses, Fremont was more or less done for the day, leaving any initiative to his brigade leaders.

Death Valley includes a “Fremont’s Caution” rule linking the Union victory point count to the number of brigades Fremont can place under Attack orders during the Division Orders Phase. His brigadiers can supplement that number by successfully rolling “Individual Initiative” at the start of a turn, but if the day later goes against the North, Fremont may “Recall” them.

Fremont simultaneously leads his corps as well as his own division, which can complicate Union command & control over a battleground as large as that of Cross Keys. He thus faces difficult decisions, not only in the game’s two historical scenarios, but in its two “what-if” scenarios, as well.

Port Republic, June 9th, 1862

Erastus B. Tyler, a pre-war businessman, was perhaps Stonewall’s most implacable foe in the Shenandoah. It was Tyler’s brigade that stormed the stone wall on Rose Hill at the 1st Battle of Kernstown. It suffered heavy losses, but Tyler’s persistence sucked the majority of southern forces into the developing battle, leaving Jackson’s right flank vulnerable when Nathan Kimball threw his own brigade into the scales.

As mentioned above, James Shields’ division, including Tyler’s brigade, was soon sent east and missed the Union debacle at Winchester. But that defeat prompted Lincoln to heavily reinforce Banks. So, back went Shields as part of Irwin McDowell’s corps. When Jackson managed to escape southward through Fremont’s and McDowell’s pincers, Shields proposed to move up the Luray Valley east of Massanutten Mountain, the massive ridge dividing the Shenandoah Valley for a length of 55 miles. Fremont would engage Jackson frontally, while Shields slipped in behind the Confederates, cutting them off from the Blue Ridge passes and any chance of assisting Lee in the defense of Richmond.

Burned bridges and the effect of heavy rains on the roads slowed Shields’ progress. Desperate to catch his quarry, he sent his two lead brigades forward, but the other two struggled through the morass. Tyler would be in overall command of the advanced force while retaining command of his own brigade. After a failed attempt by his attached cavalry to capture Jackson’s wagon train in Port Republic the morning of June 8th, he deployed between the Shenandoah South Fork and the Blue Ridge, expecting the rest of the division to soon arrive.  It didn’t. When Fremont failed to pin Ewell’s troops the next day, Tyler was left alone to face the bulk of Jackson’s army.

Jackson had to cross the swollen South River, however. A rickety bridge built on partially submerged wagons permitted only a slow build-up on the east bank. The result was a piecemeal attack. Tyler inflicted grievous wounds on the lead regiments of the Stonewall Brigade, counterattacking at the height of the struggle. But Taylor’s Louisianans were just then outflanking the Coaling, a Blue Ridge spur that anchored the Union left, and two of Ewell’s brigades hit the attacking Yankees in the flank. Tyler did not give up easily, his battery on the Coaling changing ownership five times. His splintered line finally dissolved under the converging pressures. 450 of his men were captured, and he lost more than a thousand in total. But his stubborn resistance cost Jackson 800 killed and wounded.

Tyler saw further action at Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. His brigade disbanded when his two-year enlistees mustered out in June, 1863. Tyler was then assigned the defense of Baltimore, but fate intervened to again link him with events in the Shenandoah. When Jubal Early stormed across Maryland in July, 1864, after clearing the valley of Union troops, Lew Wallace opposed him at the Monocacy River. In Wallace’s scratch force Tyler commanded the “1st Separate Brigade”, composed mainly of 100-day enlistees.

Death Valley takes a dual look at Tyler’s stand near Port Republic, with a historical scenario focusing on the battle itself, while a June 9th scenario includes the aftermath of Cross Keys, as well. The latter simultaneously serves as a “what if”, as the Confederate player is by no means compelled to adopt the approach Jackson chose that day.

New Market, May 15th, 1864

Franz Sigel was another “political” general who remained in command in 1864 after a varied record in both the western and eastern theaters. At Wilson’s Creek in 1861 his brigade routed after scoring an initial success. The battle of Pea Ridge, fought the following March, was the high point of Sigel’s career, but his performance at 2nd Bull Run later in 1862 was only adequate.

Up for reelection in 1864, Lincoln needed the German-American vote. Sigel was still a darling of the immigrant community, having fought (ineffectually) for the German revolutionaries in 1848. Thus, Lincoln prevailed upon the War Department to give Sigel command in the Shenandoah. His mission was to move up the Valley, defeat the Confederate forces there, and threaten Robert E. Lee’s strategic left flank (Lynchburg and the Virginia Central Railroad), while the Armies of the Potomac and the James drove for Richmond.

Sigel’s opponent, John C. Breckinridge, was another political general but a decidedly different animal. Confederate cavalry dogged the Yankee advance up the valley, and well before reaching New Market Sigel’s cavalry had been twice defeated. That need not have sealed his fate, but his failure to concentrate his command did. Sending half his troops forward to New Market, he held the balance of his force several miles back, and he himself did not arrive on the field until well after the battle started. This allowed Breckinridge’s fully assembled troops to gain ground against the Union advance guard. Sigel then made matters worse. He not only sent his reserve forward in driblets, but launched separate attacks, the first with his cavalry, the next with his infantry. The Confederates repulsed both despite having endured severe punishment from Sigel’s artillery. Breckinridge then counterpunched, routing the Yankees.

After the battle Sigel endured a storm of criticism. He was relieved of his command but put in charge of the Middle Department’s reserve division, composed of short-term enlistees. Later that summer he was unable to slow Jubal Early’s progress down the Shenandoah en route to Maryland. Election or no election, Sigel was finished as a battlefield commander.

2nd Kernstown, July 24th, 1864

Colonel James A. Mulligan was a hero twice over. In September, 1861, one month after the battle of Wilson’s Creek, he commanded the 3,500-strong garrison of the entrenched Union post at Lexington, Missouri, a stone’s throw from the Missouri River. Confederate fortunes in this border state were at their zenith, and up from the south came Sterling Price, former governor, at the head of 12,000 “Missouri State Guards”, the state’s pro-southern militia. Mulligan refused to budge, and Price laid siege to his position on the 13th. Despite a heavy assault on the 18th, the Yankees held out. Price’s men advanced by pushing hemp bales ahead of them, soaking them in river water to keep enemy fire from igniting them. With his men suffering shortages of all kinds and the military situation now hopeless, Mulligan surrendered on the 20th.

He was exchanged soon afterward and spent over two years on such varied tasks as commanding Camp Douglas, a prisoner-of-war camp in Illinois, and engineering duties in West Virginia. When war again came to the Shenandoah in the summer of 1864, General George Crook created a diminutive third division for him in the Army of the Kanawha, later also known as the Army of West Virginia. When Jubal Early surprised Crook on July 24th at Kernstown, Mulligan’s division was positioned near Pritchard’s Hill, not far from where Nathan Kimball had watched Stonewall Jackson deploy his troops almost two and a half years before.

This 2nd Battle of Kernstown, however, would resemble its predecessor in no other particular. The Confederates came on in overwhelming force against Crook’s advance elements. Mulligan’s troops held in the face of frontal assaults by Ramseur’s and Gordon’s divisions, but crumpled when Wharton’s division emerged from behind a rise and hit their left flank. Mulligan ordered a retreat and had accompanied his men only a short distance when he was hit in the thigh. His men refused to leave him, thus giving Early’s men a dense target. Mulligan was hit twice more and died two days later.

His wife, Marian, arrived late that night, hoping to care for him but instead learning the worst. She brought his body back to Chicago, his home town. Thousands of Chicagoans turned out to greet their fallen hero.

Death Valley includes a full battle scenario for 2nd Kernstown, as well as two shorter scenarios that begin the action at critical points during the day’s action.

3rd Winchester, September 19th, 1864

William Emory commanded the XIX Corps in Sheridan’s army. He brought a solid enough record with him to the Shenandoah, except for his rumored “timid counsels” during the Red River campaign earlier in 1864. Whether those rumors were deserved or not, Emory seemed to lose his grip when John Gordon’s division hit XIX Corps hard at 3rd Winchester. His loss of confidence was infectious and partially crippled Sheridan’s efforts that day. It was only when George Crook’s troops finally advanced on Emory’s right that the Confederate line started to waver.

Death Valley‘s “3rd Winchester” rules deal with this lapse. The first time one of Emory’s brigades becomes “Combat Ineffective”, Emory can no longer automatically issue Attack Orders during the Division Orders Phase. Instead, he must first pass a roll on the Brigade Orders Change table. If the result of the roll includes a “Stand” component, it affects his entire corps. If he rolls a Loose Cannon, his entire corps retreats one hex, as if he were a “Cautious” brigadier.

This rule, “Emory Loses Heart”, applies to all three of the longer3rd Winchester scenarios, but to no others. At Fisher’s Hill XIX Corps faced the most formidable part of the Confederate line, and thus could not shine the way Crook’s Army of West Virginia did, but acquitted itself well. Likewise, at Cedar Creek Early’s surprise attack managed to scatter XIX Corps after routing Crook’s troops, but Emory’s troops rallied during the course of the battle and played a key part in Sheridan’s afternoon counterattack.

Fisher’s Hill, September 22, 1864

George Crook, a soldier all his adult life, served in the Pacific Northwest until called east at the start of the Civil War. From leading an Ohio regiment he rose to command the Kanawha Division. In early 1864 he was ordered to strike the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, destroy the salt works at Saltville, Virginia, and then link up with Sigel’s force in the Shenandoah. After initial success Crook intercepted a communication falsely reporting that Grant had suffered a severe defeat in the Wilderness. Rather than attempt to join Sigel, he retreated back to West Virginia.

Later that year his command, now styled the “Army of West Virginia”, was sent to the Shenandoah along with the VI and XIX Corps, which had pursued Jubal Early all the way from Washington, D.C., following the battles of Monocacy and Fort Stevens. With Early seemingly in retreat toward Richmond and Grant short of troops at Petersburg, VI and XIX Corps soon left the Valley. Unfortunately for Crook, Early was not retreating, and on July 24th struck with a significant numerical advantage. The result was one of the easiest and most lopsided southern victories of the war.

Crook’s troops partially evened the score at 3rd Winchester, coming in on Emory’s right and crossing a swampy stretch of Red Bud Run to reach the Confederates’ left flank. Their pressure here pinned Early’s troops and rendered them vulnerable to Sheridan’s coup de grace, a massed cavalry attack against the enemy’s far left.

But it was at Fisher’s Hill three days later that Crook and his men fully avenged their July debacle. Sheridan sought to outflank Early’s line by sending a force to the right, along the lower slopes of Little North Mountain, and then wheeling left to hit the enemy’s lightly defended left flank. What better force than the Army of West Virginia, with its wealth of experience fighting in hilly terrain? Crook’s men executed the turning movement after making a covered approach, and were thus able to take Early by surprise. The attack caved in the Rebel left and led to a victory more sweeping than that of 3rd Winchester.

Crook wasn’t quite finished with the Valley Army, or perhaps it’s more accurate to say that the Valley Army wasn’t finished with him. A little less than a month later, Early’s desperate men suddenly emerged from the fog and overran Crook’s outposts and camps near Cedar Creek. Crook’s men truly had no chance of defending themselves, and it is a tribute to their spirit that they rallied sufficiently to form a reserve when Sheridan launched his late afternoon counterattack.

Cedar Creek, October 19th, 1864

History celebrates Phil Sheridan‘s 1864 performance in the Valley the way it does Jackson’s 1862 Shenandoah campaign. Having done well in the western theater, Sheridan was one of Grant’s favorites and came east with his boss in early 1864. Given command of the Army of the Potomac’s cavalry corps, Sheridan enjoyed Grant’s backing when strife broke out with George Meade. Sheridan went on to defeat Jeb Stuart at Yellow Tavern in May, justifying Grant’s confidence in him.

Although Sheridan fell short of success at Trevilian Station the following month, he was Grant’s choice to head the Department of the Shenandoah later that summer. Jubal Early’s marauding demanded a greater Union effort there, and Grant gave Sheridan ample means to clear the valley of the enemy.

Despite heavy losses suffered at 3rd Winchester and Cedar Creek, Sheridan was one of the Civil War’s foremost troop commanders. Death Valley reflects this by assigning him an Initiative Rating of “2”, quite high for GBACW (but exceeded by Robert E. Lee’s “3” in Red Badge of Courage). That should prove to be a Union advantage in all three of Death Valley‘s later 1864 battles. Additionally, the Cedar Creek “full battle” scenario honors Sheridan’s famous “Ride” after his late arrival from Winchester. Popularly thought to have turned the tide of that battle, it is clear from Theodore Mahr’s The Battle of Cedar Creek that Sheridan did indeed electrify the beaten Union troops. In Death Valley the “Ride” is abstract, with Sheridan’s arrival on the battlefield relieving his battered army of various disadvantages it bears until then.

Sheridan wasn’t perfect, however.  At times he could be headstrong. William Dwight, in command of XIX Corps’ 1st division, was relieved after 3rd Winchester for making nasty remarks about the performance of Curier Grover, commanding XIX Corps’ other division. But upon arriving at Cedar Creek, Sheridan reinstated Dwight, warts and all. So it is in Death Valley‘s treatment of the battle, where Dwight is not the best of division leaders.

One last thing about Sheridan:  there’s a potential price to be paid when you’re the idol of your troops. Losing Sheridan to Fire or Shock Table results will severely compromise Union chances of victory.

Conclusions

Nathan Kimball and Erastus Tyler notwithstanding, it appears evident that Jackson’s success in 1862 had something to do with the mediocre leadership opposing him. But does that subtract from his record or that of his army? It was Jackson’s unrelenting spirit that pushed his men to march and fight harder than their opponents. Those opponents always outnumbered the Valley Army in the aggregate, but were never able to combine against it. Instead, Jackson outnumbered his foes at McDowell, Winchester, and Port Republic, three of the 1862 campaign’s five large engagements. His success in repeatedly concentrating superior numbers at decisive points stands as Jackson’s greatest achievement.

The 1864 campaign was at least as fast-paced as its predecessor, with no less than 10 major engagements over a six-month period (only half of which are represented in Death Valley). It was more of a roller-coaster ride than the 1862 campaign, with several dramatic reversals of fortune during its course, including two on the final day at Cedar Creek. Union leadership was not without its faults, but it had greatly improved. Sheridan’s army was no larger than the total forces arrayed against Jackson in 1862, but “Little Phil” kept it concentrated and finished with three spectacular victories, earning his place in the northern pantheon.

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